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INTRODUCTION
The intersection of the patent and antitrust laws presents a formi-
dable paradox. The patent laws increase invention and innovation by
offering inventors a right to exclude. The antitrust laws foster compe-
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tition, sometimes through the condemnation of such exclusion. As
patents become ever more important in our information-based econ-
omy, the significance of the conflict between the patent and antitrust
laws will only increase.
Courts and commentators have struggled with this paradox for
generations. They have experimented with an array of disparate tests
to determine, for example, when a company's reliance on its patents
should immunize it from the antitrust offense of monopolization.
Courts have applied rebuttable presumptions, emphasized the "scope"
of the patent, examined the defendant's intent, and questioned
whether an "essential facility" was denied. These various tests not only
have dashed any hopes of predictability but also have failed to wrestle
with the fundamental tension between the patent and antitrust laws.'
Moreover, the tests are both overinclusive and underinclusive in
targeting activity that harms welfare.2 Some of the tests are overinclu-
The courts also have ignored the most thoughtful literature in the field, refusing
even to acknowledge the tests offered in the seminal approaches to the intersection:
WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL, at xii (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 313 (1966); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-
Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisa4 97 HARv. L. REv. 1813, 1820 (1984). For a discus-
sion of this literature, see infra Parts I.C.4-.6.
This Article will refer to "welfare" to signify "total welfare," or the sum of con-
sumer surplus and producer surplus. Stated most simply, producer surplus consists of
an aggregation of the differences between the price at which producers would be will-
ing to sell the product and the market price. See generally HAL R. VARIAN,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 256-57 (5th ed. 1999); Peter
J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge
of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REv. 849, 858 (2000). Consumer sur-
plus (sometimes referred to as consumer welfare) refers to an aggregation of the dif-
ferences between what consumers would be willing to spend for goods and the market
price. See generally VARIAN, supra, at 247. The terms are often used imprecisely, in par-
ticular as antitrust commentators refer to "consumer welfare" when, because they also
are considering producer surplus, they mean "total welfare." See Robert H. Bork, Legis-
lative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9J.L. & ECON. 7, 7-10 (1966). This Article
will refer most generally to the positive effects on welfare (or total welfare) of the anti-
trust and patent laws, and will not trace the precise contributions to welfare attribut-
able to consumer or producer surplus.
Although the antitrust laws conceivably could promote other goals, such as "the
political and social values of dispersed control over economic resources, multiple
choices for producers and consumers free of the arbitrary dictates of monopolies or
cartels, equal opportunity, and 'fairness' in economic dealings," PHILLIP AREEDA &
LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 49 (5th ed. 1997),
this Article will focus on the objective of increasing total economic welfare. It concen-
trates on this objective because of the difficulties in simultaneously promoting eco-
nomic and noneconomic goals, the contribution to noneconomic objectives from the
pursuit of economic ends, and the inconsistencies among the various noneconomic
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sive in condemning conduct that has no adverse effect on welfare.
For example, a company's intent to exclude typically reveals nothing
more than an unexceptional desire to defeat its competitors. By pe-
nalizing the right to exclude, courts engaging in this type of inquiry
take direct aim at the modus operandi of the patent laws.
At the same time, some of the tests are underinclusive in their
blind deference to the patent laws. To state that action within the
scope of the patent should automatically be immune from antitrust
scrutiny (so the incentives underlying the patent system are not dimin-
ished) "solves" the patent-antitrust conflict only by according priority
to the patent laws. This purported solution amounts to an assumption
that the increase in welfare from safeguarding the patentee's right to
exclude will always outweigh the increase that would have resulted
from antitrust's enhanced competition. Such an approach ensures
that only the patent, rather than the antitrust, path to innovation will
be traversed. In short, courts' approaches to the patent-antitrust in-
tersection fail to recognize the two independent paths to innovation
and fail to articulate a framework that conceivably could be used to
maximize (or at least to increase) welfare.
This Article proposes a new reconciliation of the patent and anti-
trust laws. It proffers a common denominator by which the laws can
be measured and compared: innovation. It also recognizes that inno-
vation is achieved through different routes in different industries and
thus adjusts the antitrust analysis based on the industry. For example,
3it counsels courts to defer to patents in industries in which patents
are critical to innovation, such as pharmaceuticals. And it anticipates
a more significant role for the antitrust laws in industries in which the
market provides the incentives to innovate, such as computer soft-
ware.
Part I of this Article sketches the dimensions of the conflict be-
tween the patent system and the antitrust laws, both in theory and
objectives. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 100, at 5, 110, at 96, 111, at 97-
115 (2d ed. 2000) (stating that populist goals should not be considered in formulating
antitrust rules since antitrust courts cannot promote these goals when they conflict
with economic efficiency, and "even where there is no evident conflict... [they] would
multiply legal uncertainties and threaten inefficiencies not easily recognized or
proved"); see also, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Con-
sumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1021 (1987) ("[T]he
purely economic goals of antitrust, properly defined, embrace most of what a progres-
sive antitrust policy requires.").
3 As explained in greater detail infra Part lI.B.2.a, because of the indeterminate
nature of the Sherman Act, courts have been the primary expositors of antitrust law.
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through a hypothetical example. Part I then surveys representative
approaches to the intersection that courts have taken and rejects pro
posed solutions to the conflict that courts and commentators have of-
fered.
Part II begins the process of reconciling the patent and antitrust
laws by introducing the common denominator of innovation. Part II
grounds this selection in the text and legislative history of the statutes
and the relevantjurisprudence and economic theory.
Part III sets forth the test that courts should apply when evaluating
monopolists' patent-based activity under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. Introduced at its most general level, the test takes the form of a
rebuttable presumption that proceeds in three steps: (1) a presump-
tion that, as long as the monopolist has a justification for the patent-
based action other than harming competitors, the conduct is lawful;
(2) a rebuttal if competition (and not patents) is responsible for inno-
vation in the industry; and (3) a surrebuttal by which the monopolist
can demonstrate that the relevant market in the industry is character-
ized by innovation. Courts are to determine whether the rebuttal ap-
plies based on an evaluation of three ex ante factors-the presence of
market-based incentives to innovate, the ease of creating the patented
product, and the difficulty of imitating the product-and the ex post
factor of the cumulative nature of innovation in the industry. If both
the ex ante and ex post factors reveal the primacy of competition in
attaining innovation in an industry, then the rebuttal will be met. Part
III concludes by applying the test to three hypothetical patentee mo-
nopolists: the Bully Monopolist, the Biopharmaceutical Patentee, and
the Internet Auctioneer.
Part IV responds to anticipated objections to the proposal. First, it
contends that courts are able to apply the test. Second, it demon-
strates that any reduction in the incentives underlying the patent sys-
tem resulting from the application of the test would be minor and not
cause for concern. Third, it explains why the proposal is superior to
readjustments to the patent system alone.
2002]
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I. THE PROBLEM: A CONFLICT AND No EASY RECONCILIATION
A. The Patent-Antitrust Conflict4
1. Different Paths to Welfare
On their broadest level, the patent and antitrust laws both en-
deavor to increase welfare.' But the paths by which they pursue this
objective frequently diverge.
The primary purpose of the patent system is straightforward.6 In-
ventors and investors expend substantial resources in creating and de-
veloping inventions. Conducting research and development and
bringing an invention to market often are lengthy and expensive pro-
4 The elucidation of a conflict between the patent and antitrust laws requires cer-
tain caveats. In many cases, the laws will not conflict. For example, a company's pure
exclusion of competitors will not implicate the antitrust laws if that company lacks mo-
nopoly power. Any "conflict" also must be situated in the context in which it will typi-
cally arise: a continually developing antitrust common law that, in certain of its itera-
tions, affects patents. Of course, the conflict also should be recognized as a
consequence of the categorization-in fact, the creation-of laws of "antitrust" and
"intellectual property." A different categorization might have avoided the conflict
(while creating other difficulties). The present categorization nonetheless implicates
the larger issue, one lying beyond the scope of this Article, of the manner in which an-
titrust law might affect parties' property rights.
SeeSherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (prohibiting trusts in restraint
of trade and monopolies); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Star. 109 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (1994)) (granting patents to inventors and discover-
ers of new and useful processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter);
see also BOWMAN, supra note 1, at I ("Both antitrust law and patent law have a common
central economic goal: to maximize wealth by producing what consumers want at the
lowest cost." (emphasis omitted)).
6 The justification advanced in the text is the standard "utilitarian" justification
that courts and commentators have articulated and that the Constitution contem-
plates. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also, e.g.,
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 621-24 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the logic of granting protection from
competition with patents). Other conceivable (but much less frequently voiced) justi-
fications for the intellectual property system (though not the patent system) include
the "moral rights" approach, see Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study
in the Law of Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) (describing
a creative act as an extension of an individual's identity); the related "natural rights"
approach, seeJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laskett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (stating that individuals are entitled to the fruits of
their labor, as long as others are not worse off as a result of the privatization); and the
"personhood perspective," see MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957, 957 (1982) (stating that an individual needs control over resources in the
external environment that take the form of property rights).
[Vol. 150: 761
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cesses, with no guarantees of success at the end of the tunnel. And on
those occasions when success is achieved, "free riders" who did not
make any such investments might imitate the hard-earned innovation
and appropriate its value for themselves. Such activity would tend to
deter future inventors and investors, thereby reducing innovation.7
To prevent this, the patent laws promise inventors a right to exclude
for a period of twenty years,8 a right that permits inventors to charge
prices higher than their postinvention costs, thereby allowing them to
recover profits in excess of the value of their front-end investments.9
The right to exclude thus is designed to increase appropriability and
thereby the level of invention in society.
The unique characteristics of intellectual property support the
right to exclude and shed light on the tension between the patent and
antitrust laws. First, intellectual property is a public good. That is, it is
nonrival (consumption by one person does not leave any less of the
good to be consumed by others) and nonexclusive (others cannot be
excluded from consuming it).' ° As a result of these characteristics,
public goods tend to be underproduced and subject to free riders,
who are tempted to imitate the invention after it has been devel-
oped." Second, the value of intellectual property often is uncertain,
7 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23J. LEGAL STUD.
247, 247 (1994) (describing the "appropriability problem" that occurs where a firm
fails to recover invention costs due to the inadequate protection of information). For
a discussion of the concepts of invention and innovation, see infta note 180.
8 For a discussion of the duration of the right to exclude, see infra note 370 and
accompanying text.
9 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 6, at 622 ("[A]n ... inventor ... must expect
that once commercialization occurs, product prices can be held above postinvention
production and marketing costs long enough so that the discounted present value of
the profits ... will exceed the value of the front-end investment."). Firms patent not
only to prevent copying and to recover their development costs, but also, for example,
to establish bargaining positions in cross-licensing agreements and to block rival pat-
ents on related innovations. See infra note 275 for a discussion of other reasons a firm
may seek patents.
10 SeeYochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Information
Goods Versus the Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 267, 270-71 n.9
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter EXPANDING BOUNDARIES]
("A pure public good is one that is nonexcludable and nonrivalrous."); see also DONALD
S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 58-59 (1998) (discussing the two charac-
teristics of public goods); Tracy R. Lewis & Dennis A. Yao, Some Reflections on the Anti-
trust Treatment of Intellectual Property, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 606 (1995) ("Unlike private
property, it is difficult to control the use and dissemination of intellectual property
once it is released.").
11 CHISUM ET AL., supra note 10, at 59; see also Nancy T. Gallini & MichaelJ. Trebil-
cock, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Eco-
20021
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most notably because of its novelty and information asymmetry. 2
From an antitrust perspective, therefore, it is difficult for enforcers
and courts to determine the effect of particular practices involving in-
tellectual property on welfare.
The antitrust laws, on the other hand, scrutinize activity that re-
stricts competition. The rationale of the laws is that competition leads
to lower prices, higher output, and more innovation, and that certain
agreements between competitors or conduct by monopolists prevents
consumers from enjoying these benefits.' 3 Because, for example, mo-
nopolists lack the constraints provided by competitive markets, they
often reduce output, raise prices, limit innovation (so as not to intro-
duce products that might dislodge their market position), and fail to
allocate resources to the uses most highly valued by consumers.14 But
many acts undertaken by patentee monopolists or agreements be-
tween patentees and licensees restrict competition by their very opera-
tion. For example, patentees may refuse to use or license their pat-
ent or may impose quantity restrictions, royalty payments,
grantbacks,16 territorial restrictions," or field of use restrictions"' on
nomic and Legal Issues, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 17, 17 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds.,
1998) ("Intellectual property embodies information that is a public good: an inves-
tor's consumption of the information does not preclude others from consuming it and
so, in the absence of property rights, an innovation will be imitated.").
12 See Lewis & Yao, supra note 10, at 605 (stating that the novelty of intellectual
property "implies that the uses and future development potential" of the property are
not well-known and that information asymmetry results from the inventor knowing
more about the characteristics of the property than do potential licensees or antitrust
agencies).
13 See BOWMAN, supra note 1, at I ("[Mionopoly makes it possible to restrict output
and raise prices so that consumers pay more for and get less of the things they want
most."); Baxter, supra note 1, at 305 ("The effect of monopoly is to lessen output, raise
prices, increase returns to producers and diminish social utility ... ").
14 BOWMAN, supra note 1, at 1; VARIAN, supra note 2, at 420-24; Baxter, supra note
1, at 305. But seeJOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 87-
106 (3d ed. 1950) (arguing that in cases in which monopolists have "superior meth-
ods" available to them than those afforded to a "crowd of competitors," the theory that
the monopoly price is higher and the monopoly output is lower does not hold).
15 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (4) (1994).
16 Grantbacks are arrangements by which a licensee agrees to extend to the licen-
sor of intellectual property the right to use the licensee's improvements to the licensed
technology. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5.6 (1995) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES].
17 The patent statute permits the exclusive licensing of a patent to "the whole or
any specified part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
Such a restriction limits the licensee's use of the patented invention to one or
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licensees. Activity that may be encouraged under the patent system
frequently raises the suspicion of the antitrust laws by reducing com-
petition.
The provision of the antitrust laws that targets monopolies, Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, exposes this tension most dramatically in
focusing on the actions of a single firm. A court may view a company's
refusal to share its patented product as predatory conduct justifying a
Section 2 violation, even if the action is perfectly lawful under the pat-
ent laws. And as courts employ tests that fail to acknowledge the
beneficial purposes of patents, such as those focusing on the intent of
the monopolist, a change in the market, or the denial of an essential
facility, patents may get short shrift.19
more specified fields. See, e.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S.
175, 179-82 (1938) (holding that a licensee's leasing of amplifiers for use in theaters
violated the patent's restriction against commercial use).
19 For several reasons, Section 2 of the Sherman Act will be the primary vantage
point of this Article in exploring the patent-antitrust intersection. Section 2 punishes
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 1997).
First, the type of conduct at issue in a Section 2 case presents the conflict most di-
rectly. Only under Section 2 may a firm's unilateral invocation of its right to exclude-
the modus operandi of the patent laws-lead to condemnation. In contrast, Section 1
of the Sherman Act applies to agreements, in which the objectionable conduct relates
to actions other than pure exclusion. Courts also must be careful not to condemn uni-
lateral actions such as excluding competitors or raising prices that, while initially ap-
pearing suspicious, may be consistent with vigorous patent-based activity. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 4 (1984) ("The tradition [of in-
hospitality] is that judges view each business practice with suspicion .... If the defen-
dant cannot convince the judge that its practices are an essential feature of competi-
tion, the judge forbids their use.").
Second, analysis under Section 2 proves insightful because of the provision's
amorphous jurisprudence. Courts interpreting Section 2 all begin with the same test:
an antitrust plaintiff must show "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acu-
men, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966). But the similarities among courts' Section 2 analyses end with the recitation of
the test. As discussed infra Part I.B., courts have applied an array of tests, in some of
which they defer to the patent, but in many of which they shoehorn the patent-based
nature of the act into a generic Section 2 analysis. In contrast, Section 1, as currently
interpreted, offers more specific and manageable tests for courts to apply. For exam-
ple, tying has its four-part (sometimes five-part) test; exclusive dealing focuses on the
degree of foreclosure in the relevant market; and price fixing is per se unlawful. See,
e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. ("Kodak 1'), 504 U.S. 451, 461-
62 (1992) (describing the elements of a tying claim as including (1) two separate
products, (2) coercion, (3) market power in the tying product market, and (4) a not
insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product market); Fortner Enter., Inc. v.
2002]
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Another lens through which to view the tension between the pat-
ent and antitrust laws involves the balance between static and dynamic
efficiency. In interpreting antitrust law, courts have focused primarily
on static efficiency-in other words, on increasing economic welfare
through a reallocation of the existing supply of resources in a Pareto-
optimal fashion (i.e., so that no individual's welfare could be im-
proved by a resource reallocation without some other person's welfare
being diminished). ° In particular, courts analyze allocative efficiency,
21striving for an optimal allocation of goods and services to customers.
Patent law, on the other hand, attempts to increase dynamic effi-
ciency, or the Pareto-optimal allocation of resources between the pre-
U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969) (indicating the elements of a tying
claim); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961) ("The remain-
ing determination [after finding an exclusive-dealing arrangement] ... is whether the
pre-emption of competition ... tends to substantially foreclose competition in the
relevant ... market."); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218
(1940) ("[Flor over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation ad-
hered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act .. "). As a result, courts interpreting Section 1 do not have the flexibil-
ity to fashion a series of tests differentially affecting patents as they do under Section 2.
Third, courts are forced to confront the patent-based nature of the defendant's
activity more frequently in Section 2 cases than under other antitrust provisions. Be-
cause Section 2 focuses on the unilateral activity of the defendant, courts sometimes
(even if less often than they should) analyze the nature of the activity-exploring, for
example, the justifications for a patentee monopolist's refusal to deal with competitors.
Under Section 1, in contrast, the court first applies unexceptional, nonpatent-based
standards, such as the extent to which the market is foreclosed by an agreement. The
patent-based nature of the activity comes into play, if at all, only when courts consider
the procompetitive justifications for the agreement. This late consideration becomes
dispositive when it never even is reached: most courts dispose of Section 1 cases by
finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove an anticompetitive effect and by never
reaching the issue of procompetitive effects. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of
Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1268 (finding that courts have
disposed of eighty-four percent of Rule of Reason cases in the modern era on the
grounds that the plaintiff could not demonstrate an anticompetitive effect).
In short, Section 2 offers the best perch from which to explore the patent-antitrust
conflict. The unilateral activity at issue frequently calls for a direct focus on the patent-
based nature of the conduct. The courts have created tests that either ignore or defer
excessively to the incentives underlying the patent system. The exclusion promised
under the patent laws is punished under the antitrust laws. And as the courts are
tossed between the powerful conflicting waves of patent and antitrust, the dim light-
house signal provided by Section 2 fades to black.
20W. KIp ViscusI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 75-76 (3d
ed. 2000); Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom. 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2551 n.99 (1997).
21 Antitrust courts could reduce the tension between the laws by focusing on dy-
namic efficiency (for example, by endeavoring to increase innovation).
[Vol. 150:761
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sent and the future . The incentives underlying the patent system
apply in the long term through the encouragement of future inven-
tion and innovation. Although courts that have analyzed the patent-
antitrust intersection have not focused explicitly on the tradeoffs be-
tween static and dynamic efficiency, the disparate temporal perspec-
tives provided by the distinct notions of efficiency further underscore
the patent-antitrust conflict.
2. An Example
A hypothetical example illustrates the conflict. Imagine a bio-
pharmaceutical 21 company that develops a drug, call it "Drug Z," that
treats a particular disease. This company, call it "CureFinder," spent
twelve years and $400 million in bringing the drug to market. It lo-
cated the gene responsible for the disease and the protein coded by
the gene, and it developed, tested, received approval from the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for, and marketed a drug that
appears to cure the disease. CureFinder applied for and received a
patent on Drug Z. And because it is the only drug on the market that
can treat the disease-in other words, there is a lack of substitutability
from the standpoint of patients with the disease-it has monopoly
24
power in the market defined by drugs treating the disease.
2 William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and Static
Inefficiencies?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 82, 83-84 (Thomas
M.Jorde & DavidJ. Teece eds., 1992).
23 The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries are often collectively referred
to as the biopharmaceutical industry. In recent years, particularly due to the rise of
genetic research, there has been a convergence between biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical firms. See Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: Opportunities
and Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive Field, in
EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, supra note 10, at 251, 253 ("Various participants in th[e]
field [of molecular biology and genetics research] .. .have turned to all manner of
joint ventures, research partnerships, strategic alliances, minority equity investments,
and licensing arrangements to speed the process of drug development and to compen-
sate for their lack of internal capabilities."); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation
in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
813, 816-17 (2001) (noting that pharmaceutical research is based on genetic or pro-
teomic information often owned by biotechnology companies and that firms in both
industries have entered into alliances more frequently in recent years).
24 Cf David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical
Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 255, 258 (1999) (stating that "[t]he relevant
product may be defined as narrowly as a specific drug compound or the manner in
which that compound interacts with the body [or even the] once-a-day use of the drug,
where buyers perceive a separate market for different dosage forms," thus limiting the
product market in pharmaceutical mergers to drugs in individual therapeutic catego-
ries); Thomas B. Marcotullio, The Battle Against Drug-Makers: An Analysis of European
2002]
772 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Now assume that a competitor of CureFinder, who will be called
"CureCopier," wishes to obtain access to Drug Z to develop additional
commercial uses for it, such as similar drugs that might cure related
25diseases. Of course, since Drug Z is patented, CureCopier cannot
simply begin to manufacture or use it.26 Nor can it independently dis-
cover or reverse engineer Drug Z. It must receive permission, typically
through a license, from CureFinder before it can use Drug Z. But
CureFinder, having incurred substantial expenditures in developing
the drug, might not wish to share the rewards of its hard-earned labor.
Years and hundreds of millions of dollars went into the discovery and
commercialization of Drug Z, and the patent laws reward such activity
by promising the inventor the right to exploit the invention by exclud-
ing competitors or charging prices higher than its postinvention costs.
In other words, CureFinder can refuse to license the discovery. Or it
can license it on terms that it chooses-say, for a particular price, or
in a certain territory, or for a specific use.
CureFinder refuses to license Drug Z to CureCopier. CureCopier
then sues CureFinder in federal district court, claiming a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.27 It alleges that CureFinder has com-
mitted the offense of monopolization by refusing to license Drug Z.
How should the court rule? Should it conclude that CureFinder did
nothing more than exclude a competitor from its patented product,
as the patent laws anticipate, and that the activity thus does not consti-
tute the exclusionary conduct a monopolist must undertake to violate
Union and United States Merger Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry 1995-1999, 32
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 449, 462 (2001) (noting the absence of cross-elasticity of de-
mand between drugs).
25 Cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1075 (1989) (recommending a new applica-
tion of the experimental use exemption in patent law to subsequent researchers that
compete with the patentee and that seek to achieve further advances in the field of the
invention); Diane Furman, Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Licensing and the Pat-
ent/Regulatory Background, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1998:
PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT'S RIGHTS 7, 24 (P.L.I. Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 514, 1998) (stating that pharmaceutical
companies may license for reasons including "income; unblocking cross-licenses; litiga-
tion avoidance or resolution; [or] because [the] product [is] not a 'fit' with [the] out-
licensing company's marketing focus"). The reader who is skeptical that a pharmaceu-
tical company would license to a competitor may wish to substitute a more "upstream"
relationship, where innovation expenditures are still significant, but licensing is more
widespread.
See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (recounting the purpose of the pat-
ent system).
Alternatively, CureFinder sues CureCopier for patent infringement, and Cure-
Copier files an antitrust counterclaim.
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the antitrust laws? Or should it conclude that CureFinder engaged in
a predatory act by refusing to license a drug essential to compete in
the market, thereby committing the offense of monopolization? What
factors should the court consider in wrestling with the intersection of
the patent and antitrust laws? The markets involved? The industries?
The defendant's intent? Characteristics of the patent?
This Article will develop an approach that courts can utilize in de-
termining whether CureFinder and other patentee monopolists vio-
late Section 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in activities based on
their patents, such as refusals to license. Its primary building block is
the industry, and its goal is to increase innovation. In other words,
the approach examines how innovation is achieved in specific indus-
tries and tailors the analysis of patent-related conduct accordingly, de-
ferring more to patentees in industries in which patents are critical to
innovation than to patentees in industries marked by competition-
centered innovation. But first, it is worth exploring how courts today
would examine the hypothetical offered above. The next section thus
surveys representative cases in which courts have applied varying
methods of analysis to monopolists' patent-based activities under Sec-
tion 2.28
28 The test is designed to apply to all patentee activity challenged under Section 2,
with the examples in this Article focusing on refusals to license. Application of similar
innovation-focused, industry-specific analysis in other contexts, such as mergers or
agreements between competitors, deserves further attention but is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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B. Representative Section 2 Cases
Four cases reveal the diversity of approaches that courts have ap-
plied to monopolists' patent-based activity 0 under Section 2: In re In-
dependent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation ("Xerox") ;31 Image
Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak I/");32 Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp.;33 and United States v. Microsoft Corp.3 4 This Section
will present the courts' analyses and then apply such reasoning to the
hypothetical example offered in the previous section of CureFinder's
29 While Section 2 of the Sherman Act is the primary focus of this Article, some of
the cases discussed in this Section address Section 1, and others arise in the copyright-
antitrust intersection. Although the applicable principles are largely the same, one
distinction lies in the less powerful protection offered by copyright. Unlike patents,
copyrights protect only expression, not ideas, and they do not bar independent discov-
ery. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1997) ("In no case does copyright protection for an origi-
nal work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration, concept, principle, or discovery. ... ); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104
(1879) ("The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to
make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book.");
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) ("It is
axiomatic that copyright does not protect ideas, but only expressions of ideas.").
There are also stronger defenses to copyright infringement, such as the "fair use" de-
fense, which protects use of a copyrighted work "for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997).
Other limiting principles are the "merger" doctrine, which bars copyright protection
when an idea can be expressed in only one or a limited number of ways, see Morrissey
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (denying copyright protec-
tion where "'the topic necessarily requires'... if not only one form of expression, at
best only a limited number" (quoting Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co.,
140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905)); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1192 n.59 (2000); and the sc~nes-A-faire princi-
ple, which refuses to extend copyright protection to the "incidents, characters or set-
tings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treat-
ment of a given topic," Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). As a result of these differences, courts
could conceivably defer to the less potent copyright (and thus not find an antitrust vio-
lation) in circumstances in which they would not defer to the stronger patent (and
thus find an antitrust offense).
30 In interpreting the antitrust laws, courts necessarily have addressed other poten-
tially overlapping statutes, such as the patent laws. See infra note 364 (explaining the
relationship between antitrust and other laws).
31 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
32 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
33 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated, 195 F.3d 1346, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
34 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 61 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact), 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.)
(conclusions of law), affd in part and rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (en





The Federal Circuit's decision in Xerox provides an example of an
approach favoring patentees. The long-running Xerox litigation in-
volved a patentee's refusal to license patented diagnostic parts to or-
35 Before presenting the cases, a quick review of history is in order. In the era
immediately after enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890, courts routinely dismissed
antitrust challenges against patentholders, contending that patents were a form of pri-
vate property that could be utilized however the holder wished. See, e.g., Bement v.
Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902) (upholding a patent pool that set prices and
required members to use technology licensed to the pool, touting "the general rule
[of] absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws"); Heaton-
Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1896)
("[The] exclusive right of use [granted by a patent] is a true and absolute monopoly..
. and this right to monopolize the use of the invention or discovery is the substantial
property right conferred by law, and which the public is under obligation to respect
and protect."); Nat'l Folding-Box & Paper Co. v. Robertson, 99 F. 985, 989 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1900) (holding that the infringer of a patent could not defend his behavior by
claiming that the patent was assigned for the illegal purpose of creating a monopoly
and controlling prices).
From the second decade of the twentieth century until the mid-1970s, courts re-
treated from this immunity, presuming that patents automatically conferred monopoly
power, see, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135
(1969) ("The heart of [the patentee's] legal monopoly is the right to invoke the State's
power to prevent others from utilizing [the patentee's] discovery without . . . con-
sent."); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395 (1947) ("The appellant's pat-
ents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward."); Crown Die & Tool Co.
v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 37 (1923) (referring to "[t]he monopoly thus
granted" by the assignment of a patent), and limiting the "monopoly" granted by the
patent laws to activities within the scope of the patent, see, e.g., United States v. Line
Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (striking down a cross-licensing agreement with
price-fixing provisions because "the possession of a valid patent ... does not give the
patentee any exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of
the patent monopoly"); Int'l Salt, 332 U.S. at 395-96 (invalidating tying arrangement
that included unpatented products). See generally Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. New-
berg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66
ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 170-73 (1997) (discussing the "monopoly granted to the pat-
entee"). Beginning in the late 1970s, the framework of antitrust analysis shifted dra-
matically. Influenced by cases such as Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977), applying the Rule of Reason-rather than per se analysis-to
vertical nonprice restraints; legislation such as the National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984, Pub. L. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1993)); and
the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (codified at
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1994)); and scholars from the "Chicago School," who posited eco-
nomic efficiency as the sole concern of the antitrust laws, antitrust courts relied more
heavily (and exclusively) on economic analysis and on the competitive effects of re-
straints.
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ganizations that provided service or parts for the patentee's product.36
As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc. ("Kodak f'), that one brand of a product
could constitute an antitrust market and that a manufacturer in a
competitive "primary" market thus could have monopoly power in the
"secondary" market of the servicing or parts of its own equipment,37
many manufacturers of durable products requiring service or parts-• 38
such as Xerox-could be treated as monopolists.
Xerox manufactured, sold, and serviced high-volume photocopi-
ers. It instituted a policy of not selling parts for one (and later, all)
of its lines of copiers to independent service organizations (ISOs) un-
S 40less they were also end-users of the copiers. At one point, Xerox cut
41off certain ISOs' abilities to directly purchase such restricted parts.
Xerox also established an "on-site end-user verification" program to
confirm that parts actually were used by end-users.42 A class of ISOs
filed an antitrust lawsuit, and Xerox settled the suit by agreeing to
suspend its parts policy and by licensing its diagnostic software for aperio of " 43
period of time. One ISO opted out of the settlement and filed suit,
alleging that Xerox violated the antitrust laws by setting the prices on
its patented parts higher for ISOs than for end-users in an attempt to
force ISOs to raise their prices. 4  Such conduct ostensibly was de-
signed to eliminate ISOs as competitors in service markets for Xerox
copiers.
The Federal Circuit held that Xerox did not violate Section 2.
The court first held that it would decide questions of preemption and
of the relationship between patent and antitrust law as matters of Fed-
eral Circuit law.45 It then emphasized the centrality of the right to ex-
clude in the patent system before carving out three limited categoriesin which a patentholder would not be immune from antitrust liability:
(1) tying patented and unpatented products; (2) obtaining a patent
36 203 F.3d at 1322.
37 504 U.S. 451, 481-82 (1992).
38 For a discussion of the Kodak case, see infra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.38





44 Id.; see also 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (D. Kan. 1997) (setting forth the factual his-
tory concerning Xerox's efforts to "use price as a weapon to defeat ISO competition in
the service market").
45 203 F.3d at 1325.
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through knowing and willful fraud; and (3) engaging in sham litiga-
tion.4 6 The Federal Circuit also refused to examine the patentee's sub-
jective intent in refusing to deal with a competitor.47 And it confirmed
that action "within the scope" of the patent grant could not violate the
antitrust laws. 8 Because the court concluded that Xerox's refusal to
sell its patented parts did not exceed the scope of the patent grant
and did not fall within any of the three exceptions, it concluded that
Xerox did not violate the antitrust laws. 9
The Xerox approach would apply to the example of CureFinder
posed above in a straightforward manner.5 0 Because CureFinder's re-
fusal to license is within the scope of the patent (in fact, the activity is
as squarely within the scope as can be imagined), because, relatedly,
the company did not engage in any of the three prohibited activities
of tying, fraud in obtaining a patent, or filing sham litigation,1 and
because the court would refuse to examine CureFinder's subjective
motivation for its action, a court following Xerox would find that Cure-
Finder did not violate Section 2.
The Xerox approach has benefits: it typically will promote the in-
centives underlying the patent laws (at least for the initial 
invention)5 2
46 Id. at 1326. "Fraud" is to be determined by reference to the case of Walker Proc-
ess Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). Xerox, 203
F.3d at 1326. To prove the "sham" exception, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
suit is objectively baseless and "motivated by a desire to impose collateral, anti-
competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable legal remedy." Id. (citation omit-
ted).
The court borrowed its exceptions to immunity from the law on patent infringe-
ment lawsuits without examining the relationship between refusals to license and in-
fringement suits. For example, it ignored the First Amendment underpinnings of the
"sham" exception to immunity elaborated in Eastern tR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
MotorFreight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and the different context presented by refusals
to license, in which the exceptions for infringement lawsuits are largely irrelevant.
47 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1327.
48 Id.; see also id. at 1327-28 (refusing to punish any anticompetitive effect resulting
from the refusal to deal as long as it was not "illegally extended beyond the statutory
patent grant").
49 Id. at 1326-28. The court also adopted an approach immunizing copyright-
based action as long as the copyrights were obtained lawfully and were not used to gain
monopoly power beyond the copyright grant. Id. at 1329.
50 Care must be taken in applying a test developed by a court in a particular fac-
tual setting to a different scenario. This concern is partially mollified here by the over-
lap between CureFinder's refusal to license and the refusals to license analyzed by the
court in Xerox (and by courts in the other cases discussed in this Section).
51 Brief consideration of the offenses of tying, fraud in obtaining a patent, and
sham litigation reveals how extreme the conduct must be to not receive immunity un-
der this analysis.
52 See infra Part III.B.2 (noting that, in certain settings, "even if the incentives sup-
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and will offer clarity for monopolists, inventors, and future courts and
lawyers. But the approach resolves the patent-antitrust conflict only by
deferring excessively to the patent: any action within the scope of the
patent is automatically lawful. In fact, even some acts outside the
scope of the patent would be protected under Xerox, since the three
prohibited activities constitute only a subset of acts outside the scope
of the patent.53 In short, the Xerox approach prevents antitrust from
playing any legitimate role in the attempt to increase welfare.i
2. Kodak II
The Ninth Circuit, in Kodak II, addressed another lawsuit brought
by ISOs against the manufacturer of a durable product.5 Kodak
manufactured high volume photocopiers. The market for such copi-
porting the initial patent diminish, those for post-patent innovation likely would in-
crease").
53 The Xerox approach also fails to consider the industry involved or the effects of
the conduct on welfare.
54 For an additional example of a court protecting a patentee monopolist that acts
within the scope of the patent, see United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 648 F.2d
642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981), holding that action outside the patent grant is not protected
and providing examples including tying arrangements, price fixing, "refusing to grant
licenses except upon condition that royalties be paid on unpatented products," and
"attempt[ing] to monopolize an industry by acquiring all present and future patents
relevant to that industry." Some courts have afforded intellectual property monopo-
lists absolute immunity from Section 2. See Miller Insituform, Inc. v. Insituform of N.
Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[A] patentholder who lawfully acquires a
patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for maintaining the
monopoly power he lawfully acquired by refusing to license the patent to others.");
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[W]here a patent has
been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot
trigger any liability under the antitrust laws."); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.,
989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding that there can be no unlawful lever-
aging of monopoly power when a patentholder exercises his patent rights); Tricom,
Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 743 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ("Under patent
and copyright law, [the patentholder] may not be compelled to license its proprietary
software to anyone."); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., No. C93-
20079JW, 1995 WL 798935, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1995) ("[I]t is not a violation of
antitrust law.., to refuse to sell, license or commercially transfer copyrighted informa-
tion to anyone ... even if customers are put in the position of only getting the benefit
of the copyrighted items if they hire [the copyright owners]."); Advanced Computer
Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 370 n.17 (E.D. Va. 1994) (deciding that
protecting a copyright is a valid business justification for limiting a license).
For criticism of the "extremely narrow limits" the Xerox court placed on "a virtually
unfettered right of a patentholder to refuse to deal in order to achieve an anticompeti-
tive objective," see Robert F. Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersec-
tion of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 921 (2001).
5 125 F.3d at 1195.
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ers was competitive, and it included Xerox, IBM, and Canon. 6 Kodak
also sold and installed replacement parts for its equipment; in this ac-
tivity, Kodak competed with ISOs. 5 7 Kodak repaired at least eighty
percent of the machines it manufactured. 58 Although the company
had, at one time, sold parts for repair service to ISOs, it began to re-
strict this practice as competition with the ISOs increased. 59 As a re-
sult of the limited access, ISOs lacked a reliable supply of parts, and so
were not able to compete with Kodak in providing multi-year service
contracts. 6° Several ISOs claimed that the parts shortage forced them
out of business.6 1
The ISOs sued Kodak, claiming that its restrictive parts policy vio-
lated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.12 Although the district
63court granted summary judgment for Kodak, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed,6 4 and the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's rever-
sal. 65 In a landmark ruling on the issue of market power, the Supreme
Court held that one brand of a product could constitute a separate
market and that "the relevant market from the Kodak equipment
owner's perspective is composed of only those companies that service
Kodak machines." 6  The Court explained that even a competitive
primary market would not forestall a finding of market power in af-
termarkets where customers faced "significant information and switch-
ing costs."c7
56 Id. at 1200.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1200-01.
59 Id. at 1201.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17218 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988).
63 Id.
(A 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990).
65 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
66 Id. at 482.
67 Id. at 473. This ruling has made every manufacturer of a durable product re-
quiring servicing or parts a potential monopolist. Of relevance here, many of these
durable products include patented parts. Admittedly, post-Kodak courts have "bent
over backwards to construe Kodak as narrowly as possible." Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-
Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 286; see, e.g.,
SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1999);
Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 515 (3d Cir. 1998);
PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 818-20 (6th Cir. 1997). None-
theless, the Kodak view of market power ensures that patentholders, many of whose
products implicate secondary parts or servicing "markets," will be subject to antitrust
scrutiny and that courts will not be able to avoid the patent-antitrust intersection.
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Upon remand from the Supreme Court, a jury entered a verdict
against Kodak. 8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the verdict.69 To ensure
that the jury would account for the "procompetitive effects and statu-
tory rights extended by the intellectual property laws," the court
adopted the presumption that the First Circuit had set forth in Data
General v. Grumman Systems Support Corp. that a party's "desire to ex-
clude others from [use of] its [protected] work is a presumptively
valid business justification."' ° But the Ninth Circuit held that the pre-
sumption could be rebutted by evidence of pretext." The court ex-
plained: "Neither the aims of intellectual property law, nor the anti-
trust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a pretextual
business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct. 7 2 In applying
its rebuttable presumption, the court found that "the proffered busi-
ness justification played no part in the [defendant's] decision to act."
s7
The court explained that "Kodak photocopy and micrographics
equipment requires thousands of parts, of which only [sixty-five] were
patented" and that Kodak's parts manager testified that patents "did
not cross [his] mind" when the company instituted its parts policy.
74
As a result, the court concluded that "it is more probable than not
that the jury would have found Kodak's presumptively valid business
justification rebutted on the grounds of pretext., 75 Even though the
district court's instructions to the jury "fail[ed] to give any weight" to
Kodak's intellectual property rights, the court concluded that such er-
ror was harmless. 6
How would a court apply the Kodak II approach to CureFinder?
68 No. C-87-1686-AWT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2386, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb 28, 1996).
69 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).
70 Id. at 1218 (citing Data General, 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)). The Data
General court found for a software monopolist that refused to share its diagnostic soft-
ware with ISOs. 36 F.3d at 1189. It elucidated the benefits of such a presumption, ex-
plaining that "antitrust defendants [cannot be required] to prove and reprove the
merits of [the] legislative assumption" that the right to exclude "promotes consumer
welfare ... by encouraging investment in the creation of desirable artistic ... works of
expression ... in every case where a refusal to license a copyrighted work comes under
attack." Id. at 1187. The court, however, never explained precisely how the presump-
tion could be rebutted, stating only that "there may be rare cases in which imposing
antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act." Id. at 1187
n.64.




75 Id. at 1219-20.
76 Id. at 1218.
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As an initial matter, a "presumptively valid business justification"
would apply to CureFinder's refusal to license since the company is
entitled to exclude its competitors in exploiting its patent to recover
its development costs. But the question then would turn to whether
this presumption would be rebutted on the grounds of pretext. Al-
though such inquiries could conceivably be based on objective find-
ings on a lack of business justification, they more frequently devolve
into explorations of subjective intent. In other words, was CureFinder
really relying on its patent in excluding CureCopier, or did it have an
ulterior motive for the refusal to deal? If, for example, the court un-
covers a statement of a company vice president announcing, "We must
quash CureCopier at all costs," the court could be tempted to rule for
the plaintiff, since the refusal to license would appear to be motivated
more by hurting CureCopier than by reaping the rewards of the pat-
ent system. Absent such a "smoking gun," CureFinder could win,
since there would be no apparent pretext to rebut the presumption.
For reasons that will be explained in greater detail below," focusing
on a defendant's subjective intent-where the goal of competition is
to defeat one's competitors, and the modus operandi of the patent
laws is to exclude-presents significant concerns. In short, while the
Kodak /!rebuttable presumption wrestles with the reconciliation of the
antitrust and intellectual property laws, the rebuttal, with its emphasis
on pretext, fails to discern welfare-reducing activity.
3. Intel
The district court in Intel"' demonstrated a third approach, one re-
lying on the "essential facilities" doctrine. Intel is the world's largest
designer, manufacturer, and supplier of high-performance computer
microprocessors, which are often described as the "brains" of a com-
puter that control the central processing of data.79 Intergraph used
Intel microprocessors in the computer workstations that it developed
and sold.80 At one time, Intergraph manufactured microprocessors,
but it then ceased production, converting its products to incorporate
Intel's microprocessors."' It made this transition based on Intel's as-
77 See infra Part I.C.3 (explaining that intent tests prove too much in antitrust law,
particularly where the challenged activity is based on intellectual property).
78 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
79 Id. at 1259.
80 Id. at 1263.
81 Id. at 1264.
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surances that its central processing units (CPUs) could support Inter-
graph's workstations and that it would supply its CPUs to Intergraph
on fair terms.82 But when Intel developed its Pentium II microproces-
sors, it shifted away from the "open architecture" that it had made
available to all participants in the industry and embraced a proprietary
architecture. As a result of this change, computers manufactured by
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) had to meet the technical
requirements of the Intel architecture in order to use Intel micro-
84processors. After this development, an unrelated patent dispute be-
tween the parties arose; as a result, Intergraph filed patent infringe-
ment claims against OEM customers of Intel. Intel responded by
refusing to provide to Intergraph confidential information necessary
for product development that it had previously provided.89 Intergraph
thus was not able to receive advance samples of Intel microprocessors
and could not deploy its products at the same time that competitors
could.86
The court first found that Intel had a monopoly in markets for
CPUs and in markets for Intel CPUs. It then treated Intel's refusal to
deal as the denial of an essential facility." The essential facilities doc-
trine provides that a monopolist cannot deny to its competitors facili-
ties that are necessary to compete in a particular market.8 A plaintiff
relying on the theory must show (1) control of the essential facility by
the monopolist, (2) an inability to duplicate the facility, (3) the denial
of the use of the facility, and (4) the feasibility of providing the facil-
ity.9 The court found that "[r]easonable and timely access to critical
business information that is necessary to compete is an essential facil-
ity. "9' It then elevated the protection of competitors to a critical ob-
jective of the antitrust laws: "[A] monopolist's unilateral refusal to
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1262.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1267.
86 Id. at 1269.
87 Id. at 1275-76.
88 Id. at 1278.
89 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (hold-
ing that an electric utility company could not prevent towns from using its transmission
system after its retail electric power distribution franchise expired).
90 See, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.
1982) (summarizing the four prongs of the essential facilities doctrine necessary-to es-
tablish liability).
91 Intel, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 1278.
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deal violates [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act where such conduct un-
reasonably handicaps competitors or harms competition."92 The court
concluded that Intel withheld an essential facility:
Intel's refusal to supply advanced CPUs and essential technical informa-
tion to Intergraph likely' violates [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act, be-
cause they are not available from alternative sources and cannot be fea-
sibly duplicated, and because competitors cannot effectively compete in the
relevant markets without access to them.
9 4
How would such a version of the essential facilities doctrine apply
to CureFinder? A court applying this approach would consider the
drug withheld by CureFinder to be essential to competition in the
market for drugs curing the disease and potentially in markets for
drugs treating related diseases. Any competitor, like CureCopier, that
would be "unreasonably handicap [ped]" by the refusal to deal could
make out an essential facilities claim under Intel. Just as the Intel court
deemed "critical business information" to be an essential facility,9 so
too would it consider access to a drug to be essential to a competitor.
Thus, CureFinder's refusal to share such an "essential facility" with its
competitors would violate Section 2.
Even though the Intel district court decision was vacated by the
Federal Circuit on the ground that Intel and Intergraph were not
competitors in any relevant market,96 the approach (which has gar-
nered attention in recent years) counsels considerable caution, as it
could apply in any market in which a monopolist relies on intellectual
property, with an excluded party claiming that the property is "essen-
tial" to compete in the market. Because this expansive version of the
92 Id.
93 The court did not definitively find a substantive violation because it considered
the issue in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1258.
94 Id. at 1278 (emphasis added). The court also concluded that Intel "ha[d] no
legitimate business reason to refuse to deal with Intergraph" since it had been a "loyal
and beneficial customer" and the dispute over Intergraph's patent claims "could [have
been] resolved separately without Intel denying Intergraph information it need[ed]."
Id. In addition, the court dismissed any defense based on intellectual property, finding
that Intel "has no legitimate intellectual property basis with which it can refuse to sup-
ply Intel microprocessors and technical information to Intergraph." Id. at 1279. Fi-
nally, the court found that Intel "unlawfully us[ed] its monopoly in the high-
performance CPU relevant market to foreclose or restrain competition by Intergraph
in the graphic subsystem relevant market." Id. at 1278.
95 Id.
% 195 F.3d 1346, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also id. at 1358 ("The district court
erred in holding that Intel's superior microprocessor product and Intergraph's de-
pendency thereon converted Intel's special customer benefits into an 'essential facility'
under the Sherman Act.").
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essential facilities doctrine conflicts with standard antitrust principles
of competition and promises to be overutilized in patent disputes
(since competitors would be excluded by the very patent grant and
since the product often will be helpful in the market), the Intel ap-
97proach to the essential facilities doctrine raises serious questions.
4. Microsoft
The Microsoft case9s has garnered widespread attention as a para-
digmatic case of the application of antitrust to the "new economy."
While the lawsuit against the manufacturer of personal computer op-
erating systems and Internet browsers challenges multiple practices,
this Article will focus on the practice that, by its own terms, directly
implicates the intersection of the antitrust and the intellectual prop-
erty laws.99
97 For additional criticism of this doctrine, see Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:
An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTrrRUST L.J. 841 (1990). See also Abbott B.
Lipsky, Jr., & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1219 (1999)
("[E]ssential facilities principles are inherently inconsistent with intellectual property
protection.").
Another, more restrained, application of the essential facilities doctrine to intel-
lectual property was provided by the court in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems
Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185 (D. Mass. 1991). In that case, the court dismissed an
ISO's claim that a manufacturer's refusal to share a diagnostic tool to be used in re-
pairing its product was an essential facility. Id. The court found that the advantages
enjoyed by the manufacturer, such as earlier development of the diagnostic tool and
contact with the owner of the product, represented only "historic accident-the natu-
ral benefit of being a manufacturer." Id. at 191. The court concluded that the "'bot-
tleneck' of... superior knowledge in the design of [the manufacturer's product] is
insufficient to invoke the essential facilities doctrine; a better mousetrap is not neces-
sarily an essential facility." Id. at 192. The court warned of the dangers of expanding
the essential facilities doctrine:
If manufacturers of complex and innovative systems were required to share
with competitors the development of accessories ... the incentives of copy-
right and patent laws would be severely undermined. Not only would the
manufacturer... have less incentive to [create accessories], but also the impe-
tus for competitors to reverse engineer and produce competing solutions
would be reduced.
Id.
s 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law). Although the appellate
court reversed the district court on certain issues, it affirmed on the issue discussed in
the text. 253 F.3d 34, 59-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
99 Again, the copyright laws are not quite as strong as the patent laws. See supra
note 29 (discussing why courts could conceivably not find an antitrust violation when a
copyrighted-rather than patented-product is involved). So courts that do not defer




One of Microsoft's requirements in distributing its Windows 95
operating system software provided that computer manufacturers
could not modify the "first screen" that users see when turning on the
computer for the first time.'00 Microsoft explained that the restriction
was intended to "prevent OEMs from compromising the quality and
consistency of Windows,"'0' and to "ensure that all Windows users ex-
perience the product the way Microsoft intended it the first time they
turn on their PC systems. ' ' The company alleged that the Copyright
Act allowed it to "prevent licensees . . .from shipping modified ver-
sions of its product without its express permission.'0 3
The district court found that such a "right of integrity" did not
appear in the Copyright Act and that Microsoft was not entitled to a
defense to its "first screen" provision based on its intellectual prop-
erty. °4 It dismissed Microsoft's arguments based on intellectual prop-
erty on several grounds. First, it inquired whether copyright protec-
tion really was necessary: "the removal of the Internet Explorer icon
and the promotion of [Netscape] Navigator in the boot sequence
would not have compromised Microsoft's creative expression or inter-
fered with its ability to reap the legitimate value of its ingenuity and
investment in developing Windows."' 5 Second, it questioned Micro-
soft's "true" purpose, claiming that "the contemporaneous Microsoft
documents reflect concern with the promotion of Navigator rather
than the infringement of a copyright." 6 Third, it distinguished the
cases that upheld a right to integrity by explaining that they were "ac-
tions for infringement without antitrust implications [and so] are in-
00 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 61 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact).
01 Id. at 64. In its findings of fact, the court countered this explanation:
In truth, however, the OEM modifications that Microsoft prohibits would not
compromise the quality or consistency of Windows any more than the modifi-
cations that Microsoft currently permits. Furthermore, to the extent that cer-
tain OEM modifications did threaten to impair the quality and consistency of
Windows, Microsoft's response has been more restrictive than necessary to
abate the threat.
Id.
102 Id. at 65; see also id. ("[A]fter all, there would be little incentive to develop a
high-quality operating-system product if OEMs were free to alter it for the worse before
handing it over to consumers.").
103 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (conclusions of law).
104 Id.
:05 84 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (findings of fact).
Id.; see also 87 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (conclusions of law) (discussing the measures
Microsoft took to increase usage share for Internet Explorer at the expense of Naviga-
tor).
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apposite."1 °7 Fourth, it subordinated intellectual property to antitrust:
"a copyright holder is not by reason thereof entitled to employ the
perquisites in ways that directly threaten competition."'
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court on this issue. Without
analyzing the copyright laws, it quickly dismissed Microsoft's copyright
argument as "frivolous."'0 9 Although it reasonably refused to accept
Microsoft's intellectual property-centric version of the antitrust laws-
by which the exercise of lawfully acquired intellectual property rights
"cannot give rise to antitrust liability"" -it responded with a contrary
blanket assertion that "[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a
privilege to violate the antitrust laws.""'
These responses belie the purposes of the system of intellectual
property. The district court, for example, questioned the company's
business judgments in relying on copyrights; looked for true purposes
in the wreckage wrought by the exclusion lying at the heart of the in-
tellectual property laws; drew meaningless distinctions with analogous
cases (i.e., whether antitrust claims are part of a lawsuit has no bearing
on the policies supporting a right of integrity); and ignored the fun-
damental nature of the intellectual property laws, which, by defini-
tion, promote welfare through exclusion. Many acts based on a patent
or copyright could be characterized as "threaten[ing] competition."
In short, the district court improperly failed to take account of the
purposes underlying the intellectual property laws.''
2
107 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40 n.2 (conclusions of law).
108 Id. at 40.
109 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
110 Id.
ill Id. (citing Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). It bears particular
irony that the court cited the patent-friendly Xerox case for this proposition.
2 just as ominous, the court tied anticompetitive effect to anticompetitive pur-
pose: "Even constitutional privileges confer no immunity when they are abused for
anticompetitive purposes." Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (conclusions of law). Focus-
ing on intent is not the answer in resolving the intellectual property-antitrust conflict.
Infra Part I.C.3.
Another example of a case that emphasized antitrust law at the intersection was
provided by the Federal Circuit in CR. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 1998). In this case, the court found that a monopolist's modification of its
product that offered improvements upon the original product violated Section 2
where it created less compatibility with unpatented complementary assets produced by
competitors. Id. at 1382. The court dismissed the defendant's argument that the
change, constituted an improvement, instead emphasizing subjective evidence-that
the "real reasons" for modification were to harm competitors. Id.
A more nuanced approach was presented in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Industries, Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1979), in which the Third Circuit recog-
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This approach would punish CureFinder and would diminish the
incentives underlying the patent system." 3 "True purposes" for Cure-
Finder's refusal to license would be divined, business judgments to
exploit patents by refusing to deal with competitors would be ques-
tioned, and the right to exclude that forms the foundation of the pat-
ent system would be weakened severely. The Microsoft approach likely
would result in a finding that CureFinder committed a Section 2 viola-
tion based on a suspicious-looking refusal to deal, with a blind eye cast
to the incentives underlying the patent system.
In conclusion, the Xerox, Kodak II, Intel, and Microsoft courts reveal
an array of disparate approaches to the patent-antitrust intersection.
The courts are representative in running the gamut from patent im-
munity to antitrust preeminence. But despite their broad differences,
none of the courts addresses the fundamental question of how to rec-
oncile two very different paths to increased welfare. And none of the
tests seems entirely satisfactory in analyzing CureFinder's refusal to li-
cense. The next Section will introduce the work of commentators in
broadly surveying the landscape of approaches that have been applied
to the patent-antitrust intersection.
C. Proposed Solutions Deconstructed
Although courts and commentators have attempted to resolve the
paradox presented by the intersection of the patent and antitrust laws,
none has offered a satisfactory approach that could be used to analyze
a monopolist's patent-based actions. 1 4 This Section will evaluate six
nized that analyzing the patent-antitrust intersection requires "weigh[ing] the poten-
tial injury to competition... against the risk that the application of antitrust sanctions
will frustrate the purposes of the patent system." The court also explored the eco-
nomic effects of licensing in antitrust markets and held that when a patentee's restric-
tion upon a licensee "results primarily in benefits for the licensee[] rather than the
patentee, the anticompetitive restriction cannot be justified as a subsidy for the pat-
entee's inventive activity." Id. at 1071. Even if it may not always be obvious for whose
primary benefit a restriction is imposed, the court nonetheless deserves credit for be-
ginning to address the difficult issues in the intersection.
13 If the Microsoft court refused to defer to the relatively less potent copyright, it
likely would not have deferred to the stronger patent that CureFinder refused to li-
cense.
14 This Article will examine proposed solutions to the patent-antitrust intersec-
tion. The problem of overly strong patent rights also has engaged commentators who
have recommended adjusting the patent laws. See generally Julie E. Cohen & Mark A.
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approaches. Three of the attempts are characterized by formalistic
analysis that leads to easy answers but fails to grapple with either the
tension between the systems or their effects on welfare in particular
cases. These approaches focus on the scope of the patent, the mar-
kets affected by the activity, and the intent of the defendant. The
other three approaches, offered by respected commentators William
Baxter, Ward Bowman, and Louis Kaplow, present more nuanced
economic analyses-indeed, the most sophisticated constructs that
have been offered to date. But despite their significant contributions,
these solutions neglect certain relevant considerations, avoid industry-
specific analysis, and fail to provide courts with administrable tests.
1. Scope of the Patent
The courts' most popular solution to the patent-antitrust conflict
is centered on the "scope" of the patent. Throughout the past century
and even now, courts have held that a patentee's actions within the
scope of the patent are immune from antitrust scrutiny, while those
outside the scope are invalid." 5 Scope traditionally has been circum-
Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2001)
(advocating narrower patent scope in software industry); O'Rourke, supra note 29
(proposing fair use defense for patent law). Another project worth considering, but
beyond the scope of this Article, would involve the extrapolation of more flexible
copyright doctrines such as those introduced above, see supra note 29 (discussing fair
use defense, idea-expression dichotomy, and merger doctrine), to the patent-antitrust
intersection.
15 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136
(1969) ("[A patentee] may not condition the right to use his patent on [a] licensee's
agreement to purchase, use, or sell, or not to purchase, use, or sell, another article of
commerce not within the scope of his patent monopoly."); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.
United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940) (holding that the patentee's right "to exclude
all others from manufacturing, using, or selling his invention ... is limited by the defi-
nition of his invention, as its boundaries are marked by the specifications and claims of
the patent"); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510
(1917) ("The patent law simply protects [the patentee] in the monopoly of that which
he has invented and has described in the claims of his patent."); Xerox, 203 F.3d at
1327-28 (noticing the "undisputed premise that the patent holder cannot use his statu-
tory right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the
scope of the patent" (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle,
m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (distinguishing the facts of the case
from situations in which "the patentee threatened to extend its monopoly beyond
those rights accruing under the patent"); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981) (listing examples of activity in which "the offending
patentee seeks to do more than enjoy the limited monopoly granted by the patent
laws"); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[W]e hold that
where a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the
patent laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws."). For examples of
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scribed by the claims listed in the specification in the patent applica-
tion .
6
At first, this construct may seem to make some intuitive sense. For
if the challenged act is not within the scope of the grant, then it does
not promote the purposes of the patent system. Inventions that are
novel, nonobvious, and useful enough to receive a patent are the in-• 117
tended target of the incentives underlying the patent laws. The ap-
plication of the antitrust laws to weaken the patent grant in these cases
could adversely affect incentives for future invention in a way that the
commentators who also have offered solutions based on the scope of the patent, see
LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 531 (1977);
Richard M. Buxbaum, Restrictions Inherent in the Patent Monopoly: A Comparative Critique,
113 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 641-45 (1965); andJohn C. Stedman, Patents and Antitrust-The
Impact of Varying Legal Doctrines, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 588, 595.116 According to the statute:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his in-
vention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly point-
ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
117 It is possible that an act within the scope of a patent does not promote maxi-
mum incentives to innovate because either (a) the patent was mistakenly granted
based on an incorrect application of the criteria for patentability or (b) the criteria
themselves do not promote the ideal level of incentives. Focusing attention on the
process by which patents are granted, including challenges facing the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), could decrease the likelihood of the first error. In contrast,
there is no simple answer to the second error.
For example, determining the appropriateness of even a partial modification to
the patent system, such as an increase in patent scope or duration, involves numerous
steps. These steps require the calculation of: (1) the effect of the modification on the
expected profit (in present value terms) of those investing in research and develop-
ment (R&D) and innovation; (2) which increases the amount of funds invested in
R&D; (3) which raises productive (i.e., human) resources allocated to R&D; (4) which
raises the output of novel and useful technological ideas; (5) which leads to an in-
crease in the rate of actual execution of innovations; (6) which raises the productivity
of resources; (7) which increases the gross national product; and (8) which is offset by
the reduction from output restrictions. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC
REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15, at 65 (Comm. Print 1958) (authored by
Fritz Machlup); see also Baxter, supra note 1, at 271 (listing the benefits and costs to
making a marginal change to the patent grant). The length of this chain and lack of
precision of each of the links reveal the difficulty of measuring the effect of even in-
cremental modifications to the patent system. For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween patent-antitrust doctrine and the optimal patent life, see infra note 333.
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application to acts not covered by the claims of the patent application
would not.
But upon reflection, the simplicity of this initial construct be-
comes apparent. For the test really just "solves" the conflict by elevat-
ing patent over antitrust. If the act is within the scope of the patent,
then it is automatically lawful. Q.E.D. While this resolution will often
promote the purposes of the patent laws (at least for initial, as op-
posed to "follow-on," inventors), it leaves no room for antitrust to of-
fer its version of promoting welfare. It cannot be the answer to say
that only the patent laws should be enforced in the attempt to in-
crease welfare.""
Analysis based on the scope of the patent also fails to recognize
industry-specific variations in achieving welfare. For example, the test
does not allow for differentiated analysis between industries in which
patents are essential for innovation (e.g., chemicals) and industries in
which competition (and not patents) is essential for innovation (e.g.,
computer software)."9 The bluntness of the scope test serves to rein-
force the primacy of patents at the patent-antitrust intersection, which
is of particular concern in industries in which patents are not neces-
sary for innovation.
Moreover, the test begs the question of exactly what conduct falls
within the scope of the patent. This is not an easy inquiry. In fact, the
key issue in many patent infringement lawsuits centers on whether an
alleged infringer's product lies within the scope of the patent, with
each party articulating different conceptions-patentee claiming
broad, infringer claiming narrow-of the scope of the patent. The
flexibility of the concept of patent scope provides yet additional impe-
tus for the primacy of patents under the test.
Finally, as explained more fully in the next Section, courts can
utilize the concept of patent scope to rationalize particular market
definitions. The determination of the boundaries of relevant markets
is quite flexible, and the temptation to superimpose inapt concepts of
patent scope onto market boundaries reveals additional apprehension
18 While the "scope" test does not provide the solution to the patent-antitrust in-
tersection, particularly for refusals to deal, it could conceivably be of some assistance in
"tying" claims in shedding light on issues relating to coercion and the number of
products involved.
119 For a fuller explication of these ideas, see infra Part III. Patents could be issued
in industries in which they are not essential to innovation as long as the requirements




with the scope test.
2. Multiple Markets
A second test looks' to the "markets" affected by the intellectual
property grant. Some courts and commentators have contended that
if the monopolist's challenged activity occurs in the same antitrust
market as that contemplated by the intellectual property, then the ac-
tion should be lawful, but if the act occurs in a second market, it
should not be lawful.
There are several concerns with such a test. First, it tempts courts
to analyze scope under the guise of markets. Market definition is of-
ten an uncertain task, as the array of goods or services that consumers
view as economic substitutes may not be obvious. 121 Consequenfly, no-
tions of seemingly unquestionable, exogenously defined patent scopes
could be viewed as lending an added imprimatur to courts' conclu-
sions on market definitions. Yet patents typically do not demonstrate
market power, and the set of technological substitutes that cannot be
practiced because of the patent grant often has little overlap with the
set of products that consumers view as economic substitutes.122 Impor-
120 See, e.g., Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29 ("[Plower gained through some natural
and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to
liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire
into the next."' (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611
(1953))); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Anti-
trust Duty to Deal 9 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 193, 217-18 (1999) ("There should be
no need to give the monopolist additional incentives by permitting the leveraging of its
power in that antitrust market... through a refusal to license its intellectual property
to its competitors in the second market."); David A. Schnider, Licensed to Kill?: The Bat-
tle Between Patent and Antitrust in Monopoly Leveraging Cases, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 857, 876 (1998) (discussing patentholders' "violat[ion of] the spirit of the patent
law" when they use the "unique competitive advantage [provided by the patent laws] to
try to expand their monopoly into downstream markets"). Also:
There is a simple formula that will ensure that the purposes of [the antitrust
and patent] statute[s] are fulfilled. Where there is one market involved, a
patent and/or copyright holder has the exclusive right to exploit his inven-
tion. However, where two markets exist and the patent or copyright holder
seeks to extend his "legal monopoly" into the second market, antitrust liability
is likely.
Ronald S. Katz et al., Intellectual Property v. Antitrust: A False Dilemma, in
ANTITRUST/INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 1, 1
(A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study Materials, No. SD72, 1999).
121 See, e.g., MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
210 (4th ed. 1997) ("In theory and practice, relevant market definition is as difficult an
undertaking as any in antitrust.").
122 See Dam, supra note 7, at 250 ("[L]eading companies may obtain 1,000 or more
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tations of patent scope into market definition would overstate the ac-
tual market power of patentees, who naturally would have monopoly
power in markets circumscribed by patent scope. Such a maneuver
also would expose the patentee to claims of invalid extensions of the
patent grant if the product at issue includes nonpatented in addition
to patented elements. This type of analysis also lapses back into
courts' earlier misconceived notions that patents automatically confer
monopoly power.1
2 5
Second, even if the "multiple markets" test serves, in some cases,
as a proxy for welfare-reducing activity, it is an imperfect proxy.
Patents could, in some instances, be mapped onto more than one an-
titrust market. Because patents only claim inventions, the patent-
holder could prevent each use of the invention in every antitrust mar-
ket in which it is used (or not used).12' For example, the patent could
implicate manufacturing, retail, and service markets. 28  But even if a
patents in a single year, and yet many such firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a sin-
gle monopoly in any market." (footnotes omitted)); Gallini & Trebilcock, supra note
11, at 22 ("[1In a survey of [patent] licensors, there were no close substitutes [for the
patented product] in only 27 percent of cases; whereas in over 29 percent of cases,
they had more than 10 competitors."); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Er-
rors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1727, 1729-38 (2000)
(criticizing "erroneous" assertion by commentators that intellectual property rights are
economic monopolies).
123 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1206
(9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Kodak has "100% monopoly shares for certain parts"
used to repair Kodak copiers).
124 A narrow patent-determined "aftermarket" definition also will deflect attention
from what may often be a competitive primary market.
125 See supra note 35 (noting courts that presumed monopoly power based on the
existence of a patent).
126 Admittedly, a party's use of power in the market in which it has a monopoly to
(at least) attempt to gain a monopoly in a second market may raise concerns. But any
such concerns do not automatically warrant the conclusions that the full breadth of the
patent should not be protected and that the application of Section 2 would increase
welfare.
127 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. ("Xerox"), 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (D.
Kan. 1997); see a/soJames C. Burling et al., The Antitrust Duty to Deal and Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, 24J. CORP. L. 527, 540 (1999) ("[L]everaging does not exist 'when a patent
holder merely exercises its rights inherent in the patent grant."' (footnote omitted)).
128 Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1136; see also id. at 1138 ("The reward for a patented in-
vention is the right to exploit the entire field of the 'invention,' not the right to exploit
the single most analogous antitrust market."). Similarly, copyright owners' activities
relating to the reproduction, distribution, performance, and display of their works of-
ten occurs in more than one antitrust market, and the right to prepare derivative
works reserves to copyright owners returns from markets other than those in which the
copyrighted work was first published. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (listing rights of copy-
right owners); Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
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patented product covers more than one antitrust market, the incen-129
tives to invent are no less than in the one-market case. Since pat-
entees will not know how their invention ultimately will be used by the
consumer, they should not be punished merely because their activity
occurs in a second market.3
Third, the "multiple markets" test is blind to differences among
types of markets and industries. The catalyst for welfare-enhancing
activity may vary in different markets, a point neglected in a test that
looks solely to the number of markets implicated. Thus, the test op-
erates inflexibly, as it fails to consider, for example, the importance of
patents or competition in increasing welfare in particular markets or
industries. Moreover, welfare can be reduced more by broad patents
in a market in which invention occurs in a cumulative fashion than by
narrow patents in multiple markets with discrete 
invention.13 1
3. Monopolist's Intent
A third test aims to reconcile the patent and antitrust laws by fo-
cusing on the intent of the monopolist. The Ninth Circuit in Kodak
112 for example, concluded that a monopolist's reliance on its intel-
lectual property-protected products is presumptively lawful but can be
rebutted based on evidence of pretext.
3 3 The court explained that a
monopolist cannot "rely upon a pretextual business justification to
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 209, 209 (1983) (documenting the expansion in copyright law to
"protect[] against uses and media that often lie far afield from the original").
129 In fact, "many patented and copyrighted works ... are developed to exploit
multiple business opportunities" and might not be developed if the creation could be
utilized in only one market. Daniel M. Wall & Charles S. Crompton, III, The Antitrust
and Intellectual Property Law Issues: Exploiting Computer Software Copyrights in Multiple
"Markets", 8 ANTITRUST 19, 23 (1994) (emphasis omitted); see also id. (explaining that a
copyrighted work "will inevitably be used in conjunction with other goods and services
that the copyright holder can or does offer").
130 See Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1136 ("'If the threat of treble damage liability for re-
fusing to license were imbedded in the minds of potential patent holders as a likely
prospect incident to every successful commercial exploitation of a patented invention,
the efficacy of the economic incentives afforded by our patent system might be severely
diminished.'" (quoting SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir.
1981))).
131 Infra Part III.B.2.
132 125 F.3d 1195, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of this case, see supra Part
I.B.2.
133 See also, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under
the Sherman Act, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 845 (2000) (advocating a Section 2 standard
based on the "substantive competitive purpose" of the monopolist).
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mask anticompetitive conduct."0 4 Although issues of pretext could
theoretically be resolved based on objective criteria-such as a lack of
any conceivable business justification for the action-they typically will
be resolved by examining the defendant's subjective intent.
There are manifest difficulties in centering analysis on the defen-
dant's intent. Speaking broadly, intent tests often prove too much in
antitrust law. The whole purpose of competition is to defeat one's
competitors.13 5  Documents, e-mails, or statements of vanquishing
one's rivals-inflammatory as they may be, as the Microsoft trial re-
vealed-often show no more than healthy competition.
Particularly worrisome here, penalizing a defendant for its intent
in refusing to deal, when the very purpose of the patent laws is to ex-
clude others from the patented product, does not make sense.1
6
Firms invent with the hope that they will prevail over their rivals, with
the right to exclude being essential to this motivation.' The "carrot"
of exclusion offered by patents will wither away if patentees have to
thread an illusory needle between excluding under the patent laws
and not excluding for unlawful reasons under the antitrust laws.
A focus on intent also suffers from peripheral problems. What
counts as a company's "intent"? Statements from vice presidents?
Lower-level managers? What of conflicting "intents"?"'s Moreover,
there will always be the concern that documentation of beneficent in-
tent will be made with an eye toward future litigation.
Three commentators have offered additional, more economically
oriented, constructs for analyzing the patent-antitrust intersection.
134 Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1219.
135 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035,
1039 (2000) ("[A]ny competitively energetic firm 'intends' to prevail over its actual or
potential rivals.").
16 See Xerox, 989 F. Supp. at 1141 ("To classify the desire to obtain a competitive
advantage over competitors as pretext is to read the right to exclude out of the patent
statute."), quoted in Burling et al., supra note 127, at 541; David McGowan, Networks and
Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J. CORP. L. 485, 514 (1999)
("[E]xclusion is the entire point of [intellectual property] rights.").
137 See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 705b, at 156 (rev. ed.
1996) (stating that "no commercial firm invents except with the hope of prevailing
over its rivals").
13 Moreover, the question of intent is, by its nature, fact-specific. The issue thus
will frequently provide the only reed on which the plaintiff can rely in surviving a mo-
tion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Such a result, which would increase the
costs of litigation, could further diminish the incentives for innovation.
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4. Baxter's "Comparability" Test
William Baxter offers a "comparability" test that provides that "a
patentee is entitled to extract monopoly income by restricting utiliza-
tion of his invention" as long as the restriction is confined "as narrowly
and specifically as the technology of his situation and the practicalities
of administration permit.""9 Baxter wisely avoids reliance on more
conclusory tests, like the purpose of the patentee or the direct nature
of the restraint. And his test recognizes that other goods and serv-
ices might be affected by the exploitation of the patent."'
But in requiring that the restrictions imposed by the patentee be
confined "as narrowly and specifically" as possible, 142 the test chips
away at the bundle of patent rights without considering the net bene-
fit to society of the patent.143 In other words, it emphasizes antitrust
law-in particular, the minimization of monopoly loss-while down-
playing concepts of patentee reward and inventive activity.
44
Such a test naturally leads to post hoc second-guessing of the li-
censing practice utilized by the patentee. Similar to the "less restric-
tive alternatives" analysis that antitrust courts use in considering the
validity of agreements under the Rule of Reason-by which courts al-
ways can unearth a less restrictive alternative than the restraint in-
voked 45-- courts invariably can question licensing restrictions, opining
that they could have been even narrower. This concern is heightened
based on the flexibility of the factors that courts are to consider under
Baxter's test, from "the technology of [the patentee's] situation" to
"the practicalities of administration." 146
The test also recalls analysis based on the scope of the patent: if
the activity is confined "narrowly and specifically enough"' 4 7-in other
139 Baxter, supra note 1, at 313.
140 Id.
141 See id. (explaining that "a patentee is entitled to extract monopoly income by
restricting utilization of his invention, notwithstanding that utilization of other goods
and services are consequently restricted").
142 Id.
143 Baxter's test is not the only one to "favor" antitrust at the patent-antitrust di-
vide. For additional examples, see SULLIVAN, supra note 115, at 509; Gerald R. Gib-
bons, Price Fixing in Patent Licenses and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REv. 273, 296
(1965); and Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
450, 459,461 (1969).
:44 Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1853-54.
143 Carrier, supra note 19, at 1336-38.
146 Baxter, supra note 1, at 313.
147 Id.
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words, it appears not to extend too far beyond the patent grant-then
it is acceptable. As discussed above, 11 however, the issue of patent
scope is frequently disputed, not exogenously defined, and susceptible
to confusion with market boundary determinations.
Finally, the test introduces substantial administrability problems.
For every challenged licensing agreement in every industry, courts
must examine the relevant "technology" and "practicalities of admini-
stration" in determining whether the particular type of restriction util-
149ized by the patentee is excessive .
5. Bowman's "Competitive Superiority" Test
Ward Bowman's "competitive superiority" test allows a patentee to
utilize a restrictive practice if the reward to the patentee measures
"the patented product's competitive superiority over substitutes."
15 0
While such a test recognizes the benefits produced by the patent sys-
tem and the role played by profit maximization, it does not calculate
the net effect of a patent's competitive superiority. In other words, the
cost of the patent system-in the form of monopoly loss that accom-
panies patentees' elimination of competition-is not considered. For
example, Bowman considers a licensee's payment to a patentee as evi-
dence of the competitive superiority of the license (if it were not su-
perior, so the argument goes, the licensee would not agree to it) with-
out considering the costs concomitantly imposed by the patentee.
Bowman also accords substantial weight to the scope of the pat-
ent, stating that the evaluation of licensing practices "will involve the
proper scope of the legal monopoly."'5 2 Consequently, practices will
be upheld if they "merely maximiz[e] the reward attributable to the
competitive advantage afforded by a patent" but prohibited if "more
[is] being monopolized than what the patent grants."13 Again, the is-
sue of patent scope does not provide the answer to the patent-antitrust
148 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing problems with reliance on the concept of patent
scope).
49 Baxter, supra note 1, at 313.
150 BOWMAN, supra note 1, at x.
151 Id. at 88. In addition, the determination of the patent's competitive superiority
over substitutes threatens to be plagued by problems of administration.
152 Id. at 8-9.
153 Id. at 9; see also id. at 240 (criticizing the Supreme Court, which has failed to




conflict. 54 Because of the emphasis on patent scope and the failure to
consider the costs of the patent monopoly, Bowman's test fails to ac-
cord a sufficient role to antitrust.
15 5
6. Kaplow's "Ratio" Test
Louis Kaplow's "ratio" test is the most comprehensive analysis to
date of the patent-antitrust intersection. The test examines the ratio
between "the reward the patentee receives when permitted to use a
particular restrictive practice" and "the monopoly loss that results
from such exploitation of the patent." 156 Licensing practices with
higher ratios "generally should be preferred."5 7 This formulation
solves many of the problems of the Baxter and Bowman approaches.
As opposed to the Baxter analysis, which focuses on the monopoly loss
accompanying a licensing practice, and the Bowman test, which em-
phasizes the gross benefit of the patented product, Kaplow's "ratio"
test addresses both halves of the equation. It thereby offers the most
nuanced and rigorously developed approach to the patent-antitrust
intersection.
As elegant as the Kaplow test is, however, it is not perfect. First,
the level on which it analyzes the challenged practice is too specific to
be applied practically. Second, the goal of social welfare that serves,
in effect, as the common denominator of the analysis also limits the
test's applicability. Third, the input the test seeks to maximize is pat-
entee reward rather than inventive activity.'"
_... First, Kaplow's test applies at the most specific level possible: the
licensing agreement. The inputs making up the ratio, patentee re-
ward and monopoly loss, must be determined with reference to par-
ticular agreements. 6° As Kaplow concedes, "various kinds of informa-
154 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the inherent problems with the issue of patent
scope).
155 Kaplow notes that Bowman's test focuses only on the numerator of his own "ra-
tio": the patentee's reward. Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1851.
156 Id. at 1816.
157 Id. at 1842.
158 See supra Parts I.C.4-.5 (discussing Baxter's "comparability" test and Bowman's
"competitive superiority" test).
1,9 The remainder of this Section expands on these difficulties with the Kaplow
test. For a discussion of how the approach proposed by this Article solves many of
these concerns, see infra note 333.
160 See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1831-32 ("' [P]atentee reward' and 'monopoly loss'
refer, respectively, to the incremental reward and loss resulting from the practice in
question." (emphasis omitted)).
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tion needed for the analysis will not generally be available. 1 6' To as-
cribe particular numbers for patentee reward and monopoly loss and
to arrive at ratios that dictate antitrust treatment of the practice is,
admits Kaplow, "a most formidable and controversial endeavor." 162 If
the project is this difficult for economists, it is impossible for courts.
That no court has attempted to apply the test in eighteen years illus-
trates this point. In seeking to analyze the composition of each grain
of sand on the beach of social welfare-rather than, for example, an
approach that groups different sections of the beach with different
characteristics (like white sand, gold sand, and rocks) into more as-
sessable categories-the test is limited to the level of the hypothetical
theorem.
Second, to the extent Kaplow offers a common denominator, it is
163total social welfare. The effect of an individual agreement on total
welfare is determined by comparing the reward to the patentee with
the monopoly loss resulting from the agreement. 164 Social welfare is a
polycentric concept with numerous inputs, and Kaplow's version con-
fronts hurdles in the interdependence among cases considered by
courts. Courts "cannot hope to articulate a coherent patent-antitrust
doctrine by proceeding on a case-by-case basis,"165 contends Kaplow,
because of the effects of each decision on related cases. In particular,
"it is wholly indeterminate how any individual case or, similarly, any
single component of patent-antitrust doctrine should be decided, be-
cause the question is whether the totality of the courts' patent-antitrust
decisions" promotes an appropriate level of reward. 66  The
comprehensiveness of Kaplow's social welfare calculi limits their prac-
161 Id. at 1842.
162 Id. at 1833.
163 See id. at 1816, 1889 (offering "economic welfare loss" as a common denomina-
tor).
164 Id. at 1831.
165 Id. at 1844.
166 Id. at 1820. Similarly, "setting the patent life and determining patent-antitrust
doctrine are interdependent endeavors; in other words, the system of equations that
defines the optimization process must be solved simultaneously." Id. at 1840. The
tasks overlap, according to Kaplow, because adjustments in patent-antitrust doctrine
produce different levels of reward for any particular patent life, thus necessitating an
adjustment of the optimal patent life. See id. at 1839 (explaining that an adjustment in
patent-antitrust doctrine leading to a greater reward ought to reduce the patent life).
This problem of the endless loop likely would apply (at least in theory) even if a more
narrow common denominator, such as innovation, were utilized. See infra note 333
for a discussion of why the common denominator of innovation might not completely
eliminate these endless loop problems.
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tical applicability. A narrower common denominator-for example,
one that is important in increasing welfare but less expansive, like in-
novation-might not open this Pandora's box.
67
Third, Kaplow's test seeks to maximize the reward to the patentee.
Kaplow recognizes that patentee reward is not the end goal of the
patent system; rather, it is the means to (initially) increased inventive
activity and (ultimately) benefits to society. 16 Kaplow stops at the level
of patentee reward, however, because of the impossibility of proceed-
ing further under his analysis. He cannot reach the stage of increased
invention because he does not know "the identity of the patentee," in
particular, the patentee's familiarity with the inventive process and
specific antitrust restrictions. 169 And he cannot reach the ultimate
stage of benefit to society because this is tied to the impracticable task
of determining the optimal patent length. Thus, under Kaplow's
analysis, the only end product to maximize is patentee reward. As he
puts it, "fruitful analysis of the patent-antitrust problem may require
the simplifying assumption that all reward has the same incentive ef-
fect."7 ° Cutting short the chain from patentee reward through inven-
tive activity to benefit to society at the first step, however, shortchanges
the objectives of the patent laws. Patentee reward is not the objective
of the patent system but is only a means to increase invention and in-
novation. Even if the elusive calculation of ultimate benefit to society
cannot be made, the omission of the link between patentee reward
and invention is disconcerting, particularly in industries in which pat-
ents are not critical to innovation.
The Baxter, Bowman, and Kaplow approaches each articulate
thoughtful economic constructs that address many of the difficult is-
sues in the patent-antitrust intersection. But there is room for a new
paradigm, not only because of the concerns raised in the previous sec-
tions, but also because of weaknesses all three approaches share when
applied to an examination of monopolists' patent-based actions.
First, all of the tests pose substantial administrability problems.
Economic approaches, with their seeming precision in theory, are
167 See infra note 333 for a discussion of how the common denominator of innova-
tion avoids some of the interdependency problems.
68 Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1823.
169 Id. at 1839.
170 Id.
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helpful in ordering and weighing relevant factors but will often be ex-
tremely difficult (if not impossible) to apply in practice. Not only are
the particular inputs usually unmeasurable, but any calculation of ra-
tios among these inputs quickly spirals out of the realm of plausibility.
Compounding the problem is the recognition that it is courts that are
charged with these tasks, which further diminishes the likelihood that
such approaches will be adopted or effectively applied.
Second, none of the tests recognizes industry-specific differences
that affect the achievement of social welfare. All three approaches re-
side simultaneously on a theoretical level (in which each argues from
global understandings about the patent and antitrust systems) and a
specific, individualized level (in determining the validity of particular
agreements). A middle ground, however, might offer benefits. An
approach based on the relevant industry would recognize that the sys-
tems are not monolithic and would offer more hands-on, informed
analyses. At the same time, it would solve many of the administrability
problems by not descending to the level of particular practices.
Third, all three tests are designed to apply to licensing practices.
Each orders relevant factors in analyzing the propriety of particular
agreements.17 But such a paradigm only applies to a license-a com-
pleted agreement between patentee and licensee. Given that patent-
ees may choose not to license at all, the question remains as to how
courts should analyze a patentee's refusal to license.
In short, there is room for a new approach to the patent-antitrust
intersection. Part II lays the foundation for this project.
II. THE COMMON DENOMINATOR
In analyzing monopolists' patent-based actions under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, today's courts either defer excessively to the patent
system or ignore the unique nature of patent-based practices. They
make little attempt to analyze the welfare-enhancing roles that patents
and competition actually play in particular industries. Nor have they
even attempted to apply the Baxter, Bowman, or Kaplow tests. What
the patent-antitrust intersection calls for is a common denominator-
a means by which courts can "weigh" antitrust against patent on a new
171 For example, Kaplow applies his "ratio" test to price-restricted licenses, patent
combinations, price discrimination, and end-product royalty schemes, id. at 1855-87,
and Bowman's "principal subject" consists of "the agreements that owners of patents
make with others who wish to use them," BOWMAN, supra note 1, at ix.
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scale with equivalent measures on both sides.
7 2
Not a common denominator at such a high level as to be mean-
ingless. Some, for example, have contended that, because the patent
and antitrust laws both promote welfare, there is no conflict.'" But
that is not helpful; if we abstract away enough levels of generality,
much the same could be said about nearly every area of law. And not
a "social welfare" common denominator with unmeasurable inputs
based on particular practices like the Kaplow ratio test. By "common
denominator," this Article refers to a construct that courts can use to
compare the likely effects of, and need for, patents and competition
in particular industries. The common denominator that this Article
proposes is innovation.
Innovation is the goal of the patent system and one of several im-
portant (and becoming ever more so) goals of the antitrust laws. This
Section defines innovation; locates it in the text, legislative history,
and jurisprudence of the patent and antitrust laws; 74 and reveals some
172 Technically, when a court analyzes monopolists' actions, it is not weighing pat-
ent against antitrust, but rather is deciding whether or not its application of antitrust
law in a particular case will penalize certain patent-based practices by monopolists.
Nonetheless, elucidation of such a balancing crystallizes the formidable choices that
confront courts in applying two disparate systems designed to promote welfare.
173 See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 1, at I (stating that the common objective of both
laws is "to maximize wealth by producing what consumers want at the lowest cost"); GEORGE A.
HAY, "STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR" CASES 1, 3 (2000) (arguing that the tension between pat-
ent and antitrust laws is "vastly exaggerated"); Kevin J. Arquit, Walker Process, Hand-
gards and Professional Real Estate Investors, and Lost Profit Damages, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANTITRUST: 1995, at 625, 629 (P.L.I. Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 414, 1995) (asserting that patent and anti-
trust laws are complementary); Howard T. Markey, Special Problems in Patent Cases, 57 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 675, 682 (1975) (asserting that conflict is "currently a popular wide-
spread myth"); Kenneth Starling, The Reagan Legacy in Antitrust: The Perspective of the
Antitrust Division, 35 FED. B. NEWS &J. 242, 243 (1988) (relaying the Reagan Admini-
stration's view that there is no conflict between the laws); see also Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[T]he aims and objec-
tives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However,
the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging
innovation, industry and competition.").
174 Statutory interpretation begins with the text of the statute. See, e.g., Bank-
america Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983) ("The starting point [of statu-
tory interpretation], as always, is the language of the statute."); Bread Political Action
Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982) (explaining that statutory construction always
begins with the statute's text). Particularly for open-ended statutes for which the text
is indeterminate, like the Sherman Act, most (though not all) would agree that the
legislative history may provide additional insight. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mor-
tier, 501 U.S. 597, 611 n.4 (1991) ("As for the propriety of using legislative history at
all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional informa-
tion rather than ignoring it."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and
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of the axes on which it varies in different industries.
A. Definition
Innovation consists of "the search for and the discovery, develop-
ment, improvement, adoption and commercialization of new proc-
esses, products, and organizational structures and procedures."175 In-
novation thus differs from invention by including not just the initial
discovery or the creation of a potential new product or process, but
also the subsequent development and commercialization of the prod-
uct or process. 76 Recent examples of innovation include the devel-
opment of novel ways to expand the capabilities and efficiencies of
computers and the Internet, the development of new means of com-
munication such as mobile telephones, and the creation of new prod-
ucts and processes in the biopharmaceutical industry (such as ge-
nomics and bioinformatics).
The patent system and competition are two primary catalysts for• • 177
innovation. Not surprisingly, innovation is a critical objective of
the Application of Statutes, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 558, 562 (2000) ("[T]o say that legislative
intent or history is not itself law does not require us to deny that it may be evidence of
what law means.").
One of the few issues on which the legislative history of the Sherman Act is clear is
the primary role that Congress anticipated for courts in the development of antitrust
jurisprudence. Infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text. Because of the responsibili-
ties envisioned for courts-along with the crucial role that courts have in fact played-
the caselaw is significant in analyzing innovation. Finally, because antitrust courts for
at least the past generation have accorded economic analysis the predominant role in
antitrust analysis, studies by economists on the importance of various types of eco-
nomic efficiencies are instructive.
175 Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust, in
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 22, at 47, 48 (citation
omitted); see also C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 27 (1973) ("[Innovation refers
to the] process of converting inventions into full-scale productive operations."). This
Article considers innovation as a normatively positive force. It does not consider po-
tential adverse consequences (such as layoffs) that are a potential by-product of inno-
vation and that are not the concern of the antitrust laws.
176 See TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 175, at 27 ("An invention ... does not
include the engineering work needed to convert an invention into an economically
viable operation.").
Innovation typically requires the presence of other factors, such as:
availability of a labor force with the requisite technical skills; decentralized
economic structures that permit considerable autonomy and entrepreneur-
ship; economic systems that permit and encourage a variety of approaches to
technological and market opportunities; access to "venture" capital... ; [and]
good relationships between the scientific community ... and the technologi-
cal community, and between users and developers of technology ....
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both the patent and antitrust laws.
178
B. Innovation and the Patent and Antitrust Laws
1. Patent Laws
a. Statutes
Ever since the Framers of the Constitution authorized Congress to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' , 79 invention and
innovation have been the primary goals of the patent laws. 8 ° The first
patent statute enacted by Congress, the Patent Act of 1790, offered
"the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, us-
ing and vending" an invention to anyone who "invented or discovered
any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any im-
provement therein not before known or used" that the patent board
considered "sufficiently useful and important."18 The inventor also
was required to provide "a specification in writing ... [that shall] dis-
tinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known
and used, [and] also to enable . . .[someone] skilled in the art or
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Introduction to ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 22, at 3, 6 (citation omitted).
178 Despite the different routes taken by the patent and antitrust laws to achieve
innovation, the end result is the same: new and improved products and processes.
These types of advances are consistent with both the statutory requirements of the pat-
ent system and market-based incentives such as lead time and learning curve advan-
tages.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
180 See Baxter, supra note 1, at 312 (describing the purpose of patent law as "the
subsidization of innovative activity"); Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RANDJ. ECON. 106, 106 (1990) ("The primary purpose of the
patent system is to reward innovators."); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of Antitrust
and Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 101, 103 (2000)
("Patent... laws give inventors and artists the exclusive right to sell, use, and license
their works in order to encourage innovation."). Even if the system is viewed more as
rewarding the initial invention than the subsequent commercialization of the product,
see Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 806-11 (1988) (distinguishing between invention and
innovation), this distinction is not significant for our purposes, since inventors typically
will consider innovation to be the closely related (and desired) successor to invention.
See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE 263 (1982) (noting that firms consider both business and techni-
cal risks in pursuing research and development, and explaining that "in the current
institutional environment.., the old ... distinction [between invention and innova-
tion] is much less useful than it used to be").
181 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109.
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manufacture .. .to make, construct, or use the [invention] ....,,82
The Patent Act of 1793 offered defenses against claims of patent in-
fringement in circumstances in which the patentee did not contribute
to innovation-for example, where the invention "was not originally
discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been de-
scribed in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery of the
patentee ....183
The patent system's current requirements of novelty, usefulness,
nonobviousness, and disclosure play critical roles in fostering innova-
tion."" The strict requirement of novelty ensures that the invention is
not "known or used by others."8 5 The prerequisite of utility guaran-
tees that the product is useful. .. Nonobviousness ensures that the in-
vention actually contributes to technological progress, as the subject
matter of the patent must not be "obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said sub-
ject matter pertains."87 Finally, the inventor's description of the in-
vention must enable others who are skilled in the relevant art to make
and use it, thereby dispersing the benefits of the invention to the pub-
lic 8. Each of these requirements ensures that the patent system culti-
182 Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 110.
183 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 322.
184 The legislature also cultivated innovation by protecting the system against en-
croachment by the courts. For example, the 1952 Patent Act was enacted in response
to court decisions of the prior two decades that had evidenced anti-patent bias. The
Supreme Court had expanded the patent misuse doctrine, Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-66 (1944); required a showing of "synergism"
(that the whole was greater than the sum of the parts) for patents combining existing
elements, Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53
(1950); raised the threshold of the invention requirement by invoking the "flash of...
genius" test, Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941);
and eliminated the practice of drafting claims in "means plus function" terms, Halli-
burton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1946). See generally CHISUM
ET AL., supra note 10, at 21-22. The 1952 Act reauthorized "means plus function"
claims, overturned the broad reading of the patent misuse doctrine, introduced an ob-
jective standard of nonobviousness in interpreting the invention requirement, and re-
jected the synergism requirement. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112, 271(d) (1994).
185 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
186 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . .
187 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. 1998).
188 The Act states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall
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vates innovation-that future inventors learn how the patented prod-
uct is made, and that new, useful, and nonobvious products are in-
vented, developed, and brought to market.
b. Legislative history
The clarity of the patent statute on the issues of invention and in-
novation minimizes the need to resort to the legislative history. None-
theless, the legislative history confirms the goals apparent in the text.
As a nineteenth-century Senate committee declared: "The promotion
of the arts and the improvements of manufactures are the objects
aimed at in granting patents for inventions .... All civilized nations
have provided in some form for the encouragement of inventive gen-
ius. " '9° In particular, the patent laws were designed to "derive a just
and appropriate encouragement proportioned to the value of [crea-
tors'] respective inventions." 19' Other institutions in the system also
would contribute to the goal of innovation: courts would apply an
"enlightened and liberal application of equitable principles . . . in a
just endeavor to sustain patents for meritorious inventions,"'92 and the
Commissioner of the Patent Office would have the power to reject ap-
plications that were not novel, so as to protect "meritorious inven-
tors.
"193
The goal of innovation is still critical today. In the early 1980s,
many voiced concerns about U.S. global competitiveness, in particular
lamenting a decline in research and development.' 94 Because the leg-
islature believed that "the primary means of improving productivity
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his in-
vention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
189 The language of the patent statute also is broad enough to allow courts to de-
velop a common law that sometimes considers characteristics of particular industries
relevant to innovation. For example, due to the risk and expense of innovation in the
field of biotechnology, the Federal Circuit has adopted a less stringent standard of
nonobviousness. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2226 (2000).
190 S. REP. No. 24-239, at 1 (1836).
191 Id. at 2.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 8.
194 See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit-A Reminiscence, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv.
513, 514 (1992) (discussing the Carter Administration's creation of the Domestic Pol-
icy Review of Industrial Innovation to review the patent system during a time of "tech-
nological obsolescence").
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lies in the creation of new technologies," 9 and because the role of the
patent system in promoting innovation was recognized to be critical,'
96
Congress amended the patent laws. It recommended the creation of a
single appellate court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, to hear appeals of patent claims from district courts, thus
"improv[ing] investors' confidence in patented technology,", 97 and it
provided for a system of administrative reexamination within the pat-
ent office, which was designed to "promote industrial innovation by
assuring ... certainty about patent validity."' 9 In the Patent Law
Amendments Act of 1984, Congress created the National Commission
on Innovation and Productivity, which was intended to "foster innova-
tion and productivity,"1 99 and in the Process Patents Amendment Act
of 1988, the Senate intended to confirm that "America's leading posi-
tion in technology innovation throughout the world is credited in
large part to the stimulus of its patent system." 200 For the past two cen-
turies, the legislative history has confirmed the centrality of innova-
tion to the patent system mandated by the text of the statute. 0'
195 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. I, at 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6461.
196 Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23 (1981) ("Patents have served as a stimu-
lus to the innovative process.").
197 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. I, at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6462. The
Federal Circuit was established in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. See also H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 23 (finding that the crea-
tion of the new court "will promote investment in innovative products and new tech-
nolou").
H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. I, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6463.
Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 303, 98 Stat. 3383,
3389.
200 S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 24 (1987).
201 Court decisions provide yet additional support for the primacy of innovation.
The Supreme Court has explained that the patent laws "seek[] to foster and reward
invention" and that the disclosure of inventions "stimulate [s] further innovation and..
• permit[s] the public to practice the invention once the patent expires." Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("The Patent Clause itself reflects
a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies
which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science
and useful Arts.'"); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (stat-
ing that the productive effort fostered by the right of exclusion "will have a positive
effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufac-
ture into the economy"); G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d
896, 905-06 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the Federal Aviation Act certification scheme
was consistent with the goals of patent law in fostering and rewarding invention, while
stimulating further innovation and the circulation of information in the public do-




In contrast to the patent laws, there has not been one universally
accepted objective animating the antitrust laws. Fostering innovation,
nonetheless, is one important goal, which is becoming ever more
critical in the "new economy" of the twenty-first century.
a. Statutes/legislative history
The text of the Sherman Act fails to provide guidance on the role
of innovation-or, in fact, any other efficiency or noneconomic fac-
tor-as a goal of the antitrust laws. Section 1 outlaws "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade.20 2  Section 2 prohibits parties from "mono-
cle I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with the authority to grant inven-
tors exclusive rights to their discoveries for limited periods to promote new ideas and
innovation."); Glen Mfg., Inc. v. Perfect Fit Indus., Inc., 299 F. Supp. 278, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) ("To promote scientific innovations and invention, the patent laws grant a mo-
nopoly to the patentee for a limited time, subject to the strict laws of the patent.").
The Supreme Court also has described the "patent monopoly [as] ... a reward, an in-
ducement, to bring forth new knowledge." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9
(1966). Finally, other courts have linked the goal of innovation to general benefits for
society, stating that "[t]he reason for the patent system is to encourage innovation and
its fruits: newjobs and new industries, new consumer goods and trade benefits." Pau-
lik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 322, 327-28 (1858) ("It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary
monopoly granted to inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advan-
tage; the benefit to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the
primary object in granting and securing the monopoly."); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829) (finding that the objective of patent law could best be ac-
complished "by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use and vend the
thing invented, at as early a period as possible").202
The constitutional grant of authority for the antitrust laws is the Commerce
Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co.,
435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) ("On its face[, the Sherman Act] shows a carefully studied
attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in business whose activities
might restrain or monopolize commercial intercourse among the states."); Ad. Clean-
ers & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932) (stating that, in passing
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Congress "could exercise only the power conferred by
the commerce clause").
203 In full, Section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said pun-
ishments, in the discretion of the court.
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poliz[ing].... attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or con-
spir[ing] . . . to monopolize" any part of interstate or foreign com-
merce.2 0 4 Such vague language does not shed light on the objectives
thereby to be served. It therefore is worth considering the legislative
history of the Sherman Act as a potential avenue of insight into the
goals of the legislation.
Most of the debate on the adoption of the Sherman Act came in
the context of Section 1.205 The members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee briefly discussed Section 2, indicating that the term "mo-
nopoly" was a "technical term known to the common law" that was not
intended to apply to someone "who merely by superior skill and intel-
ligence" amassed a significant share of the market, but rather was
meant to encompass "the sole engrossing to a man's self by means
which prevent other men from engaging in fair competition with
him."20 6 In short, the legislative history of Section 2 "provides almost
no enlightenment about what it means 'to monopolize' a part of
commerce."
20 7
An overall review of the legislative history of the Sherman Act re-
veals support for several potential goals: consumer welfare, the pro-
tection of small businesses, the process of competition, and economicf" 205
fairness. Although the history fails to reveal one overriding goal, the
promotion of innovation is consistent with several of the articulated
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
204 Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said pun-
ishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
205 Senator Sherman's bill "ha[d] for its single object to invoke the aid of the
courts of the United States to deal with the combinations." 21 CONG. REc. 2456
(1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
206 Id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at
1036 ("The only thing that seems clear is that the monopolizing offense refers to
someone who acquires or attempts to acquire all of the business in the market, and
that this acquisition could not be the result of superior skill or industry.").
207 Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at 1035.
208 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54
ANTITRUST LJ. 21, 24 (1985) ("[T]he legislative history [reveals] repeated concern for
the welfare of consumers and.., small business and for... a potpourri of other val-
ues.... So far as I'm aware, Congress, in enacting these statutes, never faced the prob-
lem of what to do when values come into conflict in specific cases.").
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objectives. For example, Congress's concern about trusts reducing
output, hampering the "skill" created by competition, 20 9 and 'pre-
vent[ing] competition in the manufacture, making, purchase, sale, or
transportation of merchandise, produce, or commodities"21 0 overlaps
with apprehensions of diminished innovation.
One issue on which the legislative history is crystal clear is Con-
gress's intention that the courts would play the primary role in the de-
velopment of antitrust jurisprudence. Courts were to turn to the "old
and well recognized principles of the common law",2 1 in fleshing out
gaps in the Sherman Act. The legislature, for example, refused to dis-
tinguish between reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade, as-
suming that courts would play this role. As Senator Sherman ex-
plained:
I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line be-
tween lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts
to determine in each particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is
to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will
apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law, as the courts of
England and the United States have done for centuries.
212
The indeterminacy of the text and legislative history, together
with Congress's delegation to the courts of the authority to develop
antitrust jurisprudence 2 " and courts' full-fledged utilization of that
209 21 CONG. REc. 4102 (1890) (statement of Rep. Fithian).
210 S. 1, 51st Cong. § 4 (1890); see also S. 3445, 50th Cong. § 1 (1888); 21 CONG.
REc. 1772 (1890); id. at 2469 (statement of Sen. Reagan); id. at 2597.
211 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 2457
(statement of Sen. Sherman) ("It is the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of
common law and human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful
and useful combination."); id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar) ("The great thing that
this bill does... is to extend the common-law principles, which protected fair competi-
tion in trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce in the
United States."); id. at 3149 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (noting the use in the debate
of "common-law terms" and "common-law definitions").
212 Id. at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 2456 (statement of Sen.
Sherman) ("[Courts] will distinguish between lawful combinations in aid of produc-
tion and unlawful combinations to prevent competition and in restraint of
trade ...."); id. at 4089 (statement of Rep. Culberson) ("Now, just what contracts,
what combinations in the form of trusts, or what conspiracies will be in restraint of the
trade or commerce mentioned in the bill will not be known until the courts have con-
strued and interpreted this provision.").
213 In the words ofJustice Stevens:
Statutes like the Sherman Act ... were written in broad general language on
the understanding that the courts would have wide latitude in construing
them to achieve the remedial purposes that Congress had identified. The
wide open spaces in [the] statutes ... are most appropriately interpreted as
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delegation, requires analysis of the caselaw in determining the propri-
ety of innovation as an objective of the antitrust laws.
b. Antitrust jurisprudence and economic efficiencies
The role that courts have played in developing antitrust law
throughout the past century has been a versatile one,. exhibiting "tre-
mendous flexibility and ... responsive [ness] to changes in economic
thinking and social policy."214 From the Sherman Act to the Clayton
Ac2 to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 16 the courts have inter-
preted antitrust statutes loosely and have treated antitrust legislation
as "organic,""7 allowing economic theory to inform the development
of the law.21 8 In discussing the precedential value of antitrust cases, for
example, the Supreme Court has declared that stare decisis, which "'is
not an inexorable command,"' often will lose out to the "competing
interest . . . in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances
and the lessons of accumulated experience."1 9 While the modes of
analysis (and attention given to economic reasoning) 22' have varied
221throughout the period, the goal of maximizing economic effi-
implicit delegations of authority to the courts to fill in the gaps in the com-
mon-law tradition of case-by-case adjudication.
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("The legislative
history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the
[Sherman Act's] broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition." (footnote
omitted)); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Com-
mon Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661, 663 (1982) ("By adopting a
common-law approach [to antitrust law], Congress in effect delegated much of its
lawmaking power to the judicial branch.").
214 Hammer, supra note 2, at 907.
215 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).
216 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994).
27 Hammer, supra note 2, at 913. For a compilation of commentators embracing
such an approach, see id. at 906 n.151.
218 Id. at913.
219 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
220 Economic objectives were one goal before the 1970s, but not to the exclusion
of noneconomic factors. See, for example, United States v. Tpco Associates, Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 610 (1972); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 & n.14 (1966);
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360 n.37 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); and Fashion Originators' Guild v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1941).
221 In the patent-antitrust intersection alone, courts have shifted from automati-
cally finding for the patentholder in the late nineteenth century, to viewing patents
with hostility through much of the twentieth century, to taking more moderate ap-
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ciency222 has been nearly unanimously accepted for at least the past
two decades. Courts today begin and end their antitrust examination
2234with economic analysis.
Of the economic efficiencies, courts have focused primarily on al-
locative efficiency-the optimal allocation of goods and services to
consumers. Courts therefore have analyzed the effect of challenged
practices on price2 4 or output 2 in the relevant markets.
But courts also have analyzed innovative efficiencies.2 6 In United
proaches today. See supra note 35 (providing a summary historical review of courts'
anal;s of the patent-antitrust intersection).
"[E]conomic efficiency refers to a decision or event that increases the total
value of all economically measurable assets in the society or total social wealth."
Brodley, supra note 2, at 1025. Antitrust courts have considered three types of efficien-
cies: (1) allocative efficiency, which refers generally to the allocation of goods and
services to buyers who value them most, (2) productive efficiency, which denotes the
production of goods in the most cost-effective manner, and (3) innovative efficiency,
which signifies gains through the invention, development, and diffusion of new prod-
ucts and production processes that increase social wealth. Id.; see also AREEDA &
KAPLOW, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that competition generates productive and al-
locative efficiencies).
223 See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. at 18 (finding insufficient economic justification for
invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing); Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 231 (1993) (examining economic indicia to find
that plaintiff had failed to prove that defendant had "a reasonable prospect of recover-
ing its losses from below-cost pricing"); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 731 (1988) (holding that economic analysis supports the view that vertical
restraints are not per se illegal under the Sherman Act unless they include some
agreement on price or price level).
224 Courts have found that restraints raised prices, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d
1342, 1352 (5th Cir. 1980); lowered prices, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020
(10th Cir. 1998); Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 375 (3d Cir.
1985); or had no effect on price, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 709
(4th Cir. 1991); Guyon v. Chinese Shar-Pei Club, No. 89-15483, 1990 WL 121080, at *2
(9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1990); Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 447
(3d Cir. 1978).
225 Courts have analyzed whether the number of suppliers or products in a market
has risen, e.g., Kumar v. Nat'l Med. Enters., Inc., No. 93-16841, 1994 WL 659031, at *2
(9th Cir. Nov. 22, 1994); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1992); Ok-
sanen, 945 F.2d at 709; remained unchanged, e.g., Sitkin Smelting, 575 F.2d at 447;
Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 (D. Minn.
1998); Miller v. Ind. Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1992); or decreased, e.g.,
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986); Nat'l Soc'y of Profrl Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113.
226 See, e.g.,JohnJ. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of
Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 497 (1998) ("[Ilnnovation and production efficien-
cies have in fact been a central concern of antitrust policy since the beginning, and
have been a principal reason for instituting some of antitrust's most doctrinally signifi-
cant and successful cases.").
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States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., for example, the court explained
that the antitrust laws permit "the process of invention and innovation
... [as conduct] which a competitive society must foster."22 7 Courts
have upheld under Section 2 monopolists' alterations of products that
228affect complementary products, introductions of new products that
have the effect of injuring competitors, 229 and instances of failure to
"predisclose" their products to competitors.230 And in the Microsoft
case, the district court found that the defendant's activity harmed in-
novation; it declared a Section 2 violation on the grounds that Micro-
soft's acts "trammeled the competitive process through which the
computer software industry generally stimulates innovation and con-
duces to the optimum benefit of consumers.2 0' The antitrust en-
forcement agencies also have come to recognize the importance of
232innovation.
227 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam).
228 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir.
1979) (stating that "it would be difficult to fault Kodak for attempting to design a
[new] film that could provide better results" than the old film).
229 See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that IBM could "redesign its products to make them more attractive to
buyers" and "need not have ... constricted its product development so as to facilitate
sales of rival products"); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423,
440-41 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (upholding modification by IBM of a plug device as a justifi-
able innovation even though it prevented the operation of interfaces with competitors'
peripheral devices), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1980).
230 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281 ("If a firm that has engaged in the risks
and expenses of research and development were required ... to share with its rivals
the benefits of those endeavors, this incentive [to innovate] would very likely be viti-
ated. Withholding... advance knowledge of one's new products, therefore, ordinarily
constitutes valid competitive conduct.").
23 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of law); see also 147 F.3d 935,
948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[A]ny dampening of technological innovation would be at
cross-purposes with antitrust law."); 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 69 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of
fact) (stating that Microsoft "stifled innovation" by computer manufacturers); id. at
111-12 ("The actions that Microsoft took against [Netscape] Navigator hobbled a form
of innovation that had shown the potential to depress the applications barrier to entry
sufficiently to enable other firms to compete effectively against Microsoft in the market
for Intel-compatible PC operating systems."); id. at 112 (finding that Microsoft re-
stricted innovation by making it more difficult for developers to write cross-platform
Java applications).
23 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.31 (a) (2000) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS] (noting that most R&D collaboration agreements
are procompetitive and that "[t]hrough the combination of complementary assets,
technology, or know-how, an R&D collaboration may enable participants more quickly
or more efficiently to research and develop new or improved goods, services, or pro-
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In determining the relative significance of various types of effi-
ciencies, the findings of economists obviously are essential. The con-
sensus among economists since Schumpeter23 3 is that the gains
achieved from innovative efficiencies dwarf those derived from maxi-
mizing allocative efficiency and that innovation is the most important
234factor in the growth of the economy. Economic studies have re-
duction processes"), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9910/
jointventureguidelines.htm; Gallini & Trebilcock, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that
competition authorities have come to recognize' that technological progress "contrib-
utes at least as much to social welfare as does the elimination of allocative inefficien-
cies"); William J. Baer, Director, FTC Bureau of Competition, Address Before the
American Bar Association (Apr. 15, 1999), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/
baerspaba99.htm ("[T]he focus of competition in [high tech] industries is not over
price but innovation of the next generation products."); Susan DeSanti, The Intersec-
tion of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Issues: A Report from the FTC Hearings,
Remarks Before the Conference: Antitrust for High-Tech Companies Business Devel-
opment Associates (Feb. 2, 1996), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/
desantil.htm (summarizing FTC hearings on global-based competition and noting that
"[c]ompetition in some markets is evolving so that the competition centers as much or
more around innovation than price").
In fact, the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines proclaim that "[t]he intellectual
property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innova-
tion and enhancing consumer welfare." INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra
note 16, § 1.0. The Guidelines elaborate:
The intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dis-
semination and commercialization by establishing enforceable property rights
for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and
original works of expression .... The antitrust laws promote innovation and
consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition
with respect to either existing or new ways of serving consumers.
Id.
I 3 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 14, at 87 (emphasizing significance of innovation,
which reduces concern with output-restricting practices).
234 See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries
Make It?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 22, at 29, 31
("At least since Schumpeter wrote nearly fifty years ago, innovation has been thought
to contribute far more to our well-being than keeping prices closer to costs through
competition."); William F. Baxter, Antitrust Law and Technological Innovation, ISSUES SCI.
& TECH., Winter 1985, at 80, 82 ("The contribution of technological advances to our
economic well-being is very substantial when compared with the damage that could be
caused by restrictive behavior the antitrust laws seek to halt."); Brodley, supra note 2, at
1026 ("Innovation efficiency or technological progress is the single most important
factor in the growth of real output in the United States and the rest of the industrial-
ized world."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST,
INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 22, at 119, 122 ("An antitrust policy
that reduced prices by 5 percent today at the expense of reducing by 1 percent the an-
nual rate at which innovation lowers the costs of production would be a calamity.");
F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1018 (1987)
(maintaining that productive efficiency is "much more important quantitatively" than
allocative efficiency and long-run technological efficiency "is almost surely even more
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vealed that at least fifty percent of the increase in U.S. output from
the late 1920s to the late 1960s was due solely to technological and
scientific progress35 and that declines in innovation contributed to a
reduction in the growth of business-sector productivity by roughly
sixty-five percent from the 1947-1973 period to the 1973-1987 pe-
216riod. In contrast, the welfare loss from monopoly is substantially less
than one percent of the gross national product.
237
Buttressing these conclusions, evidence from today's high-tech
economy shows that innovation is more important than ever. The
currency of the economy today is new information and new technolo-
gies, not simply lower prices. Fierce competition often is accompa-
nied by major paradigm shifts that "cause incumbents' positions to be
completely overturned."238 And the tools that courts traditionally have
applied to analyze allocative efficiency-such as comparing price with
important"); Donald F. Turner, Basic Principles in Formulating Antitrust and Misuse Con-
straints on the Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 485 (1985)
(" [I] n the long run, technological progress contributes far more to consumer welfare
than does the elimination of allocative inefficiencies caused by noncompetitive pric-
ing." (citation omitted)). The emphasis on innovative over allocative efficiency also
can be generally viewed as focusing on dynamic rather than static competition.
235 See EDWARD F. DENISON, ACCOUNTING FOR UNITED STATES ECONOMIC
GROWTH, 1929-1969, at 135 (1974) (attributing the increase in U.S. output during this
period largely to "advances in knowledge"); see also Thomas M. Jorde & DavidJ. Teece,
Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innova-
tion and Commercialize Technology, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/orde2.htm (last
visitedJan. 15, 2002) (referring to various economic studies that support technological
change as the driving force of economic output). If anything, the percentage of eco-
nomic growth resulting from innovation has increased in the past generation.
236 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 100-154, at 300 (1988).
Moreover, the impact of innovation on consumer welfare likely is understated by pro-
ductivity statistics due to difficulties in measuring the superiority of new consumer
goods. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 6, at 614.
237 See EDWARD F. DENISON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE US 194, 199 (1962) (noting that the welfare
loss resulting from misallocation of resources as a result of monopoly is approximately
one-half of one percent).
238 DavidJ. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in
High-Technology Industries, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 804 (1998); see also David S. Evans,
Antitrust and the New Economy, in ANTITRUST LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 41, 52 (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study Materials, No. SF63, 2000) (explaining that in the initial race,
new economy companies "invest heavily to develop a product that creates a new cate-
gory" and that "[i]n subsequent races, firms invest heavily to displace the leader by
leapfrogging the leader's technology"); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy,
in ANTITRUST LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra, at 115, 121 (noting that network mo-
nopolists "do not seem particularly secure against competition" because of very high
rates of innovation, large amounts of investment capital, and the rapidity with which
electronic networks can be activated).
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the marginal cost of producing the item-will often not be helpful to-
day. New-economy firms usually have high fixed costs, because of sig-
nificant R&D investments or the need to invest in networks, but low
marginal costs, because the cost of producing an additional unit is in-
significant.239 Today's firms innovate on the belief that the (at least
temporary) market power they foresee will allow them to charge




In short, the text and legislative history of the Sherman Act are
indeterminate as to the goals of the Sherman Act, but the legislative
history reveals that Congress intended that the courts would play the
primary role in developing antitrust jurisprudence. For at least the
past generation, courts have emphasized economic efficiencies to the
exclusion of noneconomic objectives. And because innovation con-
tributes more to economic growth than any other type of efficiency,
positing it as the goal of the antitrust laws is appropriate.
C. Different Paths in Different Industries
Even if the antitrust and patent laws both endeavor to increase
"innovation," this is no one-size-fits-all concept. Innovation occurs in
different ways in different industries, with the contours dependent on
factors such as: (1) the presence of market-based incentives; (2) the
necessity of patents; and (3) the cumulative nature of innovation in
the industry.
Sketched along a timeline, innovation can be broken down into
ex ante and ex post perspectives. The ex ante perspective focuses on
the viewpoint of the prospective inventor before the product is devel-
oped. It asks which incentives motivated the inventor to create the
product: A twenty-year right to exclude? Rewards from the market?
The first two factors in the preceding paragraph can be placed into
the ex ante category. The first factor, by emphasizing nonpatent in-
centives to innovate arising from the particular market at issue, high-
lights the benefits of competition in the industry. The second-the
239DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS IN DYNAMICALLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES 7-8 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8268, 2001); Evans, supra note 238, at 49. Simi-
larly, much of the intellectual property at the heart of the new economy has significant
fixed costs but de minimis marginal costs, as the cost of creating the product is high
but the cost of making an additional copy of the product is trivial. Posner, supra note
238, at 118.
240 Evans, supra note 238, at 55.
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necessity of patents in an industry-can further be dissected into (a)
the expense and uncertainty of creating the product and (b) the ease
with which the product can be imitated after development. The more
these latter factors exist in the relevant industry, the greater the need
for patents.2
41
The ex post perspective targets the path of innovation after the
creation of the product. In other words, does innovation take place in
a cumulative fashion, with new products building on previous inven-
tions? Or is it discrete, made up of well-defined inventions not form-
ing the building blocks for subsequent advances? The more that in-
novation in the industry is cumulative, the greater should be the role
of competition.242
Taking the ex ante and ex post perspectives into account provides
a comprehensive view not only of the temporal stages of the process of
innovation, but also of several independent and critical factors that
241inform innovation. In addition, the perspectives allow for an indi-
vidualized look at the industry at issue. These perspectives will form
the centerpiece of the test proposed in the next Part.
III. THE TEST
This Article proposes an innovation-centered rebuttable presump-
tion that courts can apply in analyzing monopolists' patent-based ac-
tions. The presumption ensures that the action makes economic
sense other than by injuring competitors. The rebuttal-the center-
piece of the analysis-determines whether competition, rather than
patents, is responsible for innovation in the industry. Finally, the sur-
rebuttal sheds light on the actual level of innovation in the market.
A. The Presumption
The first stage of analysis is the presumption. A company's patent-
241 For a more detailed explication of the ex ante factors, see infra notes 252-55
and accompanying text.
242 For a more detailed explication of the ex post factors, see infra note 297 and
accompanying text.
243 The primary methodologies underlying the factors are objective and rely on
analyses of the relevant market or industry. Obviously, the cumulativeness of innova-
tion is based on an examination of the types and path of innovation in an industry.
But even the ex ante factors, though phrased in terms of "incentives," rely on determi-
nations observable and specific to the industry-such as the presence of market-based
incentives like network effects and the cost of creating and ease of imitating inven-
tions-rather than, for example, the subjective intent of the patentee.
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244based actions are lawful as long as there is a plausible justification
for the action other than injuring competitors. A plausible justifica-
tion refers to a deferentially considered business rationale for the
conduct that explains the actions under actual (not hypothetical)
conditions and that does not second-guess what appear to be legiti-
245mate business rationales. Courts are to determine the justification
not by probing the monopolist's subjective intentions but by analyzing
246the objective consequences of the action. Such a strong presump-
tion makes sense not only because a company's actions based on its
valid patents are not the typical "bad acts" punished under Section 2,
but also, relatedly, because they are the intended reward of the patent
system. Such a presumption offers clarity and predictability for courts
and parties.
The requirement of a plausible justification for the conduct other
244 By focusing on "patent-based" actions, the test excludes patents obtained by
fraud or enforced in bad faith. Such actions, which are invalid under Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), and Handgards,
Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), do not promote the purposes under-
lying the patent system and are not entitled to a presumption of validity.
45 Courts often describe this as an "efficiency" justification for the conduct. See
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610 (1985) (conclud-
ing that evidence supports an "inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency
concerns"); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 137, 658f, at 124 (noting that courts
utilize a "business justification" defense that references productive efficiency in its fo-
cus on the costs or output of the monopolist); Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Anti-
trust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 677 (2001) (noting that credible efficiency justifica-
tions suffice to defeat a finding of specific intent to undermine competition).
The test bears resemblance to that used by the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing Co.,
472 U.S. at 585. In that case, the Court found that a downhill skiing facility with mo-
nopoly power "fail[ed] to offer any efficiency justification" for withdrawing from a
joint ticketing arrangement with a competitor. Id. at 608. The Court found that the
monopolist was willing to forego ticket sales and consumer goodwill "because it was
more interested in reducing competition in the... market over the long run by harm-
ing its smaller competitor." Id. The presumption offered by this Article differs from
this analysis in making explicit that an action that makes sense only by harming com-
petitors does not constitute a valid justification for the conduct.
246 Cf Cass & Hylton, supra note 245, at 659, 676 (utilizing the term "specific in-
tent" to refer to inquiry "conducted on the basis of objective evidence" and noting that
courts infer specific intent when evidence indicates "the absence of credible efficiency
justifications for the monopolists' conduct"). For example, licensing terms such as ter-
ritorial and field-of-use restrictions, and royalty payments for which price exceeds mar-
ginal cost, typically make legitimate business sense since the activities allow the com-
pany to recoup the expenditures it incurred in developing the product. In contrast,
licensing a patented product only on the condition that the licensee not deal with
competitors of the monopolist, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143,
155 (1951), would not receive the benefit of the presumption since the only conceiv-
able effect of the restriction is to injure competitors.
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than injuring competitors confirms that the act is not merely preda-
tory and that there is some positive effect on welfare connected with
the act. This aspect of the presumption is not meant to erect a signifi-
cant hurdle in front of the defendant. It does not require the benefits
to society from the challenged action to outweigh the costs. Nor does
it seek to balance precise levels of procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects of the conduct. Nor again does it require the action to be the
least restrictive alternative that will achieve the benefit at issue. The
looseness of the test ensures that the presumption will in fact be a pre-
sumption, rather than an unwitting stumbling block in the path of the
defendant. But if the action makes sense only by harming competi-
tors, the presumption will not apply and the conduct will (assuming
the other requirements for a Section 2 violation are proved) violate
Section 2.
Moreover, the presumption allows courts to consider the nature of
the monopolist's activity. While the rebuttal and surrebuttal stages fo-
cus on innovation in particular markets or industries, the presump-
tion concentrates judicial analysis on the defendant itself. It ensures
that the defendant's action is based on the patent (and thus promotes
the incentives underlying the patent system) and that, by virtue of hav-
ing some business justification, it has a positive effect on welfare. The
presumption thus is critical in analyzing the activity of the defendant.
B. The Rebuttal
Once the presumption is met, the burden of production will shift
to the plaintiff to prove that the rebuttal applies.247 The rebuttal will
be based on the common denominator of innovation-more specifi-
cally, on the roles played by patents and competition in attaining in-
novation in particular industries. In industries in which innovation is
achieved not from patents, but from competition, the presumption of
lawfulness will be rebutted.24s While patents may be responsible for
innovation in certain industries, patentee monopolists should not re-
ceive carte blanche from the antitrust laws in industries in which
competition is the catalyst for innovation. For even if the patent-based
act does not appear to be predatory, patents cannot be the ultimate
trump card. The rebuttal recognizes those industries in which compe-
247 The burden of proof, of course, remains with the plaintiff at each stage to
demonstrate a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
248 This inquiry is further developed infra Parts III.B.1-.2.
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tition plays the critical role in fostering innovation. 249
The building blocks for the rebuttal are the ex ante and ex post
perspectives introduced above.2 50  The plaintiff must prove that both
perspectives demonstrate that competition (and not patents) is re-
2511
sponsible for innovation in the industry.
1. Ex Ante Incentives
The question of ex ante incentives embraces three subissues: (1)
the presence of market-based incentives to innovate, (2) the ease of
creating the product, and (3) the difficulty of imitating the product.
In order to show that innovation is achieved from competition and
not from patents, the plaintiff initially must show that competition is
important for innovation: thus, the necessity of proving the first fac-
tor-that the market provides incentives to innovate. Demonstrating
249 A concern still may linger that monopolists should not be found to violate the
Sherman Act based on activities that have not traditionally been considered "bad acts."
And it is true that refusals to license are expressly permitted under the patent laws. See
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (4) (providing that a refusal to license does not constitute patent
misuse). But without being able to analyze the patent-based actions of companies, the
antitrust laws will not play a sufficient role in attaining innovation. Any conceivable
chilling effect on companies that refrain from enforcing their patent will be minor and
will not outweigh the increase in welfare from applying the antitrust laws where com-
petition is the catalyst for innovation.
Moreover, the remedy can be tailored to the situation. Divestiture, for example,
would not be called for in nearly any imaginable situation. In certain cases, compul-
sory licensing may be appropriate, though the patentee likely would be entitled to re-
ceive royalties. Although such licensing often is decried as eradicating incentives to
innovate, empirical studies call this contention into question. Infra note 366. The
heavy hand of antitrust can be wielded with care, and if it is so used, then the opening
of two paths to innovation will offer significant rewards.
250 Supra Part II.C.
251 Several well-respected studies by economists on how innovation is achieved in
certain industries will provide strong support for this determination. See infta note 340
(listing studies). Monopolists in industries that, according to the studies, are charac-
terized by patent-centered innovation would maximize their chances of rebutting the
studies' conclusions by offering evidence that the industries have changed materially
since the time of the studies-either because of the introduction of new technologies
or markets or because of a fragmentation of the industry into subcategories. See infra
note 278 (explaining that advances in technology are lowering the costs of develop-
ment in the biotechnology industry).
Moreover, additional studies should be undertaken, particularly covering indus-
tries not yet examined. If litigation arises in industries for which studies have not been
completed, the courts and parties will need to focus even more directly on each of the
factors of the rebuttal. While there may be a concern that the inquiry could devolve
into a "battle of the experts," a consensus has formed in many industries on the pri-
mary catalysts to innovation, and the factors to be applied are straightforward enough
to ease the task confronting courts.
2002]
820 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
this factor justifies the application of Section 2 as it reveals that the
competition that Section 2 could unleash naturally would lead to en-
hanced innovation.5 2
The next task is to show that patents are not critical to innovation.
The standard utilitarian justification for patents is that they address
the "public good" characteristics of inventions by increasing appropri-
253ability and preventing imitation by free riders. This rationale is
most compelling when the inventor has expended significant time
and resources in developing the product, but the product could easily
be imitated by competitors after development.214 In that case, patent
protection is crucial to allow the inventor to recoup its substantial in-
vestments. But patents are not as critical when the product is easy to
create (because the initial costs can be more easily recovered) or diffi-
cult to imitate (because of the diminished risk of imitation by free rid-
ers). And even though patents are least needed when the product is
both easy to create and difficult to imitate, the presence of only one of
these criteria is enough to assuage the most pressing concerns pre-
sented by the public good characteristics of patents. Because patents
are not as essential in these situations, there is less concern that apply-
ing antitrust law and modestly weakening patents would interfere with
innovation .55
In short, in addition to proving the first factor, the plaintiff must
prove either the second (ease of creation) or third (difficulty of imita-
tion) factors in order to show that ex ante incentives favor the applica-
tion of Section 2.
252 If studies had conclusively shown that markets comprising small finns attained
more innovation than markets dominated by monopolists, then there might be less of
a need to examine market-based incentives to innovate in applying Section 2. But de-
spite much attention, this issue has not been resolved. See infra note 316 (noting de-
bate among economists as to whether innovation occurs in markets characterized by
monopoly or competition). Therefore, the factor targets those instances in which the
application of Section 2 promises to contribute to competition-based incentives to in-
novate by opening up opportunities such as enhanced competition in network effects
markets.
253 Supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
254 Cf SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
17 (Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 240, 1999) (questioning whether
"cheap to develop" basic inventions should receive patent protection), available at
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/cum-r%26d.pdf.; Giovanni Dosi, Sources, Proce-
dures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, 26J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1161 (1988)
(noting that ease of imitation is inversely related to appropriability).
255 Of course, another potential solution to the varying degrees of reliance on pat-
ents across industries is to modify the patent laws by industry. For a comparison of that
solution to this Article's proposal, see infra Part IV.C.
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a. Nonpatent market-based rewards
The first ex ante factor focuses on nonpatent-based incentives to
innovate that originate in the relevant industry. In certain industries,
the incentives provided by patents may not be as critical as is competi-
tion in encouraging innovation. While this does not alter the validity
of patents in such industries, it may recommend a more potent role
for antitrust. For example, competition-induced innovation played a
crucial role in the rebirth of the steel and automobile industries5 6 and
the growth of consumer-goods industries in the United States in re-
cent generations. 2 57 A significant nonpatent incentive to innovate is
the advantage from being the first to enter a market-in other words,
a "market pioneer."
25 8
In some industries, such as pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, oil-drilling
rigs, and investment banking, market pioneers have maintained sig-
nificant market shares long after they entered the market.2'9 The•60 261
computer26° and semiconductor industries also reward the first to ar-
rive in a market. And in consumer goods businesses, pioneers have
amassed twenty-nine percent of the market while late entrants gained
only twelve percent.262 Such market dominance usually is explained by
customer familiarity and brand loyalty. 265 In addition, the first com-
256 1 FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, at ch. 6, at 14 (1996) [herein-
after FTC REPORT].
257 Id.; see also id. ch. 6, at 14 n.67 (reporting testimony from a Visa International
official that innovation in industry has been spurred by a need to keep up with busi-
ness and to lower costs).
258 William T. Robinson et al., First-Mover Advantages ftom Pioneering New Markets: A
Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1, 6 (1994).
259 Id. For example, two years after the expiration of patents, the average market
share of pioneers in pharmaceutical markets was fifty-one percent. Id. at 5.
260 See FTC REPORT, supra note 256, ch. 6, at 15 (noting that time to market is "ex-
tremely important" in the computer industry).
261 See id. (observing that in the semiconductor industry, "rapid introduction of a
new process and the ability to expand the volume of product moving through... [are]
extremely important to profitable competition.., simply because your window of op-
portunity is relatively brief, and therefore, it is important to move quickly and.., with
relatively high quality").
262 Robinson et al., supra note 258, at 9. In the market for industrial goods, pio-
neers gained twenty-nine percent of the market and late entrants gained fifteen per-
cent. Id.
263 Customer demands also may contribute to the competition to innovate. See
FTC REPORT, supra note 256, ch. 6, at 16 (quoting testimony of an IBM executive that
"unrelenting consumer demands" for computing capability "fuel[] the impetus" for
"innovation and commercialization of new technologies ... proceeding at a breakneck
pace").
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pany to head down learning curves also may obtain cost advantages,
which can be used to quickly recoup development costs and even to
block entry. 64 R&D executives generally consider "lead time" over
competitors to be one of the most effective appropriability mecha-
265 266nisms. While pioneers do not always encounter success, they gen-
erally survive at least as long as later entrants in many industries.67 A
type. of market in which first-mover status is particularly important is a
"network effects" market.
Network effects occur in markets in which a participant benefits
from an increase in the number of other participants in the system.
For example, a telephone or email system becomes more valuable as
the number of people connected to it increases.2 38 Network effects re-
sult in increasing returns in consumption: as more customers join a
network, the network becomes more valuable.2 6 9 Relatedly, networks
feature positive feedback: the more popular a computer operating
system becomes, for example, the more applications will be written for
it. And as these additional applications become available, the system
becomes even more popular, leading to even more applications being
written, and so on. One concern with such positive feedback is that,
as the popular product becomes increasingly valuable, consumers will
flock to that product, resulting in a market "tipping" to the product
and eliminating all other alternatives in the market.2 70 Such tipping
could theoretically leave consumers stranded with (or "locked in to")
264 SCHERER & Ross, supra note 6, at 627. Moreover, competition will not always
drive prices so low that earlier development costs cannot be recovered. AREEDA &
KAPLOW, supra note 2, at 153.
265WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS:
APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT)
10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000).
266 Market pioneers that were quickly overtaken by later entrants include Reynolds
International Pen (ballpoint pens), Bowmar Instruments (hand-held electronic calcu-
lators), Osborne (portable computers), and Royal Crown Cola (diet and caffeine-free
colas). Robinson et al., supra note 258, at 6.
267 Pioneers survive at least as long in the pharmaceutical and consumer packaged
goods industries, but not in the chemical product and local newspaper industries. Id.
at 17. And in the medical diagnostic imaging industry, later entrants have survived
longer. Id.
8 These effects are present not only in physical networks (with "direct" network
effects) but also in virtual networks like the markets for videotape players and video-
game consoles (with "indirect" network effects). In these systems, the greater preva-
lence of the primary product increases the demand for complementary products like
videotapes and videogame cartridges.
269 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Net-
works, 1996 ANTITRUST 36, 36.
270 Id. at 36-37.
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the product that loses the race, a product that might even be superior
to the dominant product, but one that fails to gain market share be-
cause it does not offer a populated network. The fears of inferior
lock-in nonetheless appear to outrun the reality."'
Network effects markets provide a clear illustration of market-
based incentives for innovation. These markets offer significant re-
wards, such as (at least temporary) market domination, to the first to
arrive in the market. Because of these rewards, innovation is fueled by
the fierce competition to arrive first and gain the critical mass of par-
ticipants that will foster the self-fulfilling prophecy of success; any in-
centives provided by patents, consequently, are less critical."' Schum-
peter's "gale of creative destruction"27 3 whips fiercely through network
markets, providing a powerful example of competition-based innova-
tion.274
b. Product creation
The second ex ante incentive relates to the creation and devel-
Opment of the product. Where the expense and time necessary to in-
vent and commercialize a product is significant, the importance of
patents increases. In cases in which the cost of innovation is high, in-
271 One commentator concludes that "[t]here are no industries in which the pre-
vailing technology is demonstrably the wrong one or one in which a clearly more effi-
cient technology has been suppressed, where 'efficiency' is defined to include recogni-
tion of switching costs." Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67
ANTrrRUST LJ. 693, 719 (2000). An oft-cited example of inferior lock-in is the
"QWERTY' keyboard layout. But studies have pointed out flaws in tests of a suppos-
edly superior alternative ("DVORAK"). See Stan Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, The
Fable of the Keys, 33J.L. & ECON. 1, 8-15 (1990) (comparing DVORAK to QWERTY). It
is also worth considering "LP" records (which lost to CDs), Betamax videos (to VHS),
and Atari video games (to Nintendo), all of which were once viewed as network effects
monopolists not subject to displacement.
See O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 1216 ("[B]ecause significant first-mover advan-
tages and returns larger than those of conventional markets often characterize net-
work markets, investors may not need the inducement of intellectual property rights at
all to encourage them to fund innovation.").
273 SCHUMPETER, supra note 14, at 81-86.
274 Monopolists in network effects markets will not be immune from challenge.
Even if there are demand-side barriers to entry in network effects markets, potential
entrants will not face supply-side barriers. Moreover, for those companies not yet in
the market, any psychological barriers to entry would appear to be reduced by the sig-
nificant expected payoff from cracking into the market. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N.
Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 8 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1999). In short, the potential rewards of dominating a net-
work effects market provide powerful incentives not only for the firm that arrives first,
but also for subsequent entrants seeking to enter the market.
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ventors and investors would be reluctant to expend the resources nec-
essary to develop inventions without the right to exclude. Conversely,
where invention and development do not require significant time or
expense, patents are less important.
275
The expenditures required for innovation will vary across indus-
tries. In the fields of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, biotechnology (at
least for downstream innovation), and agricultural products, the cost
of searching for the next breakthrough can be prohibitive. 76 Bio-
pharmaceutical 277 companies often spend hundreds of millions of dol-
lars and take ten to fourteen years to bring new drugs to market.27s
275 Of course, firms may seek patents for reasons other than preventing imitation.
For example, they could obtain patents to prevent infringement lawsuits, to enhance
reputation, to prevent competitors from patenting related inventions, to strengthen
the firm's bargaining position in entering into cross-licensing agreements, or to in-
crease the likelihood of financing by venture capitalists. COHEN ET AL., supra note 265,
at 17; Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495,
1505-06 (2001); see also BRONWYN H. HALL & ROSE MARIE HAM, THE PATENT PARADOX
REVISITED: DETERMINANTS OF PATENTING IN THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY,
1980-94, at 23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7062, 1999) (stat-
ing that, in the semiconductor industry, the desire to gain leverage in cross-licensing
negotiations is a strong motivation to seek patents). This Article will focus on the use
of patents to prevent copying and to recover initial development costs. For even if the
magnitude of the appropriability function often attributed to patents is lower than the
traditional justification would posit, it still varies by industry and appears to be a sig-
nificant contributor to innovation in several industries. See infra notes 276-82 and ac-
companying text (explaining substantial costs of innovation in certain industries).
See FTC REPORT, supra note 256, ch. 6, at 7-8 (reporting that representatives of
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries testified at competition policy hearings
that patents are critical for protecting the "large, upfront" investments necessary to re-
search and develop new drugs); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 6, at 626-27 (stating that
introduction of a new drug into the U.S. market involves significant research, devel-
opment, and testing costs incurred in "discovering molecules with desirable therapeu-
tic effects in humans and proving through extensive clinical testing that the substances
were effective and safe").
277 Because of the recent convergence of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries, supra note 23, the processes of innovation will overlap among firms in the
industries.
278 See TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 175, at 251 (explaining the time it takes
to establish the properties of a compound, perform preliminary tests, transform the
compound into a marketable product, master the production processes, and receive
acceptance by doctors); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary
Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223
(Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (finding that it costs $175 to $300 million
to develop a new biotechnology medicine and $300 to $500 million to develop a new
pharmaceutical drug); Joan Hamilton, Biotech: An Industry Crowded with Players Faces an
Ugly Reckoning, Bus. WK., Sept. 26, 1994, at 84, 87 (describing the costs of bringing new
drugs to market); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32
MGMT. SCI. 173, 174 (1986) (noting that chief R&D executives would not have devel-
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These companies must pass through multiple stages of innovation,
such as discovering the relevant molecules with therapeutic effects,
undertaking thorough clinical testing, undergoing significant FDA re-
view, and developing, manufacturing, and marketing the drug.279
Only one out of every four thousand discovered compounds tested in
oped sixty percent of pharmaceutical inventions absent patent protection); PHARM.
RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM. (PHRMA), PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2001, at
ch. 9, at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profileOl/chapter9.phtml
(2002) ("On average, it takes 14.2 years and costs $500 million to develop a new medi-
cine."). The biotechnology industry also has had difficulty in attracting investment
due to the high frequency of unsuccessful projects. SeeJosh Lerner, The Returns to
Investments in Innovative Activities: An Overview and an Analysis of the Software In-
dustry 23 (NERA Consulting Economists, Working Paper Draft, 1998) ("Only 22 bio-
technology-based therapeutics and vaccines were approved between 1975 and 1993[,
and by 1993,] the industry as a whole was losing $3.6 billion annually."), available at
http://www.neramicrosoft.com/level-1/nera-an.htm (pdf file).
Due to recent and potential future advances, conclusions related to the biophar-
maceutical industry may need to be revisited. For example, the cost of locating a gene
fragment of unknown function is now an insignificant part of the cost of determining
its function-estimated by one CEO of a bioinformatics company to be one percent.
Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation In-
centives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 173, 192 n.88.
Even the more difficult commercialization stage might be simplified in the future by
an expanded application of information technology to genome data (i.e., genomics).
See id. at 174-75 (discussing the impending era of pharmaceutical innovation). To the
extent that different stages of invention, development, and commercialization in an
industry differ markedly in the catalysts for innovation, the "industry" might need to be
subdivided into more internally consistent units.
A final concern presented by the biotechnology industry is that of broad "up-
stream" (assuming, for the moment, cognizable distinctions based on the distance of
the patented input from the end product) patent rights in research that, because of
significant transaction costs facing "downstream" developers that need to enter into
licensing agreements with such rights-holders, could stifle innovation. For a general
discussion, see Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). A more rigorous ap-
plication of the patent laws, such as prohibiting patents on gene fragments, could (at
least partially) mollify this concern. And to the extent that such upstream innovations
are not labor-intensive or expensive, they provide further support for subdividing the
biotechnology industry for purposes of the test proposed by this Article.
279 See Rai, supra note 278, at 181 (noting that prescription drug manufacturers
must provide preclinical testing on animals, file a drug application with the FDA, un-
dertake three stages of clinical/human testing, and undergo final FDA review); see also
SCHERER & Ross, supra note 6, at 626 (discussing costs that are unique to drug intro-
duction); TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 175, at 231 (concluding, based on a study
of the importance of patents in Great Britain in the 1960s, that "[t]he pharmaceutical
industry stands alone in the extent of its involvement with the patent system"); VISCUSI
ET AL., supra note 20, at 848 (describing how, after the completion of the three testing
stages, an application is filed with the FDA that covers clinical trials of more than 3000
patients and contains 90,000 pages, and that, after two and a half more years, the FDA
gives its decision).
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industry laboratories passes through each of the stages and reaches
the marketplace.
As another example, R&D for new chemical products is uncertain
and subject to much experimentation, since it is difficult to predict
the exact chemical structure that will achieve a given end and since
there often are unanticipated effects of using a new chemical sub-
211stance in a particular way. Patents also may be effective appropri-
ability mechanisms in the medical equipment, toilet preparations,
pipes/valves, special purpose machinery, oil field machinery, switch-
2812gear, petroleum, and autoparts industries.
On the other hand, patents are not necessary for innovation in
many industries. Internet business methods-most famously symbol-
ized in Amazon's "one-click ''28  patent-are usually simple ideas easily
284conceived. Patents also play a relatively minor role in the creation
of products in the civilian aircraft and semiconductor industries85 and
for office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber products, textiles, pri-
mary metals, instruments, food, printing/publishing, steel, and elec-
tric components. 286 In these industries, in which firms do not consider
280 Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable
Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34JURIMETRICSJ. 295, 303 (1994).
281 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance:
The Role of Patent Scope Decisions, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS,
supra note 22, at 185, 209 (discussing invention in the chemical industries). This un-
certainty, of course, also applies to chemical compounds in the pharmaceutical area.
TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 175, at 252.
282 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 265, at 12 (listing the industries in which patents
are most critical); id. at 32 tbl. 1 (listing the effectiveness of appropriability mecha-
nisms for various product innovations); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns
from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTmTY
783, 793-98 (relaying effectiveness of patents in various industries). There typically will
not be a substantial divergence in the effectiveness of patents between product and
process innovations. COHEN ET AL., supra note 265, at 32-33 tbls. 1 & 2.
283 Stated most simply, "one-click ordering" involves the server system "remember-
ing" information from the client system such as the customer's address and credit card
number and automatically recalling the information during the customer's subsequent
order. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G.
Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the Newo Economy, 62 U. PIrr. L. REV. 453, 468
(2001).
284 In fact, many such methods had already been utilized outside the Internet be-
fore being patented.
285 For a discussion relating to these industries, see A. PHILLIPS, TECHNOLOGY AND
MARKET STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (1971); JOHN R. TILTON,
INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF SEMICONDUCTORS (1971);
and Richard C. Levin, The Semiconductor Industy, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL
PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 9 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1982).
286 COHEN ET AL., supra note 265, at 32 tbl. 1 (reporting low mean percentages of
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patents to be effective appropriability mechanisms,"" a more rigorous
application of antitrust would not have an adverse effect on innova-
tion.
c. Ease of imitation
The final factor involves the inventor's ex ante determination of
the ease of imitation of the product after it is developed."' The easier
it is for competitors to imitate a product, the greater is the need for
patents. Once a new chemical structure (which is expensive to de-
velop) is marketed, for example, the cost of imitation is low.2s9 After
the correct compound and production processes are established, bulk
manufacture and formulation methods can readily be imitated.29'
Consequently, certain generic pharmaceutical firms "specialize in
copying brand-name products after the brand product's patent ex-
pires."2" On the other hand, the more difficult imitation is, the less
product innovations for these industries). A survey of R&D executives revealed that,
within a two-year period, one hundred percent of inventions in the office equipment,
motor vehicles, rubber products, and textiles industries, and ninety-nine percent in the
primary metals and instruments industries, would have been developed even without
patent protection. Mansfield, supra note 278.
287 See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 265, at 10 (reporting that managers consider
secrecy and lead time to be the two most effective appropriability mechanisms); Levin
et al., supra note 282, at 796 (demonstrating that, in their companies' R&D, managers
in only the chemical and petroleum refining industries believed that process patents
were important, while managers in only the chemical and steel mills industries thought
that product patents were important); Merges & Nelson, supra note 281, at 217 ("[l]n
most industries advantages associated with a head start, including establishment of
production and distribution facilities, and moving rapidly down a learning curve, were
judged significantly more effective than patents in enabling a firm to reap returns from
innovation."); F.M. Scherer, First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New Markets: Com-
ment, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 173, 175 (1994) (noting how in most corporations' R&D de-
cisions, patents played "a minor role" and "'the necessity of maintaining competitive
leadership' and 'profits resulting from customer belief in the company's technological
leadership'" were more critical (quoting F.M. SCHERER ET AL., PATENTS AND THE
CORPORATION 117-19 (2d ed. 1959)).
288 The inventor can ascertain this factor before the development of the product
based on characteristics of the relevant industry such as the likelihood of reverse engi-
neering.
289 See, e.g., SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 6, at 626-27 ("[I] mitators can free ride on
most of the innovator's investment."); TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 175, at 251
(noting the minimal research and marketing expense required to copy a drug);
VIscusi ET AL., supra note 20, at 820 (discussing the low cost of imitation). Other ex-
amples include the fabricated metals and food processing sectors, and some simple
machinery. Richard C. Levin, Patents in Perspective, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 519, 521 (1984).
290 TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 175, at 252.
291 VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 20, at 820. The Levin study found that patents raise
imitation costs by forty percent for new drugs and by twenty-five to thirty percent for
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necessary patents are: in complicated mechanical engineering indus-
tries, such as aircraft, guided missiles, and complex industrial machin-
ery, the difficulty of reverse engineering limits imitation.292
Firms' views on the effectiveness of patents to prevent copying and
to allow recovery of their initial expenditures may demonstrate not
only that products in the industries are difficult to create, but also that
they are easy to imitate. Further research thus may confirm that pat-
ents are essential to prevent imitation in industries such as pharma-
ceuticals, chemicals, biotechnology, and agricultural products2 93 and
that they are not critical for semiconductors, civilian aircraft, office
equipment, motor vehicles, rubber products, textiles, primary metals,
instruments, food, printing/publishing, steel, and electric compo-
nents.
294
Absent patent protection, imitation would not automatically hap-
pen in every instance. Imitators take some time to discover the new
25technology and determine whether it is worth copying. They also
may have to replicate some of the original R&D. Airplanes, for exam-
ple, require detailed engineering drawings, tools to produce the parts,
296prototypes, and thorough testing. Despite these caveats, the likeli-
hood of imitation is important in determining the necessity of patents.
The ex ante incentives thus reveal the roles of patents and compe-
tition in encouraging innovation before the product is created. In in-
dustries in which the market provides incentives to innovate and pat-
ents are not essential, antitrust can play a more prominent role and
need not be as concerned with quashing the incentives underlying the
patent system. Such a conclusion is supported in two respects. First,
there is less of a concern that any reduction in patent incentives will
chemical products. Levin et al., supra note 282, at 811.
292 Levin, supra note 289, at 521.
293 See supra notes 276-81 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text. For purposes of applying the
test proposed by this Article, it is not necessary to determine which of the factors-dif-
ficulty of creation, ease of imitation, or both-is responsible for a firm's conclusion on
the necessity of patents in an industry, since the satisfaction of either of these factors
demonstrates the importance of patents for innovation.
295 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 6, at 626 (describing the results of a study that
found that ten years was the average period of time before sixty percent of all relevant
producers adopted a technology and explaining that the speed of adoption may be
correlated with the profitability of adopting the technology, with companies that set a
high price encouraging imitation).
206 Id. One study revealed that the R&D costs of duplicating a significant unpat-
ented product exceed fifty percent of the original innovator's costs in 109 of 127 in-
dustries. Levin et al., supra note 282, at 809.
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reduce innovation, since, by definition, patents are not as essential in
the industry; second, increasing competition in the industry would
contribute to enhanced innovation.
2. Ex Post Perspective
The roles of competition and patents in achieving innovation are
also important after the issuance of the patent. A critical factor after
the patent has been granted is the cumulative nature of innovation in
the industry. In cumulative industries, innovation builds on previ-
ously developed products. 207 The more that innovation in an industry
is cumulative, the more the initial patent may restrict subsequent (or
"follow-on") innovation. In this situation, antitrust-whose focus on
competition often accelerates follow-on innovation as competitors
race to develop the next product generation-might have a more im-
portant role to play. Moreover, carving out a role for antitrust should
not substantially reduce the overall incentive to innovate: even if the
incentives supporting the initial patent diminish, those for post-patent
innovation likely would increase.
Some products will not encounter the problem of cumulative in-
novation. Discrete inventions, for example, typically do not incorpo-
rate numerous interrelated components and are not integral compo-
nents of a larger, continually developing product or system. So there
is less of a concern for these inventions that subsequent innovation
will be blocked by a broad initial patent or lack of competition. gs
But in many industries, such as automobiles, aircraft, semiconduc-
tors, and computer software, innovation is cumulative, with future ad-
27 See generally SCOTCHMER, supra note 254 (discussing consequences of cumula-
tive innovation, in which "innovators build on each other's discoveries"); Suzanne
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5
J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29, 29 ("Most innovators stand on the shoulders of
giants, and never more so than in the current evolution of high technologies [such as
molecular biology, pharmaceuticals, computer text editing, and computer spread-
sheets], where almost all technical progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier
innovators.").
298 The toy, consumer goods packaging, and power hand-tool industries are ex-
amples of industries with discrete inventions. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nel-
son, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880 (1990) (defin-
ing discrete inventions as "well-defined, created through the investor's insight and
hard work" and "not point[ing] the way to wide ranging subsequent technical ad-
vances"). Merges and Nelson posit four industry models explaining different patterns
of technical advance: (1) discrete invention, (2) cumulative technologies, (3) chemi-
cal technologies, and (4) science-based technologies. Id.
2002]
830 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 150: 761
vances building on present technology. 9 9 Computer software, for ex-
ample, can be viewed as "a series of inventions piled on top of each
other., 300 The chemical industry has attributes of both the discrete
and cumulative models, as the complex relationship between chemi-
cal structure and function precludes cumulative development, but
processes are improved in a cumulative fashion. 31 And science-based
technologies (such as biotechnology, lasers, and superconductors)
also emphasize cumulative development, with "research and devel-
opment efforts attempting to exploit recent scientific develop-
ments.
,,3 2
In these industries, there is a greater likelihood that an uncom-
promising deference to patents would limit post-patent innovation. 30
299 HALL & HAM, supra note 275, at 2-3;Jorde & Teece, supra note 175, at 48; Levin
et al., supra note 282, at 788. Also, molecular biologists consistently have relied on a
technique for inserting genes into bacteria developed in the early 1970s, and drugs
like insulin and antibiotics have been improved through successive innovations.
Scotchmer, supra note 297, at 29.
300 FTC REPORT, supra note 256, ch. 8, at 18 (citation omitted); see also Scotchmer,
supra note 297, at 29 ("Computer text editors are similar to one another, as are com-
puter spreadsheets, in large part because innovators have inspired each other."). Bes-
sen and Maskin demonstrate that because of the sequential and complementary nature
of innovation in the software industry, patent protection has reduced innovation and
social welfare. They substantiate their hypotheses with observations of cross-licensing
in the computer and semiconductor industries, the positive relationship between in-
novation and firm entry, and the correlation between the extension of patent protec-
tion to software in the 1980s and a relative decline in R&D activity. JAMES BESSEN &
ERIC MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND IMITATION (MIT, Working Pa-
per No. 00-01, 2000), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf.
301 Merges & Nelson, supra note 298, at 882-83.
302 Id. at 883 (footnote omitted).
303 As Merges and Nelson show, granting broad "pioneer" patents in cumulative
technology industries may limit innovation in a field after issuance of the patent. See
id. at 884-94 (documenting the effects of pioneer patents on the electrical lighting,
automobile, airplane, radio, and semiconductor industries). A famous example is
Thomas Edison's broad patent encompassing the use of a carbon filament as the
source of light: once the courts had validated this patent, the pace of improvements
slowed and Edison's company nearly doubled its market share. ARTHUR A. BRIGHT,
JR., THE ELEGrRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947, at 91-93 (1949). Bright noted that Edison's com-
petitors had quickly improved their lamp before the enforcement of the patent, but
that "[aifter the original introduction of the incandescent lamp and its first rapid
changes .. . the Edison Electric Light Company did not introduce many important
new developments. Edison himself turned to other problems, and the company's
technical leadership in incandescent lighting was not revived until after the [1876]
merger [forming General Electric]." Id. at 122.
Another example is the Wright brothers' patent on an expansive airplane stabiliza-
tion and steering system, which many believe limited the pace of aircraft development
in the United States. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 298, at 890-91 (noting that dur-
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Compounding this harm, in many of these industries, competitors in
an open marketplace would race to improve upon the initial patent.
304
But this competition does not get a chance to contribute when
blocked by the twenty-year right to exclude. So antitrust's significant
role in achieving innovation should be recognized in these circum-
stances, and the presence of cumulative innovation should make
courts more likely to apply Section 2.
3. Operation of the Rebuttal
By way of recap and further explanation, a plaintiff must demon-
strate the first ex ante factor-that there are market-based nonpatent
incentives to innovate in the industry. Proof of this element ensures
that courts' application of Section 2, by fostering competition, actually
will increase innovation.
The plaintiff also must prove at least one of the other two ex ante
subissues-that the product is easy to create or that it is difficult to
imitate.3°5 Requiring one of these factors to be met ensures that the
presence of market-based incentives alone does not trigger the con-
clusion that patents are not necessary in the industry. After all, such
incentives could apply in industries (e.g., the pharmaceutical indus-
try) in which patents also are critical. The second and third factors
highlight a prospective inventor's lack of a need for patents. In an in-
dustry in which a product is easy to create and difficult to imitate, it is
inconceivable that patents are necessary to recoup up-front expendi-
tures and to keep away free riders. And where one of these conditions
is met, the likelihood that patents are essential is vastly diminished-
either because a product that is easy to copy did not require
substantial expenditures to create, or because a product that is
difficult to create cannot easily be imitated. Thus, the plaintiff must
demonstrate only the second or third ex ante factor to show that
patents are not essential for innovation.
The ex post determination focuses on the cumulative nature of
innovation in the industry after the issuance of the patent. The more
ing World War I, the Secretary of the Navy insisted on automatic cross-licensing to
avoid the anticompetitive effects of the patent).
304 See SCHERER & Ross, supra note 6, at 635 (providing evidence of increased in-
vention by monopolists when challenged by smaller competitors).
305 The plaintiff will satisfy the rebuttal in the automobile, semiconductor, com-
puter software, and Internet industries. See supra Parts III.B.1-.2 (discussing how the
plaintiff can rebut the presumption of lawfulness in industries in which competition,
rather than patents, is the catalyst for innovation).
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that innovation is based on predecessor inventions, the greater should
be the role for antitrust. Vigorous competition among participants in
the market to develop the next generation of products will lead to
more post-patent innovation than an uncompromising deferral to the
incentives that encouraged the patentee to create the original prod-
uct.
The rebuttal applies only when both the ex ante and ex post per-
spectives favor competition. Applying Section 2 is strong medicine, so
we must be certain that it should be prescribed. The conjunction of
the two effects guarantees that competition plays a critical role in in-
novation, both before and after the patent grant, and along the axes
of appropriability and the paths of innovation. Moreover, the high
bar that the rebuttal sets prevents overenforcement of the antitrust
laws and interference with patent incentives in cases in which only one
of the perspectives is met, namely where: (1) competition (and not
patents) is necessary for innovation, but post-patent innovation is not
affected (e.g., in certain industries with discrete invention), or (2) the
industry is marked by cumulative innovation, but patents are essential
for innovation (e.g., the biotechnology industry). If the rebuttal is
met, then, by definition, any reduction in patent-based incentives to
innovate is less troubling, and the application of antitrust will promote
306
innovation.
Finally, in cases in which it is ambiguous whether any of the
stages-presumption, rebuttal, or surrebuttal' 0 -applies, the courts'
default position should be that the action is lawful. So, for example,
in industries in which both patents and competition are important in
achieving innovation (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry), and in in-
dustries in which neither is important (e.g., food products and metal-
working) ,38 Section 2 should not apply. °9 Such a position limits inter-
ference with patent incentives in cases where courts are not certain
that such interference is warranted or that the application of Section 2
306 Cf Lao, supra note 120, at 215-16 (concluding that limiting patent rights in in-
dustries in which they are not critical to innovation "would not necessarily deter inno-
vation").
307 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the surrebuttal.
I08 More specifically, industries in which neither patents nor competition-based
incentives are critical include the milk, meat products, iron and steel foundries, boiler
shops, and screw machine products (nuts, bolts, and screws) industries. Levin et al.,
supra note 282, at 802.




will enhance innovation.1 This approach also is consistent with the
relative error costs of applying antitrust analysis.3"
C. The Surrebuttal
Just because the monopolist operates in a particular industry does
not mean that it automatically has violated Section 2. So where the
1. 312
rebuttal applies, the monopolist will have a chance to offer a surre-
buttal. The rebuttal connotes the conceptual industry-wide conclusion
that competition is necessary for innovation; the surrebuttal allows the
defendant to rebut this overview with actual evidence that the relevant•1 . .• 314
market in the industry31 is in fact marked by innovation. In a fast-
310 In other words, the test errs on the side of applying the antitrust laws in an un-
derinclusive fashion. But by conducting the analysis at the level of industry, it cabins
the underinclusiveness (even accounting for the costs of administering the test) by
forging a tighter fit with welfare than that offered by global, non-industry-based ap-
proaches.
The "error costs" approach draws on the often-voiced contention that false
convictions (in which a defendant is wrongfully found guilty of, say, monopolization)
are more harmful than false acquittals (in which the defendant is wrongfully exoner-
ated). Several arguments support such a contention.
First, false convictions may increase litigation and encourage plaintiffs to redress
their grievances in court. This is particularly true where the act challenged is based on
a patentee's right to exclude, which piaintiffs may always view as a justified trigger for a
lawsuit. Second, and relatedly, such errors may encourage monopolists to compete
less vigorously and to enter into agreements with their competitors. Third, false con-
victions cannot be remedied by the marketplace-once the defendant is found guilty,
it may be forced to leave the market or, at a minimum, will likely be much weaker than
it had been (and should have been). Nor can the deterrent effect of such convictions
on innovation easily be corrected. False acquittals, on the other hand, often (though
not always) can be remedied through the marketplace, as exonerated monopolists are
still subject to the demands of the market, particularly in high-technology markets,
where the tide of competition continually threatens to erode monopoly. See generally
Cass & Hylton, supra note 274, at 30-33 (discussing why false convictions of monopo-
lists cost "far more" than false acquittals). The costs of false convictions are even
greater where they affect not only the competition process but also the incentives un-
derlying the patent system.
32 Obviously, where the presumption but not the rebuttal applies, as in industries
in which patents play a critical role in innovation, the activity will be presumed lawful.
313 Although the relative roles of patents and competition in attaining innovation
should be constant throughout industries, the actual levels of innovation experienced
may vary by market within any particular industry. For example, patents may be critical
to innovation across the entirety of the pharmaceutical industry, but markets for dif-
ferent drugs might reveal varying levels of innovation. The relevant market will typi-
cally be the market in which the patentee's activity occurs. In certain situations, it
might encompass downstream or related markets. While an effect in a related market
will not, standing alone, penalize the monopolist-in contrast to the test offered by
some commentators that focuses solely on the number of markets implicated, supra
Part l.C.2-the absence of innovation in a competition-centered related market could
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paced market with new and improved products and services, Section 2
should not be viewed as the "icing on the cake" that would promote
even more innovation. The presence of innovation demonstrates
that, even if competition is necessary, the market is already providing
enough incentives for the monopolist actually to offer innovation.
So by focusing the surrebuttal on actual levels of innovation in the
market, the test concludes on the output central to the Article and en-
sures that it will operate only in markets that lack innovation.
D. Applications
In an effort to give more shape to the rebuttable presumption, let
prevent the defendant from proving the surrebuttal.
314 The amount of innovation need not clear some predefined positive threshold.
Some true (i.e., nonsham) innovation is enough. Cf Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at
1045 ("[A] n act of innovation should never be condemned under section 2 unless it is
some kind of 'sham."'). But if, for example, a market is not benefitting from new and
improved products, while other analogous markets are, then the lack of innovation
should be apparent. Finally, because of the unique importance of innovation, dis-
cussed supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text, and the difficulties of trading off
increases in innovation against increases in prices-how much increase in price, for
example, would justify a small increase in innovation?-innovation (and not price) is
the only output that courts should analyze. The test thus errs on the side of recogniz-
ing modest amounts of innovation rather than second-guessing such innovation and
assuming the possibility of additional innovation. See supra note 311 (explaining the
"error costs" approach and the contention that false convictions are more harmful
than false acquittals).
315 The surrebuttal also ensures that courts view innovation as an unmitigated
benefit, rather than hypothesizing pernicious reasons for the innovation, as the district
court did in Microsoft "While Microsoft may not be able to stave off all potential para-
digm shifts through innovation, it can thwart some and delay others by improving its
own products to the greater satisfaction of consumers." 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26 (D.D.C.
1999) (findings of fact); see also id. (dismissing innovations that make Intel-compatible
computers more attractive to consumers because they increase the company's profits
and "push the emergence of competition even farther into the future by continuing to
innovate aggressively"). The antitrust laws should reward, not punish, enhanced inno-
vation and consumer satisfaction.
316 Economists long have debated whether innovation occurs more frequently in
markets characterized by monopoly or competition. Compare SCHUMPETER, supra note
14, at 87-106 (arguing that monopolists are encouraged to innovate because of scale
economies in R&D and increased appropriation of the full value of their ideas), with
KENNETH J. ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
EssAYs IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 156-60 (3d ed. 1976) (arguing that mo-
nopolists may have less incentive to innovate than innovators in competitive industries
because they have more to lose than competitors). This is still an unresolved question.
See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 234, at 1011 ("Although there are fairly simple and well-
accepted generalizations as to which market structures stimulate the most rapid pace
of innovation, the question of what progress rate is socially optimal, and . . .which
market structure driving it is best, is extremely complex and poorly settled.").
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us consider how the approach would apply to three hypothetical pat-
entee monopolists: the Bully Monopolist, the Biopharmaceutical Pat-
entee, and the Internet Auctioneer.
1. The Bully Monopolist
The first application involves a monopolist that licenses its pat-
ented product only to licensees that agree not to deal with the mo-
nopolist's competitors. This example brings to mind (ignoring for
the moment the fact that the product is protected by copyright, rather
than patent) Microsoft pressuring Intel to support Windows-specific
Java rather than cross-platform (i.e., interoperable) Java,"' or threat-
ening to cancel Mac Office, a profitable product, unless Apple com-
3181
promised on unrelated matters. In this first hypothetical, the pre-
sumption of lawfulness is never triggered since the activity makes
sense only by hurting the monopolist's competitors. Consumers do
not benefit in any direct or indirect way from the activity. Nor could
the defendant offer a justification based on the recovery of its fixed
costs from developing the product. Nor again could the defendant
utilize a justification similar to that used to explain exclusive dealing
agreements (in which, for example, a distributor agrees to deal with
only a particular manufacturer)-that such agreements ensure that
the distributor uses its best efforts to market the manufacturer's prod-
ucts.3 19 Here, the only conceivable effect of the conduct is to harm a
competitor. Any incentives to innovate underlying the patent system
seem wholly irrelevant in the context of such conduct. In short, the
presumption of lawfulness will not apply to the conduct which, under
current caselaw, likely will violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 32°
317 Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
318 See 84 F. Supp. 2d at 95-97, 107-10 (findings of fact) (describing the resulting
"Technology Agreement" between Microsoft and Apple Computer); 253 F.3d at 73-75
(discussing various threats to cancel Mac Office and Microsoft's recognition of the im-
portance to Apple of its continued support of the product).
319 See Posner, supra note 238, at 124 (describing how exclusive dealing agree-
ments may promote efficiency by encouraging a distributor to promote the manufac-
turer's goods). For example, Microsoft's offer to various companies of favorable
placement on the Windows desktop or in other places (such as the interactive "Active
Desktop") in return for their promotion of Microsoft's browser, Internet Explorer,
served as a potential means to promote Microsoft's product, an act that made sense
even if it did not injure Microsoft's competitors.
320 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608
(1985) (finding a Section 2 violation where a monopolist "fail[ed] to offer any effi-
ciency justification whatever" for withdrawing from a joint arrangement with a com-
petitor and consequently lost business); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.
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2. The Biopharmaceutical Patentee
Case 2 recalls the hypothetical example of CureFinder introduced
at the beginning of the Article.32' A monopolist biopharmaceutical
company discovers the gene responsible for a disease and the protein
coded by the gene, and it develops, extensively tests, and markets a
drug that appears to cure the disease. It then refuses to share with a
competitor the patented drug it develops. This conduct will be pre-
sumptively lawful, and the rebuttal will not apply.
First, the presumption applies since CureFinder's conduct is based
on the patent and has a business justification: exploiting the patent to
recover its extensive initial investment. Second, the rebuttal does not
apply, chiefly because patents are critical to innovation in the fields of
pharmaceuticals and (particularly for downstream development) bio-
technology. 2 The process of developing and commercializing phar-
maceuticals is lengthy and expensive, with many failed leads and no
guarantee of success. In addition, once the drug is developed, it is
easy for free-riding competitors to replicate this work. So even if there
are market-based incentives to innovate, the demonstration by the
second and third ex ante factors of the importance of patents ensures
that innovation in the industry cannot possibly be achieved exclusively
through competition. And even if competition is important from the
ex post perspective-as it seems to be, since biopharmaceutical R&D
occurs in a cumulative fashion 23-an ex post effect alone is not
enough for the rebuttal to apply. The presence of significant ex ante
patent-based incentives ensures that the rebuttal does not apply. Con-
sequently, the presumption of legality will carry the day for Cure-
Finder's refusal to license its patented product. CureFinder's actions
will not violate Section 2.24
143, 149-50, 152-53 (1951) (finding that a local newspaper attempted to monopolize
the market for local advertising when it refused to accept advertising from parties that
also advertised on a competitor radio station); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC
Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 1999) ("If the conduct has no rational business pur-
pose other than its adverse effects on competitors, an inference that it is exclusionary
is su?orted." (citing Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 585)).
Supra Part I.A.2.
32 See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of dis-
covering, developing, and marketing new drugs).
323 See supra notes 301-02 and accompanying text (noting how cumulative devel-
opment allows R&D to make use of recent scientific advances).
324 The rebuttal also would not apply in the chemicals industry (in which market
pioneers do not survive longer than later entrants, patents are important for innova-
tion, and chemical structures are easy to imitate). Albeit for a different reason-the
failure, in industries marked by discrete innovation, of ex post considerations to show
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3. The Internet Auctioneer
In Case 3, a monopolist Internet company3 2 5 patents an "on-line"
auction, through which a consumer seller lists an item for sale, poten-
tial purchasers search the listings and bid on the item, and the seller
sells the item to the highest bidder.3 26 The company refuses to share
this patent with a competitor that wishes to apply the bidding concept
in an analogous setting. If there is innovation in the market, the sur-
rebuttal will apply and the conduct will be upheld, but if there is no
innovation, then the rebuttal will apply, with the result that the com-
pany has violated Section 2.327
First, the presumption applies since the defendant rationally can
exploit its patented product by refusing to license it. Second, the re-
buttal applies, most significantly because there are substantial nonpat-
ent market-based incentives to innovate in the market for Internet
auctions. This is a network effects market: the more buyers and sell-
ers that are present at an Internet auction, the more valuable it is.
Internet companies thus have very powerful incentives to bring the
first Internet auction website to market. Once a customer has located
such a site, "bookmarked" it, and told her friends about it, it will be
the necessity of competition-the toy, power hand tool, and consumer goods packag-
ing industries also would not be subject to the rebuttal.
325 Many Internet and related companies appear to have very significant (perhaps
even monopoly) shares of the market. In 2001, for example, Cisco had more than
sixty percent of the market for high-speed routers directing traffic on the Internet, and
the Palm operating system ran approximately eighty-seven percent of the handheld
computers in the market for "personal digital assistants." Alexei Oreskovic, Palm Losing
Grip on Market Share, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, at http://www.thestandard.com/
article/0,1902,23850,00.html (Apr. 20, 2001); Wylie Wong, Cisco Widens Lead Against
Juniper, CNET NEws.coM, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-6909139.html
(Aug. 17, 2001). In 2000, Oracle software managed databases on more than sixty-five
percent of the Unix networks, and Intel had more than eighty percent of the PC mi-
croprocessor market. Cade Metz, PC Sales Down, Chip Competition Up, PC MAGAZINE, at
http://www.pcmag.com/article/0,2997,s%253D990%2526a%253D7348,00.asp (July
11, 2001); Rick Whiting, Database Market Is Three-Way Race, Report Says,
INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, at http://www.informationweek.com/story/
IWK2001052350012 (May 23, 2001).
326 See Cohen & Noll, supra note 283, at 468 (discussing increases in software pat-
ents including patents for "on-line auctions," which keep competitors from writing
software that makes use of the basic idea of auctions).
327 Some may question whether Internet business methods should be patentable
in the first place. But even if the patent system is not adjusted simultaneously with the
adoption of the rebuttable presumption, some of these underlying concerns will be
addressed by the proposed test. Further, as discussed infra Part IV.C, reconciling the
conflict between the patent and antitrust laws is a more nuanced approach than
merely adjusting the patent system.
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that much more difficult for the second Internet auctioneer to con-
vince all of these users to switch to its website.32s
Not only are there market-based incentives to innovate, but the
factor relating to the ease of creating the product demonstrates that
patents are not necessary. Creating a method for doing business on
the Internet is not expensive (it often requires just a programmer and
a computer) and often not time-consuming (unlike the search for the
next miracle drug, it just requires the development of an often un-
329complicated idea).
The ex post analysis also demonstrates the necessity of competi-
tion. The auction site that is dominant today likely will not be the site
that prevails in just a few years (or perhaps even a few months).
There are bound to be improvements to, for example, the accuracy
and rapidity of responses to bids, the complexity and diversity of fea-
tures on the site, etc. It would not make sense for future sites to be
developed out of thin air, invented around the current patented auc-
tion, but for improvements to be made to the presently operated site.
Competition among web designers to create the next auction site will
optimize post-patent development of the market. Since the ex ante
and ex post considerations both recognize the role of competition in
achieving innovation, the rebuttal applies.33 °
The auction site monopolist then has a chance to show the pres-
ence of innovation in the market. Has innovation ground to a stand-
still? This would be the case if, say, the market for Internet auctions
has failed to progress while other analogous markets (like markets for
other consumer-to-consumer websites) have incorporated new (and
readily transferable) generations of technologies. Or is the market
characterized by the fast-paced development of new products and
services? The answer to this question will determine if the surrebuttal
is met and, consequently, if the monopolist has violated Section 2.
Such a conclusion makes sense: the application of the rebuttal dem-
328 Network effects on the Internet, of course, will not be limited to auctions. Mes-
saging services, chat rooms, and dating services are but a few other obvious examples.
See Evans, supra note 238, at 51 (discussing the network effects present in various
Internet markets).
329 Many such business methods have already been developed on the Internet in
remarkably short periods of time.
330 The rebuttal also would apply in the semiconductor and automobile industries
(in which time to market is important, patents are not necessary to create the product,
and invention takes place in a cumulative fashion) and in the computer software in-




onstrates that competition contributes to innovation in the industry,
and the surrebuttal focuses on the ultimate question of whether the
market is in fact characterized by innovation. In this case, it seems
likely that the Internet markets are characterized by innovation, thus
allowing the Internet Auctioneer monopolist to utilize the surrebuttal
to escape liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
A comparison of the results of the proposed test with the four rep-
resentative cases discussed earlier in the Article33' demonstrates the
promise of the new approach. Take CureFinder, the biopharmaceuti-
cal patentee. One court would uphold the company's refusal to li-
cense because it was within the scope of the patent (Xerox); two courts
would punish it on the grounds that it was predatory (Microsoft) or
denied an essential facility (Intel district court); and one court's con-
clusion would depend on the company's intent (Kodak 11).32 None of
these tests even attempts to ascertain the net result of the conduct on
innovation or welfare. The approach proposed in this Article eschews
such formalism and tailors its analysis to the industry at issue. The test
also is grounded in the reality of market conditions. Even in indus-
tries in which competition is the catalyst for innovation, a Section 2
violation can be found only after the market is examined and found to
be lacking in innovation. Application of the test would lead to the
conclusion that, because of the crucial role patents play in attaining
innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry, the rebuttal is not satis-
fied, and CureFinder does not violate Section 2 .
331 Supra Part I.B.
332 For a discussion of the extrapolation of courts' approaches to new factual set-
tings, see supra note 50, cautioning against applying a test developed in the context of
a particular fact pattern to a new scenario.
33 The approach also solves some of the difficulties presented by Kaplow's "ratio"
test, discussed supra Part I.C.6. First, courts will be more likely to apply the approach,
whose primary focus lies on the level of industry, not of particular licensing agree-
ments. For many of these industries, respected studies have demonstrated the roles
played by patents and competition in attaining innovation. See infra note 340 (noting
five such studies).
Second, the approach solves some interdependency problems by moving the de-
bate from the common denominator of social welfare to that of innovation. Innova-
tion is not subject to the same synergistic relationship among each of its manifesta-
tions. For example, a court decision affecting a monopolist's patent-based activity in
the pharmaceutical industry will not automatically affect innovation in the automobile
industry, particularly if the decision is grounded in conceptions of how innovation is
achieved in the pharmaceutical industry. Even if there is some relationship among
2002]
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industries, innovation can reside in a more multidimensional construct than can the
single calculation of social welfare. At the same time, innovation benefits from being
the most important factor in achieving economic growth. See supra notes 233-37 and
accompanying text (discussing economic studies that have revealed a powerful link
between innovation and economic growth). Therefore, even if it is a narrower com-
mon denominator, innovation still contributes substantially to the broader social wel-
fare.
Shifting the common denominator might not completely solve the feedback loop
between patent-antitrust doctrine and the optimal patent life (or lives). Each applica-
tion of the test offered by this Article could have some effect on the optimal patent life.
But this effect is likely to be more theoretical than practical. In those industries that
are most affected (those in which patents are not critical to competition), any weaken-
ing of the patent grant is not likely to have a significant effect on innovation. So even
if, in theory, a patent life in a competition-based industry (assuming, for the moment,
more than one optimal patent life) would need to be extended to compensate for the
narrowing of patent breadth, this extension (from, say, twenty years to twenty-two
years) would be beside the point when market-based incentives have altered the mar-
ket dramatically by year twenty, rendering the patent largely irrelevant as a practical
matter.
Finally, the proposed test aims to increase invention, not just patentee reward. By
moving from the level of the individual agreement to that of the relevant industry, the
relationship between patentee reward and inventive activity finally can be ascertained.
Empirical industry-based studies of the link will replace individualized determinations
of the motivations of individual patentees. The analysis thus will not bog down in is-
sues such as the importance for each patentee of the patent in achieving innovation,
or the patentee's repeat involvement in the inventive process and familiarity with anti-
trust restraints. Rather, inquiry will focus on factors determining the need for patents
in particular industries, such as a product's difficulty of creation and ease of imitation,
and the presence of market-based incentives to innovate. These industry-specific de-
terminations inform Kaplow's observation, on the individual level, that "inventors' de-
cisions to undertake inventive activity are based on their perceptions of potential re-
wards before they undertake the activity." Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1838 (emphasis
omitted). The difference between Kaplow's approach and the approach presented in
this Article is that the link between patentee reward and inventive activity can be un-
earthed only when we leave the level of the individual practice and move to the level of
industry. The benefit of forging the link is that the goal to be maximized becomes in-
vention rather than reward to patentees-a distinction that matters most in industries
in which patents are not critical to innovation. In these situations, application of this
Article's test likely would lead to a different result than that provided by the Kaplow
test.
Matched up against the Kaplow ratio test, most factors in the industry-specific ap-
proach offered by this Article would fall into an expansive version of the numerator in
their focus on inventive activity. The ex ante factors, for example, in analyzing the role
of patents in achieving innovation, could be placed there. The ex post factor, in rec-
ommending a stronger role for competition in industries in which innovation is cumu-
lative, could be treated as a variant of the denominator in its focus on monopoly loss:
a patent in an industry with cumulative innovation will, ceteris paribus, result in greater
monopoly loss than a patent in an industry with discrete innovation. So, extrapolating
the ex ante and ex post factors to this construct, a stronger role for antitrust would be
envisioned in industries in which the numerator was small (because patents are not
necessary for innovation) and the denominator was large (because innovation is cumu-
lative). But again, the proposed test aims to be practically applicable, as it does not
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IV. COUNTERING THE OBJECTIONS
The test elaborated in Part III offers a new approach to the para-
dox presented by the intersection of the patent and antitrust laws.
But it is more than a modest proposal. Three objections can be an-
ticipated: (1) the test is too complicated for courts to apply, (2) it re-
duces the incentives underlying the patent system, and (3) similar re-
sults could be achieved merely by adjusting the patent system. The
next three Sections address these potential criticisms.
A. Application of the Test
The first objection is that courts cannot apply the proposed test-
it is too complicated, and courts cannot determine how innovation is
achieved in various industries. This Section demonstrates that, to the
contrary, courts can apply the test, and assistance from the govern-
ment antitrust enforcement agencies would provide even more sup-
port for the courts' position.
1. The Rebuttable Presumption
As a matter of form, a rebuttable presumption is a particularly
useful tool by which courts can structure their analysis, as it promises a
middle ground between amorphous open-ended standards and in-
flexible bright-line rules.3 3 4 Jurisprudence under Section 13 of the
Sherman Act provides examples of these two extremes. On the one
hand is the kitchen-sink approach of the Rule of Reason, by which
courts consider multiple factors in deciding whether restraints be-
tween competitors are "unreasonable." On the other is per se con-
demnation, which leads to blanket condemnation of activities like
price fixing and market allocation agreements. In between per se and
Rule-of-Reason analysis are presumptions. Presumptions provide de-
fault positions that give shape to, but do not hamstring, the analysis.
Presumptions promise certainty for parties, increased predictability,
require the calculation of ratios, but rather pinpoints observable inputs in the innova-
tion process and orders them in a rebuttable presumption.
See Areeda, supra note 234, at 42 ("Carefully formulated presumptions to im-
plement open-ended legal rules can approach the clarity of bright line rules without
sacrificing flexible responsiveness to the peculiarities of the particular case.").
335 Like analysis under Section 2, Section 1 interpretation resembles common law
analysis. The law develops case by case, with no assistance from the statutory language.
See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (noting that the vague language of Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act does not illuminate the Act's objectives).
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and the reduction of error costs.
Presumptions, of course, are only as effective as their component
parts. Here, courts can apply each of the three stages of the proposed
test. The presumption requires only that courts determine whether
the practice makes economic sense solely by injuring competitors. It
is similar to the "business justification" analysis that antitrust courts
today employ under Section 2.336 Courts need not explore subjective
intentions; rather, they just need to determine the likely effect of the
conduct. Similarly, courts can apply the surrebuttal. Although inno-
vation may be slightly less measurable than price or output, its pres-
ence or absence typically will be apparent, as courts that have exam-
337ined the issue have demonstrated. Moreover, courts need not
compare the level of innovation in the market to a particular thresh-. 338
old; its presence alone is sufficient.
The most challenging stage for courts to apply will be the rebut-
tal. 39 Determining the relative roles of patents and competition in
336 See supra note 245 (describing this analysis).
337 See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text (citing illustrative decisions).
338 Courts also can filter out inauthentic "innovation" that results in no improve-
ments in the market.
339 A prerequisite to the application of the rebuttal involves the definition and
boundaries of particular industries. Denoting the industry as the unit of analysis as-
sumes that various types of firms within the industry achieve innovation in a similar
manner. To the extent that this is not true and that certain firms, for example, in the
biotechnology "industry" rely more on competition than patents, the relevant unit of
analysis must contract to embrace a subset of the industry for which consistent innova-
tion-specific conclusions can be drawn. In that case, further study of the "industry" is
called for. But in most cases, this should not present difficulties. Most companies fall
into obvious, discrete industries in which broad conclusions about attaining innovation
can be drawn-personal computer manufacturers, commercial aircraft, automobiles,
and pharmaceutical companies, to name but a few. Moreover, the fact that the relative
contributions to innovation in a particular industry may evolve over a period of time
does not deny that the typical industry will not experience such radical and overnight
change. (If it does, then parties should be able to demonstrate that previous studies of
the industry are less persuasive.) Finally, it is worth remembering that courts will not
be creating a genus-species taxonomy chart for which the relationship between every
industry needs to be sketched precisely; they will only be addressing particular (typi-
cally repeat) industries in which a company has an overwhelming share of the market
and a Section 2 claim has been filed on account of the company's patent-based activity.
Nor should the application of the test to new industries be a cause for concern.
Even if, for these industries, courts cannot rely on economic studies that will prove
helpful in other industries, the application of most of the ex ante and ex post factors
should be straightforward. By the time the court considers a challenged patent-based
practice, it will be able to determine the presence or absence of market-based incen-
tives to innovate in the industry and the ease of creation, and difficulty of imitation, of
the product or process. The only factor that might prove challenging is the cumulative
nature of innovation in a fledging industry that is still in the first generation of a pat-
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Even the testimony of dueling experts on the issue of how innovation
is achieved in particular industries will be received subject to the
backdrops of the economists' studies and measurable objective factors
such as the cost of invention and the presence of network effects.
3 44
Each of the factors in the ex ante and ex post perspectives could,
in certain cases, be resolved by the court at summary judgment or on
motion for a directed verdict.3 45 For example, the court could readily
determine the application of the rebuttal in industries such as phar-
maceuticals, chemicals, the Internet, computer software, semiconduc-
tors, and automobiles. Moreover, even juries could apply the factors
of the rebuttal. The issues of market-based incentives to innovate,
ease of creating and difficulty of imitating products, and cumulative-
ness of innovation are narrower and more focused (and certainly not
more difficult to apply) than other tasks with which juries have been
charged, such as balancing the anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects of agreements between competitors, delineating the bounda-
ries of markets, and determining whether a monopolist's action is
"exclusionary." Moreover, the jury's conclusion on each of the ex
ante and ex post factors of the rebuttal can be checked (and even re-
versed) through the use of special verdicts or general verdicts with in-
546terrogatories.
In short, the rebuttable presumption offered by this Article ac-
knowledges the nuances of the intersection that preclude inflexible
bright-line rules, and it recognizes the need for direction so often
lacking in indeterminate open-ended standards. Furthermore, the
rebuttable presumption is consistent with the types of tasks that courts
and juries have undertaken, and it builds on respected economic stud-
ies that already have examined how innovation is achieved in various
industries. The antitrust government enforcement agencies can pro-
vide yet additional assistance in this endeavor.
2. Antitrust Government Enforcement Agencies
Because of the complexity of the issues, assistance from the anti-
344 In applying the rebuttal, courts should focus not on the parties before the
court but on the characteristics of the relevant industries.
345 The court also could resolve the presumption and surrebuttal inquiries at these
stages in many cases. Courts, as opposed to juries, will decide the outcome of a case
when the parties waive their right to ajury trial or when the government brings a case
seeking only equitable relief. 2 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 2, 306(d), at 62.
346 See FED. R. CIv. P. 49 (authorizing the use of special verdicts and general ver-
dicts accompanied by answers to interrogatories).
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particular industries could, in theory, call for exhaustive proceedings
and the comparative evaluations of experts. But courts need not at-
tempt to tackle matters on their own. In particular, several well-
respected studies by economists examining how innovation is
achieved in various industries should prove a constructive starting
point.3 40 For many industries covered by these studies, the conclusions
can be adopted automatically by courts, absent any showing that they
are dated or not applicable in a particular case. For example, the
studies demonstrate that industry executives consider patent protec-
tion important in a handful of industries, such as chemicals, pharma-
ceuticals, and biotechnology,34' and that they consider the benefits of
competition to be vital in most other industries.3 42 Therefore, courts
can readily dismiss arguments by patentee monopolists that patents
are critical in industries such as, for example, computer software or
the Internet, or arguments by plaintiffs that competition is the pri-
mary incentive for innovation in the pharmaceutical or chemicals in-
dustries. Although new studies-particularly of industries not previ-
ously examined-are necessary and should be undertaken, the studies
343already completed should prove of significant assistance to courts.
ented product. In that case, the ex ante factors will be vital, supplemented by an edu-
cated guess and reasoning by analogy to similar industries on the ex post perspective.
340 E.g., COHEN ET AL., suprn note 265; F.M. SCHERER ET AL., PATENTS AND THE
CORPORATION (2d ed. 1959); TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 175; Levin et al., supra
note 2 2; Mansfield, supra note 278.
For a discussion of the evolving and nonhomogeneous nature of the biotech-
noloqi industry (which could entail further subdivision), see supra note 278.
Of course, even well-intentioned executives might be mistaken in their beliefs.
But the overlap between executive beliefs and measurable determinants from indus-
tries (such as the difficulty of creation and ease of imitation) assuages some of these
concerns.
343 The methodology and authors of any new studies should reveal if the works are
not entitled to deference on account of being, for example, funded by particular in-
dustries. The Levin and Cohen studies provide examples of studies to be emulated.
The Levin study surveyed high-level R&D executives on the effectiveness of patents,
alternative means of appropriation, and the cost of imitating rivals' innovations; it
compiled the responses of 650 executives in 130 industries to a questionnaire that was
based on literature concerning technological change, the economic impact of the pat-
ent system, scholarly work on imitation costs, and case studies. Levin et al., supra note
282, at 785, 789-90. The Cohen study surveyed 1478 R&D laboratories in the manufac-
turing sector to determine the percentage of innovations for which various appropri-
ability mechanisms were effective. COHEN ET AL., supra note 265, at 35. The Cohen
study also sought to determine why firms patented inventions. See id. at 16-24 (analyz-
ing reasons for patenting such as preventing copying, preventing other firms' attempts
to patent related inventions, earning licensing revenue, strengthening the firm's posi-
tion in negotiations with other firms, preventing infringement suits, measuring inter-
nal performance of a firm's technology workers, and enhancing the firm's reputation).
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trust government enforcement agencies would be helpful. Nearly all
of the staff of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the U.S. Department of Justice possess antitrust experience,
and some (such as those in a section of the agency devoted to intellec-
tual property) also have patent expertise. Economists, researchers,
and other professionals join lawyers at the agencies, and all are well-
suited to undertake broad analyses of industries.347 The agencies also
can call on a wide range of experience outside the government-as
the FTC did in its 1996 hearings on global-based competitionS4"-and
in fellow agencies. 349 The FTC's 2002 hearings on "Competition and
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Econ-
omy" promise to shed additional light on the subject in focusing on
"the implications of antitrust and patent law and policy for innovation
and other aspects of consumer welfare."35°
The issuance of guidelines would be the most helpful act that the
35'agencies could undertake. Guidelines take a comprehensive ap-proach to a particular area of law, contain supporting theory, and are
347 See 2 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 2, 302(h) (5), at 25 (arguing that the FTC can
probe an industry with more depth than can the courts).
38 Witnesses at the hearings included academics from a broad range of institu-
tions and representatives from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, American Intellectual
Property Law Association, American Pharmaceutical Association, AOL, AT&T, Citi-
corp, Coca-Cola, GE, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Kodak, Lockheed Martin, Novell, Pfizer,
Sun, Texas Instruments, U.S. West, and Disney. FTC REPORT, supra note 256, app. A.
The chance that the FTC (or the Antitrust Division) would suffer from "capture" by
affected companies would appear to be less than that at other federal agencies. The
antitrust agencies each regulate at least half of the economy-they typically divide the
industries for which they are responsible-in contrast to most agencies, which regulate
a single industry. Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature
of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REv. 1383, 1428 (1998). The final report on global
competition issued by the FTC (as well as, for example, the Intellectual Property
Guidelines) reveal the agencies' professional nature and the lack of any apparent cap-
ture. See generally FTC REPORT, supra note 256; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES,
supra note 16.
s49 For example, the FTC has turned to the National Institutes of Health for bio-
technology issues, the Federal Communications Commission for communications ex-
pertise, and the Food and Drug Administration for help on pharmaceutical mergers.
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New
Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 558 (2001).
350 Notice of Public Hearings and Opportunity for Comment, Federal Trade
Commission, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001 / 11/ciphearingsfrn.htm (Nov. 15, 2001).
351 Such guidelines would not be a one-shot promulgation. Rather, they would
evolve as the agencies continue to amass experience with the issue of industry-specific
innovation. The FTC's hearings on global-based competition provide a strong starting
point, as they include testimony from the business community on how innovation is
achieved in various industries.
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not bound by the facts of any particular case. These features allow the
agencies to take more expansive approaches than courts. Guide-
lines also provide the framework that the agencies will use in deciding
353
whether to challenge a practice.
Moreover, there is precedent for guidelines. In the past decade
alone, the agencies have issued Horizontal Merger Guidelines,354 In-
ternational Guidelines, 315 Intellectual Property Guidelines, s56 and
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors.57 Of particular
significance here are the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines devel-
oped jointly by the Justice Department and the FTC. These guidelines
offer an overview of the conflict between the antitrust and the intellec-
tual property laws, reasonable presumptions with which to analyze the
intersection of the two areas of law, and illustrative examples of the
treatment of patent licensing transactions. Courts have shown in-
creasing respect for (or, at a minimum, awareness of) guidelines as
standards of evaluation upon which they can rely. For example, the
various Merger Guidelines have been cited in more than 100 federal
antitrust cases, and the International and Health Care Guidelines also
have been cited extensively.3 53 Adoption of guidelines concerning the
relative roles played by patents and competition in achieving innova-
tion in various industries would supplement the studies that have been
undertaken by economists and would provide additional assistance to
courts.
3. Role of the Courts Under Section 2
The new test will not require amendment of the Sherman Act. It
is consistent with the statute's amorphous text and indeterminate leg-
islative history, and with the primary role that courts have played in
352 See Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REv. 1677, 1698,
1709 (1995) (contending that the persuasive power of guidelines exceeds that of most
reasoned judicial decisions because the judicial format is not well adapted to general-
ized policy analysis).
3 Waller, supra note 348, at 1405. Because the decision of the government to
challenge an action is so important, "[t]he guidelines ... enjoy considerably greater
stature than the case law itself." Id. at 1404.
354 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (1992).
355 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995).
356 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 16.
357 GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS, supra note 232.
358 Waller, supra note 348, at 1405-06.
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the development of antitrust jurisprudence.
As discussed above, the Sherman Act is an open-ended statute.9
Adopting a new innovation-increasing, industry-specific approach is at
least as consistent with the statute and the legislative history as other
approaches that have predominated-from immunity for patenthold-
ers, to essential facilities, to presumptions rebuttable on the grounds
of pretext.3st And, again, courts have played by far the most significant
161role in developing antitrust jurisprudence. Such a role has wit-
nessed many shifts and reversals of Section 2 analysis. Even now, after
more than a century of interpreting Section 2, courts apply many dif-
ferent approaches-as revealed by the Xerox, Kodak II, Inte4 and Micro-
soft cases _to claims involving intellectual property. None of these
approaches required a change in the statute. In fact, none of the dis-
parate goals motivating antitrust analysis in the past century (and of-
ten changing generation by generation) were accompanied by
changes in the statute.
To the extent courts focus on innovation, they are merely select-
ing a type of efficiency that they already have recognized (especially
recently) as an important goal of the Sherman Act, and that Congress,
in related contexts, has acknowledged is essential to the competitive-
ness of the U.S. economy. 36s And to the extent this test displaces other
approaches, it promises greater predictability and certainty as to how
courts will treat monopolists' patent-based activity.
359 Supra Part II.B.2.a.
There is always the risk that certain industries will lobby Congress for legisla-
tion declaring the patent-centered nature of innovation in their industry. The legisla-
ture should tread carefully before offering such sui generis protection, and courts
should analyze any such legislation realistically, considering it to be more closely
aligned with industry-sponsored studies than objective surveys.
361 See supra text accompanying notes 214-23 (outlining the role of courts in the
evolution of antitrust law).
362 See supra Part I.B (describing and analyzing the approaches used by the courts
in the four cases).
363 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (4)-(5) (1994) (stating that the refusal to license a pat-
ented product and the tying of a patented product for which the inventor lacks market
power to a second product do not constitute patent misuse); National Cooperative
Production Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, § 2, 107 Stat. 117, 117 ("It is the
purpose of this Act to promote innovation, facilitate trade, and strengthen the com-
petitiveness of the United States in world markets ...."); National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815, 1815-16 (intending to "promote
research and development, encourage innovation, stimulate trade, and make necessary
and appropriate modifications in the operation of the antitrust laws" by requiring
courts to conduct an inquiry into the reasonableness of the conduct of persons in-
volved in research and development joint ventures, rather than deeming their conduct
per se illegal).
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B. Reduction of Patent Incentives
The second anticipated objection to the proposal is that it weak-
ens the incentives underlying the patent system. Congress enacted the
patent system, so the argument goes, to promote invention and inno-
vation, and any weakening of patents-through, for example, a find-
ing that a patent-based action violates Section 2-will diminish the in-
centives that support the system. 64 Admittedly, the proposed test
could lead to a marginal reduction in the breadth of patents. But (1)
the magnitude of any such reduction would be small, and (2) there
must be some minimal reduction if any role at all is to be accorded to
antitrust in achieving innovation.
First, any reduction in patent-based incentives will be minor. The
patent itself will still be valid. The patentee can continue to enforce
the patent for the remainder of the twenty-year period against in-
fringers, can control the manner in which the patent is used, and can
license the patent. And even the imposition of remedies like com-
pulsory licensing typically still allows the patentee to recover the costs• • 366
of invention, and probably would not limit innovation. Moreover,
%4 Courts can apply the antitrust laws even if other statutes are thereby implicated.
For example, ever since the enactment of the Sherman Act, courts have considered the
validity of patent, copyright, and labor issues under the antitrust laws. See supra Part I.B
(discussing federal cases in which the courts consider the relationship between the an-
titrust laws, on the one hand, and the patent and copyright laws, on the other); see also
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975) (noting that some union-employer agreements should be granted a limited
non-statutory exemption from antitrust sanctions); Local Union No. 189, Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) ("[E]xemption for un-
ion-employer agreements is very much a matter of accommodating the coverage of the
Sherman Act to the policy of the labor laws."). Congress's intention that courts play
such an expansive role in interpreting antitrust law assuages any concern that courts
encroach on the province of the legislature in considering the applicability of other
areas of law. See supra Part lI.B.2.a (outlining the legislative history of the Sherman
Act); cf Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1818-20 (rejecting the argument that antitrust law
should yield to other overlapping statutes).
35 For a discussion of potential remedies that courts might consider upon finding
a Section 2 violation, see supra note 249.
166 Compulsory licensing was a frequently applied remedy in the 1940s and 1950s,
with 107 antitrust settlements between 1941 and 1959 calling for such licensing or
dedication of between 40,000 and 50,000 patents. Scherer, supra note 234, at 1017. In
1956 alone, IBM and AT&T were required to license more than 9,000 patents, many
royalty-free. Id. In the following decade, company-financed R&D industrial expendi-
tures grew substantially. Id. Studies from the era (and later) demonstrated that "ac-
tual or feared compulsory licensing had very little impact" on corporations' invest-
ments in new technology. Id. at 1018; see also Levin et al., supra note 282, at 804
(reporting that R&D executives "rarely judge[]" compulsory licensing to be "a signifi-
cant limit on the effectiveness of patents").
[Vol. 150:761
PA TENT-ANTITRUST PARADOX
the test will apply only to monopolists-those with at least a sixty to sev-
enty percent market share in a relevant antitrust market with barriers
to entry. Many patentees, of course, will never be subject to Section 2
because, even though they have the power to prevent others from
making, using, or selling the patented product or process, they lack
the power to exercise control over a market of goods or services that
includes the patented product. Finally, even patentee monopolists
will be penalized only if. (1) their actions make sense only by injuring
competitors, or (2) they operate in competition-based industries that
361lack innovation.
More fundamentally, antitrust cannot contribute to innovation if
every indirect manifestation of a reward of the patent system is, as a
matter of principle, off limits. This would lead us back to a test based
on the scope of the patent, which fails to recognize that, in some in-
dustries, certain exclusive activity within the scope of the patent leads
368to a smaller increase in innovation than would competition. So in
order to carve out any type of role for competition in industries in
which competition, and not patents, is critical for innovation, and in
markets in which patentees exercise monopoly power, the incentives
underlying the patent system can be marginally reduced.36q Again, this
is not a significant concern: if the objective of the patent system is to
promote invention and innovation, and there is strong evidence that
innovation is achieved in a particular industry substantially more from
competition than from patents, then there should be no quarrel with
limiting (at most) a small amount of patent-motivated innovation to
open the floodgates to a potential torrent of competition-induced in-
novation.
36 Of course, a patentee may not know ex ante if, upon the ultimate development
of the product, it will be a monopolist in a particular, to-be-defined market. The test
thus conceivably might have a chilling effect on innovation in instances in which pat-
entees refrain from innovating because of fear of antitrust liability but ultimately would
not have become monopolists or would have escaped a Section 2 violation by operat-
ing in a patent-centered industry or an industry marked by innovation. Such a conse-
quence, however, is the inevitable result of according antitrust a meaningful role to
play in achieving innovation in industries that utilize patents.
368 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing a proposed solution to the patent-antitrust con-
flict based on the scope of a patent).
Even if the plaintiff has not yet benefited from competition-based incentives
(e.g., it did not arrive in the market first), such incentives do not disappear after the
initial invention. The application of Section 2, then, particularly in industries with
cumulative innovation, would tend to keep alive these incentives.
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C. Readjustments to the Patent System
The final anticipated objection would question the need to haul
out the heavy artillery of antitrust and Section 2 of the Sherman Act
when many of the benefits could be achieved merely through read-
justments to the patent system. Certainly, one conceivable response to
the concern that different industries rely in varying levels on patents
for innovation may be to calibrate the patent reward accordingly. If
patents are not critical in an industry, then less patent protection
might make sense. One problem with such an approach is that it is
impossible to know the exact parameters of the patent grant that
would maximize-or at least substantially increase-innovation. In
industries in which patents are less critical, should the breadth of the
grant be narrowed? Should the twenty-year right to exclude be re-
duced to ten years? Five? Two? Zero? It is impossible to answer such
questions precisely.37 In fact, it is difficult to determine the overall
311net effect of the patent system on innovation and welfare today.
370 See supra note 117 (outlining the difficulties of determining the precise form of
patent system that would maximize innovation); see also Baxter, supra note 1, at 271-72
(discussing the optimal term length for patents and noting that "given the existing
state of the economic art, we cannot say how much subsidy is optimal"); Kaplow, supra
note 1, at 1824 ("[O]ur knowledge of the functional relationships... connecting pat-
ent life to social benefits remains quite limited."); Machlup, supra note 117, at 9-10
(noting that the reason for the length of patent terms "is probably more political than
economic" and that "many patent attorneys and few economists" have testified before
the legislature when it considers patent terms).
Another example of tinkering with the patent system might arise based on the ex
post effect of cumulative innovation. All we would need to do in industries character-
ized by such innovation, some might argue, is to calibrate the incentives supporting
initial and follow-on invention to maximize innovation. The more that innovation in
the industry is cumulative, the greater the incentive for follow-on innovation (and so,
perhaps, the shorter or narrower the initial patent grant should be). This is subject to
similar difficulties of measurement as the problem posed in the text: it is impractical
to divine precise characteristics of a patent grant that could structure the relationship
between initial and follow-on invention so as to maximize innovation. Moreover, the
"problem" of cumulative innovation matters most in industries in which competition is
critical to achieve innovation-where parties will compete to improve the product. So
the proposed test does not concern itself with the problem of cumulative innovation in
industries in which competition is not important for innovation. And where competi-
tion is important, we need not draw difficult divisions of reward between initial and
follow-on invention; rather, we just need to recognize a role for competition.
371 Several commentators have sharply criticized the existing patent system. Ac-
cording to one:
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with
certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a
net loss upon society. The best he can do is to state assumptions and make
guesses about the extent to which reality corresponds to these assumptions."
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Deciding whether antitrust should apply in a particular setting is
-not subject to these obstacles. The calculation that courts must make
is a binary one: does innovation develop through patents or through
competition? The test carves out a role for Section 2 in industries in
372
which innovation is achieved primarily through competition. The
exact parameters of other permutations of the patent-competition ma-
trix need not be delineated. Courts need only examine the relevant
industry and determine the primacy of competition-centered innova-
tion to decide whether to find a Section 2 violation.
More fundamentally, the proposed test incorporates more factors
than would an industry-specific recalibration of the patent system.
Such a readjustment can take place only along one dimension: strong
patents at one pole; weak (or no) patents at the other. Figure 1 de-
picts such a system graphically:
Figure 1: Criteria in an Industry-Specific Patent Recalibration:
Importance of Patents to Innovation in Various Industries
No Patent Patent
(Food Products, Metalworking, (Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals)
Automobiles, Semiconductors,
Computer Software, Internet)
At one end of the spectrum are industries in which patents are not
essential for innovation, such as food products, metalworking, auto-
mobiles, semiconductors, computer software, and the Internet. At the
other end are industries in which patents are crucial, such as chemi-1 • •373
cals and pharmaceuticals. But the grouping of industries along the
one-dimensional axis according to the importance of patents in
Machlup, supra note 117, at 79-80; see also, e.g., JOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF
INVENTION 253 (1958) ("It is almost impossible to conceive of any existing social insti-
tution so faulty in so many ways. It survives only because there seems to be nothing
better.").
372 For those industries that are characterized by innovation in roughly equal
amounts from patents and competition, courts should defer to patents. See supra notes
307-11 and accompanying text (explaining that ambiguity in applying the factors
should be resolved against a finding of Section 2 liability).
373 Figures 1 and 2 include the pharmaceutical-rather than biopharmaceutical-
industry because patents conceivably could be less critical for the latter for certain activ-
ity that occurs far upstream. For a discussion of the varying inputs to innovation in the
biotechnology industry, see supra note 278.
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achieving innovation cannot consider the role of competition. 7 4 So
the recalibration could not distinguish, for example, two industries in
which patents are not important to innovation-one in which compe-
tition is important (e.g., computer software) and one in which it is not
(e.g., food products). The patent recalibration, then, fails to recog-
nize the more important role played by the antitrust laws in fostering
competition-induced innovation in industries like the computer soft-
ware industry. The proposed test, in contrast, recognizes that the
roles played by competition and patents are independent and that
there are two axes to innovation. Figure 2 demonstrates the advan-
tages of the two-axis approach over the single-axis recalibration pre-
sented in Figure 1.
Figure 2: Criteria in Proposed Test: Importance of Patents and
Competition to Innovation in Various Industries
Competition
Patents
The above figure illustrates the roles played by patents and com-
374 Any contention that the inverse of the finding on patents equals the finding for
competition (that is, competition is not important when patents are, and vice versa) is
not persuasive since there is no reason why the contributions of patents and competi-
tion to innovation need to be mutually exclusive. For example, the fact that patents
are critical in the pharmaceutical industry tells us nothing about the importance of
competition in attaining innovation in the industry.











75 The greater the magnitudes of the inputs
76
(and further out the x- and y-axes), the more critical they are to inno-
vation.37 So the proposed test would defer to patents, by not applying
the rebuttal, in Boxes 2 and 4. In Box 4 (e.g., chemicals), deference
is mandated since patents are important and competition is not. And
in Box 2 (e.g., pharmaceuticals), even though competition is impor-
tant, courts should defer to patents so as not to interfere with the in-
centives underlying the patent system (which are important in Box 2)
and to minimize error costs.
37
8
In Box 3 (e.g., food products, metalworking), the presumption
also would carry the day: even though patents are not critical to inno-
vation, competition is not important either, so it would not be produc-
tive to apply Section 2. Only in Box 1 (e.g., automobiles, semiconduc-
tors, computer software, Internet) would the presumption be
rebutted, since innovation is achieved through competition and not
through patents.
The one-axis calculation implicit in the readjustment of the patent
laws misses the complexity and independence of the dual paths to in-
novation.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a new approach to reconcile the patent and
antitrust laws. The centerpiece of this approach is an industry-specific
analysis of innovation. Such a focus has several benefits.
First, it offers a common denominator. Innovation is the goal of
the patent system and a critical objective of the antitrust laws. By en-
deavoring to increase innovation, the proposed test promises to take
advantage of both the patent system and competition in those in-
stances in which they have the most to contribute to innovation. The
common denominator also offers courts an alternative to formalistic
375 See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the industries in the Figure. Again,
placement of industries in particular boxes in Figure 2 should be viewed as an initial
effort, subject to revision as additional studies reveal new detail concerning how inno-
vation is achieved in particular industries.
376 The inputs are determined by considering both ex ante and ex post perspec-
tives.
377 A precise spot on the axes, of course, need not be marked. Ballpark spots (or
at least placement in one of the four boxes depicted) can be ascertained and the roles
of patents and competition can be assessed independently.
378 See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text (explaining that ambiguity in
applying the factors should be resolved against a finding of Section 2 liability).
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and incomplete tests based on the scope of the patent, the intent of
the defendant, and the number of markets involved.
Second, it engages analysis at a productive, heretofore unex-
plored, level: the level of industry. Commentators have offered ap-
proaches that simultaneously (1) argue from global understandings
about the patent and antitrust systems and (2) apply on the narrow
level of particular agreements. Such analyses neglect variations
among industries and quickly bog down in impracticability.
The proposed rebuttable presumption offers a middle approach.
It recognizes that the patent and antitrust systems are not monolithic
and that innovation takes place through different paths in different
industries. Patents, for example, are critical for innovation in the
chemicals and pharmaceutical industries. Competition is essential in
industries in which network effects are significant, such as Internet
business methods and computer software. The approach recognizes
and orders the essential building blocks of the intersection that have
until now been overlooked: the presence of market-based incentives
to innovate, the ease of creating products, the difficulty of imitating
products, and the cumulative path of innovation. At the same time,
the test avoids severe administrability problems by not focusing exclu-
sively on the level of particular practices, and it forges the otherwise
impenetrable link between patentee reward and inventive activity.
Courts and commentators have struggled, unsuccessfully, with the
patent-antitrust paradox for generations. The rebuttable presumption
proposed by this Article offers a new tool with which courts can tackle
the intersection. In acknowledging the incentives underlying the pat-
ent system while simultaneously preserving a role for the antitrust
laws, the test marshals the unique contributions of both systems in the
attempt to increase innovation.
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